![The intrepid Abhilash and GGR 2022-Part IV The intrepid Abhilash and GGR 2022-Part IV](/sites/default/files/styles/large/public/2023-04/1_27.jpg?itok=OiQwTTEc)
ASEAN remains ill-equipped to handle the fallout from the tensions in the South China Sea or the potentiality of a full-blown Taiwanese conflict.
China's rising military and economic involvement in the region provides India with a strategic challenge to formulate a foreign and security policy blueprint for the Indo-Pacific.
The participation of Indo-Pacific partners in the NATO summit epitomizes the breaking of traditional geopolitical barriers, ushering in what is often referred to as "the new geometry" of international relations.
India introduced the Agnipath system of recruitment in its military, denying regular recruitment to thousands of Nepalese Gurkhas into the Indian Army, not only aggravating unemployment in Nepal, but more importantly, shattering the strong bond between the Indian and Nepalese armies.
From the Indian standpoint Prime Minister Modi may like to keep the Tibetan issue on the foreign policy agenda of his third term while dealing with a recalcitrant China. Its particular reference to the Tibetan issue remaining unresolved in accordance with international law may provide some opening to New Delhi to work on given the historical sensitivities of India's border dispute with China.
ASEAN remains ill-equipped to handle the fallout from the tensions in the South China Sea or the potentiality of a full-blown Taiwanese conflict.
Against this backdrop, India has been promoting the idea of ‘net security provider’ in South Asia and the Indian Ocean Region (IOR).
Following the attack on a mosque in Kunduz, Afghanistan on October 8, 2021, ISK confirmed the recruitment and mobilization of Uyghur fighters. This was the first time that the alliance between IS-K and Uyghurs was affirmed by IS-K on media platforms.
But New Delhi must not be complacent, because a lot more needs to be done in acquisitions and modernisation to match the much larger and more sophisticated Chinese arsenal and to raise India’s politico-diplomatic assertiveness against Beijing's muscle-flexing.
To gain a strong foothold in Sri Lanka, China used the political weakness of the Rajapaksa family to sustain its corrupt and authoritarian regime by funding its electoral campaign in order to gain a strategic advantage in the Indian Ocean Region to marginalize India and other Western countries. especially US influence in the Indo-Pacific region.
Safeguards Defenders, a Spain-based human rights NGO that first drew attention to the Chinese overseas “police stations” last year, listed operations in 30 countries in North and South Americas, Europe, Africa and Asia (but not in India or other South Asian countries).
China has blocked several times attempts to designate Pakistan-based operatives behind attacks on India as global terrorists, which would place them under international sanctions.
Viewing Bangladesh and other areas to the south as a single economic zone, Japan will build Bengal-Northeast India industrial value chain concept in cooperation with India and Bangladesh to foster the growth of the entire region.
Keeping the warfare history and strategic culture of China in the Indo-Pacific region in perspective, chances are high that there could be more short-term military clashes in the near future with India which will be more intense by nature, especially before India’s general elections in 2024, in order to influence India's political landscape and change the politico-and security architecture of the Indo-Pacific region.
Whatever has been achieved by BRO in 2022 and early 2023 is very substantial and has raised Beijing's ire much more. For India, it is imperative to continue the momentum of its long overdue building of strategic infrastructure, because a lot more needs to be done to match PLA’s buildup and deployment.
India and Japan are already cooperating on the Bay of Bengal infrastructure development through their strong regional cooperation. Among these initiatives are the construction of LNG infrastructure in Sri Lanka, the building of pipelines and electrification in Myanmar, and the improvement of Bangladesh's road network.
This agreement has profound geo-strategic implications against the backdrop of the US-China maritime battle in the Indo-Pacific region. It will not only add fuel to the fire of their strategic competition but also result in the growing militarization of the strategic region amid the Taiwan crisis.
Unlike the US and Western countries, or even Myanmar's fellow members of the ASEAN, Beijing has refused to condemn the military junta enabling it to play a role in diplomacy with Bangladesh on the Rohingya and with the internal insurgencies.
As Beijing midwives a multipolar world as an alternative to the world order dominated by the US, there are many issues that stand in the way. They include simmering border disputes with India and its aggressive behaviour along the Line of Actual Control, its claims on the Japanese islands of Senkaku, and the dispute over the Spratly Islands that involve the Philippines, Taiwan, Malaysia, Vietnam, and Brunei. Above all is its menacing posture towards Taiwan.
AUKUS remains a symbol of a clear message to Beijing, and regional players, as a powerful deterrence to step up militarily if necessary; and remains a crucially needed counterbalancing measure that will bring assurances and guarantee that the West’s pivot and readiness to maintain its Indo-Pacific presence are here to stay.