Scarcity of cooking fuel is pushing people, particularly across South Asia, toward hunger. Livelihoods have been lost among the large unorganised labour force while thousands of self-employed street vendors, smaller restaurants and eateries are being forced to close shop, facing a scary, insecure future. For middle class households across India, everyday snacks like the samosa or dosa have become scarce because of shortage and high prices of cooking gas cylinders.
India is one of the world’s largest suppliers of generic medicines and APIs to Europe. If the EU begins favouring “Made in EU” pharmaceutical production through procurement preferences, subsidies or state aid, Indian drug manufacturers could face reduced access to EU public procurement contracts and tougher supply-chain resilience requirements.
India’s pharma export market has been affected as India supplies medicines to more than 200 countries. Supply chain interruption not only hurts Indian producers but also creates medicine scarcity in the US, UK, and African markets that highly depend on Indian generics. From the logistics end, re-routing of cargo away from conflict-ridden corridors such as the Red Sea and Strait of Hormuz has increased freight insurance premiums, distressing Indian exporters who function on lean cost structures.
Neutrality and balance — Colombo’s habitual vocabulary — have yielded little economic benefit. Ultimately, Sri Lanka slid into bankruptcy. Given this background, the land link is not merely a strategic starting point but a necessity. India’s strategic position on Sri Lanka is perennial; whether the bridge is built or not, India’s concerns remain fundamental. As an immediate neighbour and rising global power, India will not allow rivals to use Sri Lanka as a base.
The Indo-Pacific has indeed been relatively more stable compared to many other geopolitically contested regions. The QUAD plays a role in deterrence and in norm setting, but its impact is partial. India, through its constellation of policies—Act East, SAGAR, IPOI, MAHASAGAR, etc.—contributes significantly to that peace
The convergence of instability in Myanmar, fragility in Bangladesh, and external meddling by China and Pakistan threatens to form a volatile arc along India’s eastern flank. The challenge for New Delhi is not to pick sides in Myanmar’s internal war but to manage outcomes—to stay present, relevant, and nimble while others overreach. Because when the last ballot is counted, Myanmar will likely look the same: weary, divided, and ruled by men who mistake fear for order. The generals will call it normalcy; the world will call it tragedy.
As China continues to invest beyond what its economy can absorb, unproductive spending—much of it debt-financed—has expanded far faster than GDP. A decade ago, total debt was about twice the size of the economy; now it is roughly triple. The debt-to-GDP ratio has reached around 300 percent, alarmingly high for a developing economy.
While China’s model may not be directly replicable in a democratic setup like India, the emphasis it places on institutional adaptability, long-term strategic planning, and coordinated governance holds enduring relevance. India’s path will be different—but learning from China’s successes and failures can help shape a more inclusive, resilient, and forward-looking developmental trajectory.
Open war with India is not in China’s interest. It would jeopardize its Belt and Road Initiative, alienate global markets, and push India closer to the United States and other like-minded partners. Moreover, the Himalayan terrain offers no guarantee of quick victory. Still, China might employ limited conflicts or sudden skirmishes to test India’s resolve, create psychological pressure, or distract from internal challenges.
China’s Myanmar policy highlights a core strategic contradiction. While Beijing positions itself as a champion of peace, development, and regional connectivity, yet its explicit support for the military regime entrenches coercive rule to safeguard its strategic and economic interests.
Strategically, the display went beyond the immediate region. The unveiling of long-range nuclear platforms and hypersonic missiles positioned China as a peer competitor to the United States in global deterrence. No longer confined to regional defense, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) signaled its readiness to project power across continents.
The debate in Delhi will inevitably ask whether engagement through the SCO dilutes India’s other partnerships or rewards China without resolving the frontier. That binary misses the point. The right question is: can we turn multilateral statements into Indian payrolls while holding our security lines? The answer is yes, if we focus on execution.
While Wang Yi’s India visit and PM Modi’s upcoming China visit may signal a degree of creeping normalcy at the bilateral level, Beijing’s expanding footprint in South Asia is set to intensify regional competition, requiring careful assessment of its implications for the overall India-China relationship
Over the past decade, India’s strategic landscape has grown increasingly complex. Beijing has not diluted its consistent strategy of constraining India. Whether through deepening ties with Pakistan, or expanding influence in India’s periphery, China’s approach remains adversarial. Beijing’s assertive regional posture underscores the urgency for India to rethink both its economic and security policies.
What began with a coup in 2021 has devolved into a theater for China’s energy security, India’s border anxieties, Russia’s arms sales, and America’s China strategy. Each external actor pursues its narrow interests; none has the incentive to restore genuine stability. The losers, inevitably, are Myanmar’s people.
Chinese emperors, especially those of the Manchu-led Qing Dynasty, recognized that control over Tibetan Buddhism offered a powerful form of soft power. By leveraging religious authority, they could exert indirect political influence over Buddhist populations beyond China's borders.
Development diplomacy remains India’s strongest soft-power tool in the Indian Ocean. The contrast between India’s low-interest, grant-based infrastructure projects and China’s debt-heavy Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has not gone unnoticed. The Maldivian pivot back to India is partly driven by this contras
It risks turning a bilateral infrastructure issue into a trilateral diplomatic flashpoint, where India would have to thereafter balance its upstream anxieties with downstream responsibilities. In this context, Beijing’s growing hydrological footprint is not only being viewed as a strategic challenge in New Delhi, but also as a potential disruptor of its regional diplomacy in South Asia.
The broader strategic ramifications of the India–UK FTA are profound. It strengthens bilateral cooperation in areas such as defence, technology, renewable energy, and education, reinforcing both countries’ strategic footprints in the Indo-Pacific region.
