The China tale offers important lessons. China’s rise in the renewable sector is not just fuelled by demand for clean energy, but by a broader strategy, linking energy policy with manufacturing, technology development and global trade. India now seems to have begun taking steps in this direction. Policy measures such as the production-linked incentives scheme for solar manufacturing and efforts to expand domestic battery production are intended to strengthen the country’s clean energy ecosystem.

China’s expanding influence in Myanmar and Bangladesh does not operate in isolation. It is reinforced by Beijing’s long-standing strategic partnership with Pakistan, frequently described by both sides as an “all-weather” alliance. In recent years, Islamabad has sought to revive and expand diplomatic engagement with both Dhaka and Naypyidaw, reflecting a broader effort to re-establish its presence along the eastern arc of the Bay of Bengal. While Pakistan lacks China’s financial scale or infrastructure capacity, its diplomatic signalling complements Beijing’s presence

Officially, India maintained that no territory was lost. Strategically, however, many analysts described the situation as a shift in the status quo—an altered operational environment in which access, patrolling patterns and tactical depth were recalibrated.

India’s rise coincides with China’s structural slowdown, reshaping Asia’s strategic landscape. For Malaysia, the choice is not between India and others—but between preparing early for India’s ascent or adjusting late. Prime Minister Modi’s visit represents a strategic inflection point. Deepening ties in defence, technology, semiconductors, energy, food security, education, and culture is not merely prudent—it is foundational to Malaysia’s long-term prosperity, security, and strategic autonomy.

But in NSS 2025 the specific reference to the “Quad” appears less central as compared to its 2022 prominence. The document emphasized the allies assuming primary responsibility for their own region even as it identified the Indo-Pacific as a key economic and geopolitical battleground. It reiterates that alliances and strengthening partnerships “will be the bedrock of security and prosperity long into the future” 

It’s heartening to see that China has resumed the pilgrimage of Indian pilgrims to the sacred Mount Kailash and Lake Manasarovar in Southwest China’s Xizang Autonomous Region this year after a five-year break, and India has restarted the issuance of tourist visas to Chinese citizens suspended since 2020. Recently, several direct flights between the two countries have been restored. This development is expected to strengthen exchanges in people-to-people fields, as well as in trade, culture, and other areas.

Despite China's might and backing, Gyeltsen Norbu has lacked legitimacy and following among Tibetans and Tibetan Buddhists elsewhere, and many suspect the 15th Dalai Lama appointed by Beijing will suffer the same fate. The Dalai Lama has emphasised that China must reach a resolution on the Tibetan question during his lifetime,  and many fear that without his moral authority, no solution will have widespread acceptance among the Tibetan people.

In reality not much has changed, the two sides lack a clear understanding of each other and misperception, nationalism and overall strategic mistrust have become the driving force. Even after much talk of building mutual understanding, in reality the gap continues not only among the governments but also among the people. In November 2025 Prema Wangjom Thongdok, a UK-based Indian woman from Arunachal Pradesh was harassed at Shanghai airport on her way to Japan. As per reports, Chinese officials claimed that, “Arunachal is not a part of India” and that she “should apply for a Chinese passport” as she was Chinese and not Indian. 

The evolving Russia–India–China trilateral relationship presents a growing challenge to the United States and its aligned economies. More importantly, it represents a strategic opportunity for the three countries to coordinate policies, counter external economic coercion, and assert greater autonomy in pursuit of national interests. Putin’s visit to India thus goes beyond symbolism. It reflects a broader realignment in global power equations

China remains central to the 2025 NSS, particularly in the Indo-Pacific. The strategy strengthens U.S. denial capabilities along the First Island Chain, deepens integration with allies such as Japan, Australia, the Philippines and Taiwan, and increases pressure on partners to reduce economic and technological dependencies on China.

As two large maritime nations with aspirations to be global leaders, and who have also been identified as contributors to both these problems (China in both cases and India in relation to plastic pollution),  if Beijing and Delhi  are committed to equitable global governance, their actions on the ground must harmonize with their policy rhetoric. The oceans offer an opportunity to pursue their own initiatives – GGI in the case of China and the Mahasagar vision for India

The 75th anniversary of India–China relations offers a rare diplomatic opening. In a world of strategic rivalry, climate change and air pollution represent a shared threat where national interests converge. Environmental cooperation provides a low-politics entry point for rebuilding trust—through joint work on crop-residue management, high-density air-monitoring networks, and clean-energy transitions. Moreover, the Himalayan region—the planet’s “Third Pole”—is acutely vulnerable to black carbon and atmospheric pollutants from both sides of the border. Cooperation on air quality is therefore an act of Himalayan stewardship, protecting the water security of over a billion people.

At the same time, MBS has skilfully leveraged China as a strategic counterweight, signalling that any American hesitation could push Riyadh towards deeper military and technological cooperation with Beijing—an outcome the United States would prefer to avoid. China has already become Saudi Arabia’s largest trading partner, while the United States remains its primary arms supplier and security guarantor.

If Taiwan were to fall, Japan’s security architecture would be fundamentally compromised. The First Island Chain would fracture, opening a northern pathway for Beijing toward Okinawa and Kyushu. Takaichi recognised this reality and voiced what many regional strategists have long acknowledged: Japan has little choice but to act, even at the cost of Beijing’s displeasure.

While low-level clashes may continue, the possibility of a large-scale conflict, as projected by recent U.S. intelligence reports, remains far-fetched. Both countries are acutely aware that they stand to lose far more than they can gain. Despite uneasy relations, several factors actively discourage conflict