Bangladesh’s ongoing crisis—sparked by student protests and deepened by military intervention—marks one of the country’s most significant democratic regressions toward a praetorian state since the 1980s. The student protests of July 2024, triggered by a 30% job quota for descendants of 1971 freedom fighters—seen by many as favoritism towards Awami League loyalists—ignited widespread unrest. Authoritarian governance only added fuel to the fire, leading to mass protests, injuries, and deaths.

In this context, the military forced Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina to resign and go into exile. In August 2024, an interim government under Nobel Laureate Muhammad Yunus was installed—signaling Bangladesh’s slide toward praetorianism, where the military holds disproportionate sway over civilian affairs.

Now, not just political parties, but civil society, teachers, students, and notably the military, are pressuring the Yunus regime. Key demands include a time-bound election by December 2025. The military, in particular, has opposed initiatives like the Bangladesh-Myanmar Humanitarian Corridor and has issued firm warnings against any interference in military affairs or institutional restructuring.

This convergence of demands amid the political crisis has exposed deep fault lines in Bangladesh’s democracy, reinforcing concerns over the military’s expanding role in governance. Such developments indicate a classic praetorian environment—wherein the military dominates political discourse and weakens civilian authority.

The Praetorian Slide

The current crisis is not an isolated episode but part of an ongoing pattern, suggesting that Bangladesh may be veering toward militarized governance. This trajectory became clearer with Sheikh Hasina’s resignation and exile on August 5, 2024.

Parliament Speaker Shirin Sharmin Chaudhury reportedly advised Prime Minister Hasina to step down due to rising threats to her safety amid protests. However, Hasina and her party leaders resisted. According to India Today and The Economic Times, army officials confronted her, demanding resignation, to which she defiantly responded, “Shoot me and bury me in Bangabhaban (President’s House).”

The interim government that followed was engineered by the military under General Waker-uz-Zaman, with Muhammad Yunus appointed as its advisor through negotiations involving military officers, student leaders, and the president—an arrangement that underlined the military’s central role.

Bangladesh's political history is replete with similar episodes of military intervention. It began with the 1975 coup that assassinated Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and continued with the 1981 assassination of President Ziaur Rahman and General Hussain Muhammad Ershad’s bloodless coup in 1982. A military-backed caretaker government in 2007 was formed in response to political gridlock and unrest between the Awami League (AL) and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), leading to credible elections in 2008.

Even in 2012, a foiled coup attempt—rooted in opposition to the government's secular and India-friendly stance—highlighted lingering military ambitions. The Guardian reported that this plan was thwarted before execution and lacked widespread support within the army. In short, military interventions have been a recurring theme whenever civilian governance falters.

Institutional Weaknesses 

The erosion of democratic institutions has created a vacuum ripe for military dominance. The Awami League’s electoral victories in 2018 and 2024 were marred by allegations of vote rigging, opposition suppression, and BNP boycotts. The caretaker government system, introduced through the 13th Amendment in 1996 to ensure free and fair elections, was scrapped in 2011 via the 15th Amendment—passed unilaterally by the AL. While the military had no direct role in this constitutional change, its long-term impact has been the weakening of electoral integrity and civilian oversight.

Some scholars argue that the Yunus-led interim government represents a democratic reset driven by student-led demands for reform. Others view the military’s role as a necessary response to political paralysis. However, these interpretations often overlook the military’s historical tendency to expand its influence during crises.

The appointment of Yunus under military pressure, and decisions like demanding an election timeline, opposing humanitarian efforts, resisting institutional reforms, and retaining President Shahabuddin, all signal military overreach. The Awami League’s banning and criticisms around the release of alleged mutineers further underscore the army’s interference in civilian affairs.

Tipping Point

Bangladesh’s 2024 crisis has significantly strained civil-military relations. The military’s instrumental role in ousting Hasina and installing the interim government has amplified concerns of a deepening praetorian drift. As Yunus’s control weakens amid economic turmoil, law-and-order issues, and geopolitical friction, the military appears increasingly assertive—opposing civilian initiatives and resisting reforms. Historical coups and interventions only exacerbate fears that Bangladesh could again succumb to overt military rule.

To reverse this trend, both civilian and military leaders must recalibrate their relationship. Restoring civilian supremacy requires urgent electoral reforms, revitalization of democratic institutions, and curbing the military’s political influence. Without decisive corrective action, Bangladesh risks entrenching a praetorian state structure—one where democracy is perpetually subordinated to military might.

(Prof. Bawa Singh is with the Department of South and Central Asian Studies, Central University of Punjab, Bathinda. Jay Koche is a Ph.D. scholar in the same department. Views are personal. They can be contacted at bawasingh73@gmail.com)