Belgium views India as an opportunity to reduce its economic dependence on China and limit vulnerability to developments in the United States. India offers scale, growth, industrial capacity and ambition, while Belgium offers technology, specialised expertise, logistics and access to the European market.
India has its own legacy of maternal peacebuilding, from Jijabai to the Meira Paibi. What we lack is the language to celebrate and institutionalize these contributions. Recognizing mothers as peacebuilders is not just a cultural insight; it is a practical necessity for societies striving for harmony.
The numerical divide between the two camps is widening significantly, in favour of the West. The Artemis Accords added 19 nations in 2024, and 7 in 2025; and has already added 12 signatories in 2026 so far. By contrast, the ILRS has expanded at a much slower, tightly controlled pace. It counts 13 sovereign nations as members.
The timing of the present diplomatic initiative is also noteworthy. Ajit Doval’s visit to Beijing comes ahead of the BRICS Summit in New Delhi and could create space for political direction at the highest level, including a possible meeting between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Xi Jinping.
This is the futility that must be highlighted. India's moral voice is heard politely but it does not stop missiles. The declaration itself is telling - it condemns strikes on Iran, but contains zero mention of Russia's war, because Moscow would veto it. In summary, Nonalignment 2.0 can inhibit the SCO from becoming anti-West or a China-led grouping but it cannot make Russia end a war Moscow intends to win.
This raises an interesting question: what if Russia, India and China were to substantially deepen their strategic cooperation? Such cooperation, supported by other BRICS members and partners, could create a formidable economic and geopolitical grouping.
Amid concerns regarding U.S. reliability on trade and defence commitments under the current White House, both India and Japan are leaning on each other to build supply chain and economic resilience—acting as a pragmatic "middle power" buffer rather than purely relying on Washington.
For decades, Europe generally followed Washington when American and European strategic interests broadly coincided. Iran exposes what happens when they do not. Europe still needs the United States for security—but increasingly wants to retain the right to say: “We share your objective, but we do not necessarily accept your method.”
Rather than relying solely on high-level political rhetoric, India can employ a combination of economic diplomacy, institutional de-escalation, water-sharing agreements, and people-to-people engagement to rebuild trust and stabilize relations with Bangladesh.
The Wakhan Corridor has become a possible trade road for China's economic expansion. The corridor provides China with strategic advantages. First, it offers potential overland access to Afghanistan and on to Pakistan and the Arabian Sea
Before the mid-2020s, Iran lacked the specific low-cost tactical capability (drones, missiles and tech int) required to hold SoH against the US military. Today, the newly acquired capabilities allow Iran to enforce an effective, sustainable, and lethal denial-of-access corridor at a much lower cost.
China’s growing influence on small countries thus extends far beyond trade and infrastructure. It shapes debates on governance, challenges democratic norms, and pressures sovereign states to align with Beijing’s priorities. For nations like Sri Lanka and Nepal, the dilemma is stark
Here is something that is perhaps not widely reported. According to this account, Iranian forces were able to destroy a significant part of the logistics infrastructure supporting these large carrier operations. They struck the central logistics hub in Bahrain very early in the conflict.
Bangladesh's Prime Minister need not visit India simply to keep relations cordial, but when engagement can advance its interests, refusing engagement becomes a cost of its own. The objective should be to preserve leverage through engagement, not to mistake rigidity for leverage.
However, the political situation has gradually begun to show currents that may move against Munir. The Supreme Court of Pakistan’s order to shift former Pakistan Prime Minister Imran Khan, Munir’s arch-rival, to a private hospital and the statement by the US Ambassador to India, Sergio Gor affirming that J&K is "an important part of India", reinforces the impression of classic temporariness and limited strategic relevance of Pakistan in US-Pak relations.
New Delhi’s official response has been measured, almost pointedly so, a statement that India is “looking into the implications” rather than any dramatic condemnation. That restraint is wise, and should be read as strength rather than uncertainty. India’s ties with Saudi Arabia are too economically consequential, too carefully cultivated over the past decade, for Riyadh to jeopardize them by handing Pakistan a blank check.
The vulnerability for India lies in the asymmetry of technological readiness and the aggressive sub-surface mapping being conducted by external actors, most notably China. Beijing has been able to resource its scientific research vessels, oceanographic mapping devices, and supposed civilian ocean surveys to map the bathymetry and mineral content of the Indian Ocean Region systematically.
China’s growing influence in Sri Lanka is an immediate concern for India as the resident power in the region, but it is also a global concern for the United States.
The Indian government is caught in a bind. Despite the BNP government’s outrage, for Delhi to hasten Hasina’s extradition is not an option.
