India is one of the world’s largest suppliers of generic medicines and APIs to Europe. If the EU begins favouring “Made in EU” pharmaceutical production through procurement preferences, subsidies or state aid, Indian drug manufacturers could face reduced access to EU public procurement contracts and tougher supply-chain resilience requirements.
India’s pharma export market has been affected as India supplies medicines to more than 200 countries. Supply chain interruption not only hurts Indian producers but also creates medicine scarcity in the US, UK, and African markets that highly depend on Indian generics. From the logistics end, re-routing of cargo away from conflict-ridden corridors such as the Red Sea and Strait of Hormuz has increased freight insurance premiums, distressing Indian exporters who function on lean cost structures.
Neutrality and balance — Colombo’s habitual vocabulary — have yielded little economic benefit. Ultimately, Sri Lanka slid into bankruptcy. Given this background, the land link is not merely a strategic starting point but a necessity. India’s strategic position on Sri Lanka is perennial; whether the bridge is built or not, India’s concerns remain fundamental. As an immediate neighbour and rising global power, India will not allow rivals to use Sri Lanka as a base.
Increased industrial activity in India could generate demand for raw materials, intermediate goods, and services from countries such as Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka. Bangladesh’s textile industry could strengthen its links with Indian manufacturing networks, while Sri Lanka may gain from expanded opportunities in tourism, logistics, and services.
ADB’s role has evolved beyond financing into shaping India’s structural transformation into a high-growth, technology-driven, and climate-conscious economy. Compared to other multilateral institutions, it offers a more agile, implementation-focused, and regionally attuned approach. As India moves toward becoming one of the world’s largest economies, this partnership will play a defining role in shaping not only India’s growth trajectory but also the broader economic future of Asia.
The days of “benign neglect” of our exchange rate policy are over. Nepal’s macroeconomic fundamentals — record reserves, stable remittance inflows, a gradually diversifying trade base — have quietly put in place the foundation for reform. What is missing is the political will to act on it.
This is why citrus should not be treated as a narrow commodity issue. It reveals a larger problem in India’s agricultural development model. India wants to move from being a large producer to becoming a reliable supplier in high-value agricultural trade. But that transition cannot happen through production alone. It requires farm-to-port systems designed around perishability.
The Andaman and Nicobar Islands offer a natural strategic advantage. Often described as “unsinkable aircraft carriers,” they provide an ideal platform for surveillance, deterrence, and force projection across the Bay of Bengal and beyond. With modern aircraft, naval assets, and refuelling capabilities, India can monitor vast maritime spaces from these islands.
The exit suits the relative aspirations of both nations. UAE with its world-class port infrastructure, financial centers, and geographical position linking Asia, Africa, and Europe, is uniquely positioned to give a push to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). This newfound independence of UAE makes it a perfect match for China’s preference for flexible bilateral relations over the rigid multilateral regional forums.
Myanmar’s unfolding reality demands a fundamental shift in how it is perceived and addressed by the international community. Treating the country as a unified state under a single authority is no longer tenable, and policies built on that assumption will continue to fall short. The challenge now lies in adapting to a fragmented political order while seeking pathways toward stability and eventual reconciliation.
The external support by China and Russia lent support to the Tatmadaw, especially during the elections, and while ASEAN and western powers have refused to accept the legitimacy of the election, many of the immediate neighbours like India, Bangladesh, and Thailand prefer what they see as stability under the military, given their cross-border concerns.
At a time when global consumers are increasingly drawn to wellness-oriented and sustainable diets, South Asian culinary traditions, particularly those rooted in India’s Ayurveda, offer significant potential. However, without institutional backing, this remains diffused cultural capital rather than strategic influence.
The China tale offers important lessons. China’s rise in the renewable sector is not just fuelled by demand for clean energy, but by a broader strategy, linking energy policy with manufacturing, technology development and global trade. India now seems to have begun taking steps in this direction. Policy measures such as the production-linked incentives scheme for solar manufacturing and efforts to expand domestic battery production are intended to strengthen the country’s clean energy ecosystem.
China’s expanding influence in Myanmar and Bangladesh does not operate in isolation. It is reinforced by Beijing’s long-standing strategic partnership with Pakistan, frequently described by both sides as an “all-weather” alliance. In recent years, Islamabad has sought to revive and expand diplomatic engagement with both Dhaka and Naypyidaw, reflecting a broader effort to re-establish its presence along the eastern arc of the Bay of Bengal. While Pakistan lacks China’s financial scale or infrastructure capacity, its diplomatic signalling complements Beijing’s presence
Officially, India maintained that no territory was lost. Strategically, however, many analysts described the situation as a shift in the status quo—an altered operational environment in which access, patrolling patterns and tactical depth were recalibrated.
India’s rise coincides with China’s structural slowdown, reshaping Asia’s strategic landscape. For Malaysia, the choice is not between India and others—but between preparing early for India’s ascent or adjusting late. Prime Minister Modi’s visit represents a strategic inflection point. Deepening ties in defence, technology, semiconductors, energy, food security, education, and culture is not merely prudent—it is foundational to Malaysia’s long-term prosperity, security, and strategic autonomy.
But in NSS 2025 the specific reference to the “Quad” appears less central as compared to its 2022 prominence. The document emphasized the allies assuming primary responsibility for their own region even as it identified the Indo-Pacific as a key economic and geopolitical battleground. It reiterates that alliances and strengthening partnerships “will be the bedrock of security and prosperity long into the future”
It’s heartening to see that China has resumed the pilgrimage of Indian pilgrims to the sacred Mount Kailash and Lake Manasarovar in Southwest China’s Xizang Autonomous Region this year after a five-year break, and India has restarted the issuance of tourist visas to Chinese citizens suspended since 2020. Recently, several direct flights between the two countries have been restored. This development is expected to strengthen exchanges in people-to-people fields, as well as in trade, culture, and other areas.
Despite China's might and backing, Gyeltsen Norbu has lacked legitimacy and following among Tibetans and Tibetan Buddhists elsewhere, and many suspect the 15th Dalai Lama appointed by Beijing will suffer the same fate. The Dalai Lama has emphasised that China must reach a resolution on the Tibetan question during his lifetime, and many fear that without his moral authority, no solution will have widespread acceptance among the Tibetan people.
