There is much more in common between Afghanistan and Pakistan than there is in dissociation. Both countries share a 2,400 km border, as well as common cultural, and religious ties. Despite these similarities, the relationship between the two countries has always been unfriendly. The roots of this uneasy relationship go back to disputes over the Pashtunistan issue, Durand Line, and Kabul’s close relations with New Delhi, which Pakistan has always perceived as a threat.

After the creation of Pakistan, Afghanistan rulers avoided recognizing the Durand Line as an international border between the two countries. Meanwhile, they provided shelter to Pashtun nationalists and Baloch separatists on Afghanistan soil. Consequently, this policy led to several border clashes, suspension of diplomatic relations, and border closures by Pakistan, actions that proved disastrous for Afghanistan due to its dependency on Pakistan for exports and imports.

This policy continued until the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. After 1979, a large number of Afghanistan citizens, particularly Islamists, fled to neighboring countries, especially Pakistan and Iran. Those who fled to Pakistan were mobilized by the Pakistani military establishment and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), with the support of Western countries, to wage jihad against the Soviet forces in Afghanistan and the pro-Soviet regime in Kabul. This period marked a turning point in Pakistan’s policy toward Afghanistan.

Pakistan's Changed Stance

Before the Soviet invasion, Pakistan was in a weak position and therefore interested in resolving all its disputes with Afghanistan through negotiation, as well as ending the Balochi and Pashtun separatist threats within its territory. However, the invasion not only caused instability in Afghanistan but also provided an extraordinary opportunity for the Pakistani military and intelligence agencies to use the situation in line with their own interests. From that point on, Pakistan mobilized, equipped, and trained Afghan Mujahideen, allowing them to cross the border into Afghanistan territory to wage war against the Soviets. Likewise, after the Soviet withdrawal and the overthrow of the pro-Soviet regime, Pakistan supported Hizb-e-Islami (Hekmatyar) to prevent the consolidation of the Mujahideen government and later extended its support to the Taliban movement.

This policy gave the Pakistani military establishment an upper hand inside Afghanistan. From that time to the present, Pakistan has used all its influence to prevent the establishment of a stable government in Kabul. Pakistan believes that a strong and stable government in Afghanistan is not in its interest. Pakistani policymakers fear that the establishment of such a government could lead to a repeat of history, with Afghan rulers potentially resuming support for separatist movements and insurgencies in Pakistan. On this basis, they have suggested that Pakistan should use all its leverage in Afghanistan to prevent the emergence of a stable government. 

Another justification is that a stable government in Kabul could foster a strong Kabul-Delhi nexus, which Pakistan perceives as a threat to its territorial integrity. However, over the past four decades, while Pakistan has succeeded in eliminating safe havens for Balochi separatists and Pashtun nationalists on Afghanistan soil, concerns about the Kabul-Delhi nexus, Tahreek Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the Durand Line remain unresolved. Even the recent clashes between the Taliban and Pakistan were over these very issues.

Chronologically, the dispute between Pakistan and India dates back to the time of partition. Following the division of the subcontinent into two nation-states, both newly formed countries (Pakistan and India) claimed control over Kashmir. Consequently, they fought several wars to assert their dominance over the region. This longstanding conflict has fuelled rivalry between the two states.

Due to their dispute over Kashmir, both countries have extended their rivalry to other parts of South Asia. One key arena of this rivalry is Afghanistan. Experts believe that competing in Afghanistan allows both nuclear powers to avoid direct conflict. Consequently, India and Pakistan are both interested in establishing influence over Afghanistan. In pursuing control, both adopt a zero-sum approach. India fears that Pakistan’s influence in Afghanistan could create safe havens for anti-India elements such as Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad. Pakistan fears that India’s presence in Afghanistan could lead to its encirclement and threaten security along its northwestern borders. Additionally, Pakistan perceives the so-called Kabul-Delhi nexus as a threat to its territorial integrity.

Kabul's Options

To avoid this competition, Afghanistan needs to adopt a policy based on its own national interests, guided by rationality rather than sentiment. Pakistan is its immediate neighbor, while India is its extended neighbor. Considering this, Afghanistan policymakers should determine which strategic relationship best serves Afghanistan’s interests and which country can contribute in establishing peace and stability in the country. The former Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (2001–2021) attempted a policy of neutrality toward both rivals to keep Afghanistan out of their rivalry but ultimately failed. Nevertheless, a neutrality policy alone cannot solve Afghanistan’s challenges. Afghanistan's strategic location in the region inevitably places it at the centre of regional power dynamics, making it difficult to maintain a perfect balance. Therefore, it is logical that Afghanistan must make a choice. This choice should be based on rational assessment rather than nationalistic sentiment. Policymakers should carefully evaluate the actual potential of India and Pakistan in the country, observing which country is capable of fostering stability and which may contribute to instability.

Every country has national security concerns, and to address these concerns, they are often willing to make significant sacrifices. Pakistan, too, has its own security concerns, one of the main ones being India’s influence in Afghanistan. Pakistan does not want India to establish a strong presence in the country. In contrast, Afghanistan has historically pursued a pro-India policy, which has consistently provoked Pakistan to adopt destructive strategies against it. The past 40 years of war, instability, mass migration, and regime changes in Afghanistan illustrate the consequences of failing to reach an understanding with Pakistan.

Considering this, Afghanistan has two options in its relationship with Pakistan. The first is to reach an understanding with Pakistan, addressing key issues such as the border dispute, insurgency, and the level of Afghanistan’s engagement with India. The second option is to continue a pro-India policy to counterbalance Pakistan’s influence in Afghanistan. However, failing to reach an understanding with Pakistan is likely to keep Afghanistan in a state of turmoil and instability.

(The author is a Ph.D Scholar from Afghanistan studying at the Department of Defence and National Security Studies, Panjab University, Chandigarh. Views are personal. He can be contacted at zahidaria12@gmail.com )