Mohammed Muizzu’s convincing electoral victory (54% votes) on an openly ‘India out’ campaign has shaken up New Delhi’s strategic and intelligence community, which had for years taken the Maldives relationship for granted and, consequently, misread political signals and shifting public sentiments. In popular and official perception, the Maldives is thought of only as a small idyllic island country blessed with natural beauty that was a haven for tourists and rich Indians, and dependent on India.

To be fair, at a purely government-to-government level, New Delhi and Male have enjoyed warm and friendly relations over several decades. India had consistently reached out to the Maldives. During the pandemic, Maldives was a priority beneficiary of vaccines and medical support from New Delhi. Maldivians flocked in large numbers to India for education and professional training. Male’s first and biggest government hospital was a gift from India. Keeping the climate change concerns of the Maldives in mind, Indian negotiators have consistently ensured that Maldivian interests are not lost sight of. 

In 1988, when there was a coup attempt to overthrow the then-president Maumoon Abdul Gayoom, he reached out to India (Operation Cactus). India stationed two helicopters and a Dornier aircraft on request from the Maldivian government to provide for medical evacuation, and search and rescue operations. The list can be expanded to reflect several actions by New Delhi in support of and response to Male’s requests.

Despite this, anti-India sentiment appeared to be growing in the island country that strategists failed to fully appreciate the depth and intensity of, even though it directly threatened India’s critical strategic interests.

Misreading of Male sentiments

Male’s wooing of China, especially during the Yameen tenure, was meant to aggravate India. New Delhi patronizingly dismissed it as an irritant and an aberration. Yameen’s arrest and imprisonment on corruption charges was viewed as vindication that Yameen’s pro-Beijing policies had been rejected and had few takers, if any. President Solih’s pro-India stance reinforced the view that New Delhi had nothing to fear and that the Maldives was firmly in its camp.

Perhaps the biggest misreading was of the resentment openly expressed through demonstrations outside the Indian embassy when it celebrated Yoga Day. Maldivians are intolerant of other religions. Former president Gayoom had once directed that no religion, other than Islam, should be permitted in the Maldives. The celebration of Yoga Day was, consequently, seen as being openly hostile and anti-Islam. Muizzu, a deeply devout Muslim, took advantage of this and knew he would find support among the many practicing Muslims in the Maldives. A reading of the election results shows that India was seen as a potential threat to Islam and needed to be distanced.

Muizzu was also confident that India’s reaction would be predictable because New Delhi adhered to the norms and tenets of diplomacy, unlike Beijing. Indeed, if China were its neighbour, instead of India, anti-China posturing would have seen a quick response through a military invasion and the possible annexation of the Maldives, despite the 1887 protection agreement Maldives has with the UK. New Delhi, on the other hand, in keeping with the traditions of democracy, would respect the will of the Maldivian people, even though it found the current developments unfairly confronting and deeply disturbing. Quiet and persuasive diplomacy has been a hallmark of Indian foreign policy and Muizzu took advantage of that.

What is particularly alarming is the absolute temerity with which three of Muizzu’s deputy ministers felt emboldened enough to make derogatory remarks against none other than Prime Minister Narendra Modi himself. This was unprecedented. While the ministers were quickly suspended, following protests from the Indian embassy, it was also a clear indication that Muizzu’s supporters had no hesitation in openly voicing their anti-India and hostile sentiments. The unnecessary statements by social celebrities and film actors from India only added fuel to the fire.  

Challenge to win back trust

The Maldives has undergone a radical transformation. To see this as playing the India or China card would be a miscalculation. Indeed, the strategic narrative of what is going on is very different. It may be recalled that to ensure security and avoid being caught in a tug-of-war between Beijing and New Delhi, Solih decided to play for higher stakes by wooing the international community. Muizu will do the same and the Maldives will punch above its weight.

Consider, for instance, that only a handful of countries presently have a diplomatic presence in Male, India included. While China engages the Maldives through its embassy in Colombo, it is widely believed that the US is proposing to open an embassy in Male, which would trigger similar interest from other Western powers, especially Washington’s allies. This might well result in the emergence of the Maldives as a strategic player in the geopolitical landscape with different rivalries vying for their attention and more importantly, space. For India, this cannot be good news, especially with Kathmandu, Colombo and Dhaka not averse to Chinese presence. Indeed, it would be yet another encroachment in India’s sphere of influence triggering a ‘great game’ type of scenario.

The neighbourhood has been a matter of concern and priority focus for Indian foreign and security policy. Muizzu’s frostiness towards India is, undoubtedly, a setback for New Delhi. This is, however, the time for quiet diplomacy and a consistent process of reaching out to the government and people to allay fears and to help Maldivians realize that India has been a long and trusted ally. The process will be slow and painstaking. Given the genuineness with which India has always responded to Male, it is not impossible to win back trust.

(The author is a former Indian diplomat. Views are personal.)