The critical mineral supply chain in the Indo-Pacific is undergoing transformative changes through new deals, reforms, and negotiations facilitated by the strategic partnership of QUAD.
The evolving Indo-Pacific strategy, led by the United States, has added a new layer of complexity to the geopolitics of the Indian Ocean. As the U.S. and its allies seek to counter China's influence in the region, India has emerged as a key partner in this strategic framework. However, this realignment has implications for regional stability, particularly for Pakistan
Quad does create an overarching arc of stability in the region, checking the expansion capacity of Beijing, which will in turn boost India’s regional ambitions that are mutually aligned with the Quad’s objectives.
Modi marked a new chapter in his strategic geopolitical moves over the past few months since the start of his third term with visits to the region and to Ukraine. All these marked a new frontier for India’s power projection while sending a clear message to allies and adversaries that New Delhi has its own bargaining chips in pursuance of its strategic neutrality while ensuring the best returns for its national security and international interests.
The critical mineral supply chain in the Indo-Pacific is undergoing transformative changes through new deals, reforms, and negotiations facilitated by the strategic partnership of QUAD.
The belligerence by the PLA also exposes the futility of continuing Corps Commander-level military-to-military talks when China has repeatedly indicated there will be no more PLA pullback.
Beijing might still use this election victory for President Tsai as a pretext to increase aggression and to justify that peaceful reunification is a lost cause, portraying the DPP as the cause of increasing cross-Strait tensions.
As traditional geopolitics transforms, with the Gulf regaining centrality in the larger Indo-Pacific arena, India, Japan, and Southeast Asia see their strategic perspectives increasingly converge. The Big-B plan has significant implications for India, Bangladesh's Look East policy, and Thailand's Look West policy.
It would be prudent to establish a joint working mechanism with Myanmar at the diplomatic and military levels for managing the borders - unless we want China to keep winning.
China and Russia have shown their support for Myanmar despite the dire situation there, and their interest in the region is evident by their growing naval presence in the Indian Ocean and Bay of Bengal.
As far as China is concerned, the so-called buffer zones are now a permanent arrangement and it knows India can do precious little about it. That is why China has been saying keep the border issue separate and get on with the bilateral relations.
Melaka is also seen as a possible counterbalancing base against potential power presence in the Nicobar Island chain in the Andaman Sea and as a fallback in complementing China's existing forward bases and port capacities in Gwadar in Pakistan and in linking up with the other routes in accessing the Indian Ocean.
The Indian government has no answer to the question that if we have not lost any territory, then why the 20 rounds of military-to-military talks?
The organisation of the Forum a few kilometres away from the eastern sector of the Line of Actual Control (LAC) not only signalled Beijing’s disregard for the LAC but also its attempt to buttress its claims over Arunachal as part of Tibet (Xizang) by selecting the venue of the international meeting in Nyingchi
The conflict of interest between India and China on the political front is likely to continue for a long time to come, with China’s territorial greed being what it is. However, business dealings between both countries must continue since such business is of mutual interest to both India and China.
India will do well to initiate the SWAMs and build a nuanced acoustic capacity and capability-building initiative nationally and at the regional level. The Security And Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR) vision of India will be better served with an effective implementation of the UDA framework on the ground.
The debt phenomenon is so significant that nearly half the African Union member states are in debt – mostly to the state-owned banks of China. Countries in South America and Asia are also being caught up in this debt slide. While the New Delhi G20 summit only appealed to countries to address this serious debt issue, that China is now being seen as a part of the problem seems to be hanging over it like a Sword of Damocles.
Given the growing power differentials and China’s global hegemonic ambitions, it is observed that Xi attends mega events where his country has some clout and skips those that could put China in a tight spot and raise questions related to its accountability and responsibility.
India is increasingly being courted by the US-led West as a bulwark to Beijing, and China will want to send a two-pronged message to Delhi and Washington as well as regional neighbours that Beijing still holds the economic and security upper hand, although its economic credentials have taken a serious hit.