Melaka is also seen as a possible counterbalancing base against potential power presence in the Nicobar Island chain in the Andaman Sea and as a fallback in complementing China's existing forward bases and port capacities in Gwadar in Pakistan and in linking up with the other routes in accessing the Indian Ocean.
The Indian government has no answer to the question that if we have not lost any territory, then why the 20 rounds of military-to-military talks?
The organisation of the Forum a few kilometres away from the eastern sector of the Line of Actual Control (LAC) not only signalled Beijing’s disregard for the LAC but also its attempt to buttress its claims over Arunachal as part of Tibet (Xizang) by selecting the venue of the international meeting in Nyingchi
The conflict of interest between India and China on the political front is likely to continue for a long time to come, with China’s territorial greed being what it is. However, business dealings between both countries must continue since such business is of mutual interest to both India and China.
Japan now wants to provide its leadership role in the region for the Western world. Washington, which was so long seeking to counter China through India, has now turned to Japan as it felt that New Delhi was not living up to that role.
ASEAN remains ill-equipped to handle the fallout from the tensions in the South China Sea or the potentiality of a full-blown Taiwanese conflict.
Against this backdrop, India has been promoting the idea of ‘net security provider’ in South Asia and the Indian Ocean Region (IOR).
Following the attack on a mosque in Kunduz, Afghanistan on October 8, 2021, ISK confirmed the recruitment and mobilization of Uyghur fighters. This was the first time that the alliance between IS-K and Uyghurs was affirmed by IS-K on media platforms.
But New Delhi must not be complacent, because a lot more needs to be done in acquisitions and modernisation to match the much larger and more sophisticated Chinese arsenal and to raise India’s politico-diplomatic assertiveness against Beijing's muscle-flexing.
To gain a strong foothold in Sri Lanka, China used the political weakness of the Rajapaksa family to sustain its corrupt and authoritarian regime by funding its electoral campaign in order to gain a strategic advantage in the Indian Ocean Region to marginalize India and other Western countries. especially US influence in the Indo-Pacific region.
Safeguards Defenders, a Spain-based human rights NGO that first drew attention to the Chinese overseas “police stations” last year, listed operations in 30 countries in North and South Americas, Europe, Africa and Asia (but not in India or other South Asian countries).
China has blocked several times attempts to designate Pakistan-based operatives behind attacks on India as global terrorists, which would place them under international sanctions.
Viewing Bangladesh and other areas to the south as a single economic zone, Japan will build Bengal-Northeast India industrial value chain concept in cooperation with India and Bangladesh to foster the growth of the entire region.
Keeping the warfare history and strategic culture of China in the Indo-Pacific region in perspective, chances are high that there could be more short-term military clashes in the near future with India which will be more intense by nature, especially before India’s general elections in 2024, in order to influence India's political landscape and change the politico-and security architecture of the Indo-Pacific region.
Whatever has been achieved by BRO in 2022 and early 2023 is very substantial and has raised Beijing's ire much more. For India, it is imperative to continue the momentum of its long overdue building of strategic infrastructure, because a lot more needs to be done to match PLA’s buildup and deployment.
India and Japan are already cooperating on the Bay of Bengal infrastructure development through their strong regional cooperation. Among these initiatives are the construction of LNG infrastructure in Sri Lanka, the building of pipelines and electrification in Myanmar, and the improvement of Bangladesh's road network.
This agreement has profound geo-strategic implications against the backdrop of the US-China maritime battle in the Indo-Pacific region. It will not only add fuel to the fire of their strategic competition but also result in the growing militarization of the strategic region amid the Taiwan crisis.
Unlike the US and Western countries, or even Myanmar's fellow members of the ASEAN, Beijing has refused to condemn the military junta enabling it to play a role in diplomacy with Bangladesh on the Rohingya and with the internal insurgencies.
As Beijing midwives a multipolar world as an alternative to the world order dominated by the US, there are many issues that stand in the way. They include simmering border disputes with India and its aggressive behaviour along the Line of Actual Control, its claims on the Japanese islands of Senkaku, and the dispute over the Spratly Islands that involve the Philippines, Taiwan, Malaysia, Vietnam, and Brunei. Above all is its menacing posture towards Taiwan.
