Despite ASEAN's growing efforts to diversify its economic and strategic alignments towards BRICS, the GCC, and other parts of the Global South—including deepening dependence on China—this remains a self-fulfilling utopian belief. It ignores current and emerging realities where power parity and long-term influence are still dominated by the United States.

Without the capacity for credible self-defence, ASEAN remains reliant on the US security umbrella. As long as this dependency endures, ASEAN's aspiration for centrality and non-alignment—hoping to extract benefits from both China and the West—remains unrealistic.

ASEAN is increasingly vulnerable to external shocks after decades of comfortably riding on Washington’s strategic support. Leaders in the region are aware that this void cannot be easily filled by China, despite Beijing’s rise as a major economic partner and supplier of capital and resources.

This reality has left ASEAN walking a diplomatic tightrope: cautious not to provoke either Washington—or a possibly returning Trump administration—or Beijing.

China’s Grip: Strategic Dilemma for ASEAN

China's geographic proximity and growing power remain the core reasons ASEAN clings to its long-standing hedging and neutrality strategy. Fear of retaliation—whether economic or military—has deterred ASEAN from adopting a firm position against Beijing, which could compromise the region’s economic survival.

But this model is fast becoming outdated. China’s economic slowdown, demographic decline, and looming domestic troubles signal a reduced capacity to provide ASEAN the "safe economic haven" it once did. This weakens Beijing’s leverage and could erode the economic fear factor that has kept ASEAN diplomatically cautious.

US Retains Strategic Superiority

By 2050, the balance of power among Beijing, Washington, and ASEAN will heavily favour the United States. America will enjoy advantages in youthful demographics, military power, innovation, and technological leadership. In contrast, China will grow old before it grows rich, while ASEAN’s own demographic dividend will plateau.

ASEAN's collective economic weight remains modest: its average per capita income is only $5,300, and its combined GDP of $4 trillion is roughly equivalent to what the US imports in a single year. Internal divisions—political, economic, and geographical—continue to limit ASEAN’s capacity to act as a unified strategic or economic bloc.

Similarly, China’s economic structure, with high savings, low domestic consumption, and dependency on exports, means it too will remain tied to the US-led global financial system for the foreseeable future. Neither BRICS nor other Global South alliances can match the scale, depth, and innovation ecosystem of the US.

Even maintaining neutrality will not shield ASEAN from future conflicts. Lacking strong collective defence and contingency plans, the region risks becoming a strategic pawn or battlefield, with individual member states potentially breaking ranks to secure their own survival.

South China Sea: Beijing’s Leverage Point

Beijing’s intensified focus on the South China Sea reflects its long-term ambitions—not just territorial, but also aimed at Taiwan and broader Pacific influence. Control of this crucial maritime corridor enables China to restrict the inflow of Western naval power in the event of a Taiwan conflict and to extend its strategic deterrence via submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) capable of targeting Alaska.

China’s push to dominate the First and Second Island Chains as part of its anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) strategy underlines the importance of the South China Sea as a secondary front in any potential Taiwan conflict. In such a scenario, ASEAN’s neutrality and regional agreements—like the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ), and the Code of Conduct (CoC)—would likely become irrelevant.

With no credible first- or second-strike capabilities in a high-intensity conflict, ASEAN will remain dependent on external military powers to safeguard its peace and security.

Time for ASEAN to Get Real

ASEAN’s complacency in building a credible, modern collective defence force leaves the region vulnerable to exploitation. China is poised to capitalise on this weakness—through both military and non-military means—to diminish US influence and solidify its own grip over the region.

To reduce this risk, ASEAN must:

• Enhance military and non-military interoperability with Western forces.

• Improve docking, resupply, and logistical support for friendly external powers.

• Significantly raise defence budgets and investment in emerging warfare capabilities—drones, space, cyber, quantum, and nanotechnology.

Without meaningful upgrades in these areas, ASEAN will find itself isolated and unprepared when geopolitical crises—like a Taiwan conflict—erupt.

Efforts to revive SEATO-like pacts or form an "Asian NATO" will remain ineffective as long as fear of Chinese retaliation dictates regional behaviour. However, quiet moves to embrace AUKUS, Quad, and new "Squad" initiatives, along with individual defence partnerships, signal a slow but necessary shift.

For ASEAN to stay relevant, it must move beyond its outdated hedging playbook and engage realistically with the West—particularly the United States—as its indispensable security partner.

(The author is a Kuala Lumpur-based strategic and security analyst. Views expressed are personal. He can be contacted at collins@um.edu.my)