India possesses immense talent, entrepreneurial capacity, and a large domestic market, yet it still lacks sufficient depth in high-end manufacturing, research and development, semiconductor ecosystems, advanced engineering, and globally dominant product companies.
One of the most striking features of South Asian trade is how little the region trades internally. Intra-regional trade within South Asia remains among the lowest in the world relative to geographic proximity. Political tensions — especially between India and Pakistan — have prevented the emergence of a deeply integrated regional production system comparable to ASEAN or the European Union. This is a major missed opportunity.
Scarcity of cooking fuel is pushing people, particularly across South Asia, toward hunger. Livelihoods have been lost among the large unorganised labour force while thousands of self-employed street vendors, smaller restaurants and eateries are being forced to close shop, facing a scary, insecure future. For middle class households across India, everyday snacks like the samosa or dosa have become scarce because of shortage and high prices of cooking gas cylinders.
India is one of the world’s largest suppliers of generic medicines and APIs to Europe. If the EU begins favouring “Made in EU” pharmaceutical production through procurement preferences, subsidies or state aid, Indian drug manufacturers could face reduced access to EU public procurement contracts and tougher supply-chain resilience requirements.
It risks turning a bilateral infrastructure issue into a trilateral diplomatic flashpoint, where India would have to thereafter balance its upstream anxieties with downstream responsibilities. In this context, Beijing’s growing hydrological footprint is not only being viewed as a strategic challenge in New Delhi, but also as a potential disruptor of its regional diplomacy in South Asia.
The broader strategic ramifications of the India–UK FTA are profound. It strengthens bilateral cooperation in areas such as defence, technology, renewable energy, and education, reinforcing both countries’ strategic footprints in the Indo-Pacific region.
China’s presence in South Asia has expanded considerably since the launch of the BRI in 2013. Beyond trade and infrastructure, it has emerged as a provider of military hardware and a key influencer in education, media, and policy discourse. China's outreach in smaller South Asian countries is multifaceted, ranging from party-to-party diplomacy to soft power tools like Buddhist cultural ties and influence operations.
In a media interview, Khandu strongly refuted Beijing’s territorial claims and emphasized Arunachal’s historical relationship with Tibet, a nation forcibly occupied by China in the 1950s. He pointed out that Arunachal Pradesh shares roughly 1,200 km of border with Tibet, around 100 km with Bhutan, and 550 km with Myanmar. His remarks were a pointed rebuttal to China’s repeated claims over Arunachal Pradesh, including renaming it as “Zangnan” or “South Tibet.”
The Tibetan diaspora must now take the lead in mobilizing global opinion. The Dalai Lama has issued a clarion call — not only to uphold Tibet’s spiritual and cultural values, but to defend the right of a people to decide their own destiny.
There are multiple reasons why the MEA doesn’t dare to say “no one except Dalai Lama can decide his successor”, some of which could include External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar fears getting snubbed during his coming visit to Beijing
China’s strategy for building a regional order in Central Asia converges with its playbook in sub-regions across the Global South, like Latin America, Africa and South Asia. The substance and optics of its Latin America Summit and Xi Jinping’s tour of Southeast Asia in the last few months reflect this strategy.
Contrary to the longstanding popular expectation that the Dalai Lama could announce an interim successor until a reincarnation is determined after his death, he has chosen the option that sets the stage for a long-term conflict between Beijing and the institution of the Dalai Lama. It is clear now that the next Dalai Lama will be from outside China and Tibet.
While SCO saw ministers invoke "mutual trust" and “overall development” in public, Chinese actions reveal a twin-track approach toward India—maintaining diplomatic channels and economic engagement in public, while simultaneously tightening its grip on sectors where India remains dependent.
China's geographic proximity and growing power remain the core reasons ASEAN clings to its long-standing hedging and neutrality strategy. Fear of retaliation—whether economic or military—has deterred ASEAN from adopting a firm position against Beijing, which could compromise the region’s economic survival.
The Chinese making inroads into Pakistan for a while now may also be a significant factor behind President Donald Trump not taking an unambiguously supportive position towards India. Trump’s comments have been calibrated to achieve equivalence between India and Pakistan and quite strikingly handed Islamabad some bragging rights by offering to intervene in resolving the Kashmir issue.
Over the past 40 years, the U.S. has transitioned from an industrial to a consumption-driven economy. Manufacturing, which contributed about 25% to GDP in 1970, now accounts for just 10%. The outsourcing of production to China, Mexico, Vietnam, and others has led to the loss of nearly 5 million factory jobs between 2000 and 2020 alone.
A landmark event in 2023 was the MoU with Japan’s Rapidus Corporation to establish semiconductor manufacturing in India. Backed by Japanese giants like Sony, Toyota, Kioxia, NEC, NTT, and MUFG Bank, this move could be a game-changer for India’s electronics ecosystem, which currently lacks indigenous chip production.
The Pahalgam tragedy, coupled with Pakistan’s public admission of its role in fostering terrorism, presents such a moment. China must rise to the occasion—not by choosing sides, but by choosing peace. It must move from silence to strategy, and from passive balancing to active peace-building.
In this context—marked by fresh US scrutiny of tariff offenders—India has a unique opportunity to step in as a more reliable and less controversial partner for the US in supply chain manufacturing. A complementary—not adversarial—partnership with China could also benefit India in tapping the US market, especially since India has incurred a relatively lower tariff increase of 27 percent
