Hopes for Sino-Indian relations centre on a cautious diplomatic thaw, institutionalised border stability and renewed high-level engagement. Indian negotiators and defence planners are well aware that “trust must be verified”. While the activation of these eight points provides valuable channels to prevent an accidental kinetic clash on the ground, the real test of China’s sincerity will not be the joint statements signed in Beijing, but whether it ceases infrastructure build-ups and respects the historical patrolling rights of Indian troops along the LAC.
By removing the ‘Indo’ prefix from Indo-Pacific the US implicitly acknowledges that it no longer unilaterally defines the eastern strategic landscape. Regional organisations like BRICS continue to redefine the lexicon of ‘rules-based order’ to insulate themselves from western domination.
The bilateral discussion between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping on the sidelines of the 18th BRICS Summit indicates surge in mutual ties, particularly by way of trade. However, little can be expected by way of full settlement of the boundary dispute.
The timing of the EU announcement coincided with the BRICS+ Summit in New Delhi, creating speculation about whether the EU was seeking to reinforce its strategic engagement with India amid the growing influence of the BRICS grouping.
Abbottabad itself is symbolic. Just 30 miles north of Islamabad, along the historic Karakoram Highway, it is home to Pakistan’s premier military academy. For bin Laden to live there undetected is not simply a mystery—it is a reminder of the uncomfortable realities of counterterrorism
Amid strategic challenges from Beijing in Bangladesh, New Delhi cannot separate border management with foreign policy. New Delhi should hold high-level dialogue with Dhaka and develop a cooperative roadmap to facilitate the identification and repatriation of undocumented migrants from India.
The visit therefore should not be viewed simply as another bilateral defence engagement. It represents an attempt by New Delhi to institutionalise India's security relationship with Sri Lanka, while simultaneously reassuring Colombo that India's expanding security interests need not threaten Sri Lankan sovereignty.
Belgium views India as an opportunity to reduce its economic dependence on China and limit vulnerability to developments in the United States. India offers scale, growth, industrial capacity and ambition, while Belgium offers technology, specialised expertise, logistics and access to the European market.
India has its own legacy of maternal peacebuilding, from Jijabai to the Meira Paibi. What we lack is the language to celebrate and institutionalize these contributions. Recognizing mothers as peacebuilders is not just a cultural insight; it is a practical necessity for societies striving for harmony.
The numerical divide between the two camps is widening significantly, in favour of the West. The Artemis Accords added 19 nations in 2024, and 7 in 2025; and has already added 12 signatories in 2026 so far. By contrast, the ILRS has expanded at a much slower, tightly controlled pace. It counts 13 sovereign nations as members.
The timing of the present diplomatic initiative is also noteworthy. Ajit Doval’s visit to Beijing comes ahead of the BRICS Summit in New Delhi and could create space for political direction at the highest level, including a possible meeting between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Xi Jinping.
This is the futility that must be highlighted. India's moral voice is heard politely but it does not stop missiles. The declaration itself is telling - it condemns strikes on Iran, but contains zero mention of Russia's war, because Moscow would veto it. In summary, Nonalignment 2.0 can inhibit the SCO from becoming anti-West or a China-led grouping but it cannot make Russia end a war Moscow intends to win.
This raises an interesting question: what if Russia, India and China were to substantially deepen their strategic cooperation? Such cooperation, supported by other BRICS members and partners, could create a formidable economic and geopolitical grouping.
Amid concerns regarding U.S. reliability on trade and defence commitments under the current White House, both India and Japan are leaning on each other to build supply chain and economic resilience—acting as a pragmatic "middle power" buffer rather than purely relying on Washington.
For decades, Europe generally followed Washington when American and European strategic interests broadly coincided. Iran exposes what happens when they do not. Europe still needs the United States for security—but increasingly wants to retain the right to say: “We share your objective, but we do not necessarily accept your method.”
Rather than relying solely on high-level political rhetoric, India can employ a combination of economic diplomacy, institutional de-escalation, water-sharing agreements, and people-to-people engagement to rebuild trust and stabilize relations with Bangladesh.
The Wakhan Corridor has become a possible trade road for China's economic expansion. The corridor provides China with strategic advantages. First, it offers potential overland access to Afghanistan and on to Pakistan and the Arabian Sea
Before the mid-2020s, Iran lacked the specific low-cost tactical capability (drones, missiles and tech int) required to hold SoH against the US military. Today, the newly acquired capabilities allow Iran to enforce an effective, sustainable, and lethal denial-of-access corridor at a much lower cost.
China’s growing influence on small countries thus extends far beyond trade and infrastructure. It shapes debates on governance, challenges democratic norms, and pressures sovereign states to align with Beijing’s priorities. For nations like Sri Lanka and Nepal, the dilemma is stark
