The Kargil War, as it was called, was in fact only a phase of intense confrontation in the ongoing India-Pakistan conflict which, thanks to Pakistan, has been ongoing since the late 1980s. India responded to the massive intrusion in May 1999, almost eight months after it began, for which Pakistan’s preparation started much earlier. 

In 1997, when India was celebrating 50 years of Independence, the Pakistan Army marked it with an artillery bombardment of the Kargil area, including the Srinagar-Leh road. A diary captured from Pakistan Army’s young Lieutenant Mazullah Khan Sumbal by an Indian Army unit during the May-July 1999 Operation Pawan (the codename for the Kargil War) recorded that he had reported to his newly raised Northern Light Infantry (NLI) battalion in December 1998. The Pakistan Army raised twelve NLI battalions for its grandiose plans of occupying the general area of Kargil and cutting off Ladakh. Raising 12 battalions suggests that preparations for Kargil probably began even before General Pervez Musharraf became Chief of Army Staff in 1998, likely when he was the Director General of Military Operations.

A detailed look at the major flaws of Operation Vijay in the Kargil Heights in 1999 reveals several critical shortcomings.

Intelligence Failures

There was a colossal failure by both civilian intelligence agencies and the Army to anticipate Pakistan's large-scale intrusion. A significant lack of tactical intelligence regarding the enemy's positions and strength led to very costly attacks in terms of both fatal and non-fatal casualties. Initial reports described the infiltrators as terrorists, and it took considerable time to realize that the scale and involvement were that of the Pakistani Army, which had raised 12 battalions of Northern Light Infantry specifically for this misadventure.

Paucity of Arms and Equipment

Operation Pawan exposed the Indian Army's lack of modern military equipment and its depleted state of weapons and ammunition reserves. There was a particular shortage of equipment suitable for high-altitude warfare, including night vision devices and appropriate weaponry for mountainous terrain. The absence of a weapon-locating radar (WLR) like the Swathi radar significantly raised Indian Army casualties.
Operational and Tactical Lapses
The initial response to the intrusion was slow and characterized by a lack of coordination between different units. Units were deployed without adequate acclimatization and preparation, leading to increased vulnerability and casualties. Frontal assaults were often used against well-defended enemy positions on commanding heights, resulting in heavy losses. There was a lack of proper coordination between artillery and air support, further hindering offensive operations. The mountainous terrain of Kargil made reconnaissance and troop movement difficult. The Pakistani forces had the advantage of occupying higher ground, making it challenging for Indian troops to dislodge them.

Lack of Comprehensive Security Policy

The Kargil conflict exposed the absence of a comprehensive security policy that addressed the evolving threat landscape, including proxy wars, nuclearization, and the revolution in military affairs (RMA). There was a need for a more holistic approach to national security, considering the changing dynamics of warfare and regional tensions. As very often in the past, a major shortcoming was a focus on a reactive approach rather than proactive measures. The 527 Indian soldiers who lost their lives in the 77-day Operation Vijay represented proportionately much more significant fatal casualties than in the 14-month-long 1947-1948 Jammu & Kashmir War, the 23-day-long 1965 Indo-Pak War, and the 13-day 1971 Indo-Pak War which liberated Bangladesh.

Operation Sindoor

Named very significantly as Operation Sindoor, it was meticulously planned over barely fourteen days at the highest levels by a group headed by Prime Minister Narendra Modi. This group included Home Minister Amit Shah, Defense Minister Rajnath Singh, External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar, National Security Advisor Ajit Doval, Chief of Defense Staff General Anil Chauhan, and the three Services Chiefs. The first phase of Operation Sindoor, which lasted just four days, demonstrated how almost all the flaws of Operation Vijay were overcome.

Key Outcomes of Operation Sindoor:

* Nine Terror Camps Eliminated: India successfully destroyed nine major terror launchpads and facilities of Lashkar-e-Taiyyeba, Jaish-e-Mohammed, and Hizbul Mujahideen in Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied Jammu and Kashmir (PoJK). This resulted in over 100 terrorists, including some of their commanders, being killed.
* Elimination of Key Terrorist Commanders: Multiple high-profile terrorists on India’s most-wanted list were neutralized in a single night, crippling key operational modules. High-value targets eliminated included Yusuf Azhar, Abdul Malik Rauf, and Mudassir Ahmad, individuals linked to the IC-814 hijack and Pulwama blast.
* India Redefined Rules of Engagement: By striking deep into Pakistan’s heartland, including Punjab province and Bahawalpur, once considered out of bounds even for U.S. drones, India made it clear that neither the Line of Control nor in-depth Pakistani territory would remain untouched if terror originates from there.
* A New Strategic Red Line: Operation Sindoor drew a new red line: if terror is state policy, it will be met with a visible and forceful response. This marked a significant shift from deterrence to direct action.
* Equal Punishment for Terrorists and Sponsors: India rejected the artificial separation between terrorists and their backers, striking both simultaneously. This ended the impunity enjoyed by many Pakistan-based/Pakistani elements.
* Airstrikes on Pakistani Military Installations: On May 9–10, India became the first country to accurately strike eleven airbases of a nuclear-armed nation in a single operation, destroying 20% of Pakistan’s air force assets. High casualties were inflicted at Bhoolari Airbase, including the death of Squadron Leader Usman Yusuf and destruction of key fighter jets.
* India’s Self-Sufficiency and Air Defense Superiority Displayed: India’s multi-layered air defense, including the indigenous Akashteer system, shot down hundreds of drones and missiles. This also showcased India’s growing capabilities in exporting advanced defense systems.
* Exposure of Pakistan’s Air Defense Weaknesses: The Indian Air Force bypassed and jammed Pakistan’s Chinese-supplied air defense systems, completing the mission in just 23 minutes using Rafale jets, SCALP missiles, and Hammer bombs, demonstrating India’s technological edge.
* A Global Message Delivered: India showed the world that: (a) it does not require anyone’s permission to defend its people, (b) terrorists and their masterminds cannot hide anywhere, and (c) if Pakistan retaliates, India is prepared for a decisive counterstrike.

(The author is a strategic affairs analyst and former spokesperson for the Ministry of Defense and the Indian Army. Views expressed are personal. He can be reached at wordsword02@gmail.com | LinkedIn | X/Twitter: @ColAnilBhat8252)