Turkey has efficiently managed to place itself strategically as a focal actor within the Middle Eastern, South Asian and African conflicts. It has calculatedly employed diplomacy, economic and military tools, even utilizing proxy militias and Private Military Contractors (PMCs), to execute its influence and secure its national interests in targeted regions. Ankara has redressed its foreign policy by pushing for reconciliation efforts with former adversaries while consistently augmenting its sway across the regions.

Key aspects of Turkey's strategy include: Deployment and support for Proxy Militias and PMCs: According to several security reports, Turkey has employed Syrian opposition fighters as proxies in conflicts in Libya and Nagorno-Karabakh to achieve military objectives with reduced political and institutional costs. Companies like SADAT International Defence Consultancy are often linked to these efforts, operating in a legal grey zone which guarantees plausible deniability. However, reliable reports state otherwise, suggesting state control.

Military Presence and Arms Exports: it is imperative to highlight Turkey’s growing dominance by maintaining military presence in several nations, including its largest overseas military base in Somalia. Turkey has transitioned from a regional-centric to a more global-centric approach with regards to its defence posture by building security relationships on basis of expeditionary training missions, bilateral defence agreements for the possibility of long-term stationing, naval deployments and port/naval cooperation, and forward deployments inside regional or neighbouring nations. The most evident and well-documented Turkish overseas military influence can be perceived from its base facility in Mogadishu (Somalia), its official military cooperation / base arrangement agreement with Qatar, the troop deployments in Northern Cyprus, the forward deployed training/presence in northern Iraq (Bashiqa area), the consistent naval activity and security cooperation in Libya/Southern Mediterranean, and the renewed security/defence cooperation across the Sahel (this includes agreements with Niger and wider West Africa).

It has been ascertained that these acquired assets/bases are employed for training the partner / allied forces, secure maritime routes and energy and oil contracts, provide diplomatic leverage, counter potential security threats (example - Kurdish groups in Syria/Iraq), and to also strengthen national security by boosting defence exports and broadening its intelligence capabilities.

Following are the confirmed Turkish bases and major facilities as reported:

Camp TURKSOM in Mogadishu, Somalia (opened 2017)
This Turkish base functions as a training base and provides a defence-education campus in Mogadishu. This is regarded as Turkey’s largest overseas military facility. It is known for conducting joint Somali-Turkish training missions (sometimes called “TURKSOM” of the Somali-Turkish Task Force / African Eagle).

It can be inferred that this long-term training of Somali National Army units and maritime security cooperation will ensure a strong political and economic influence in the Horn of Africa. According to Reuters and other media outlets, this confirms Turkey’s plans to utilize this base, which can tie maritime security and energy cooperation deals with Somalia.

Turkish base(s) and camp in Qatar (announced 2015 – ongoing)
Post 2015, a formal military cooperation and troop presence was established with Qatar. According to reports, the facility could host thousands of troops and includes air and land support arrangements. This aids Turkey to leverage its strategic interest in the Gulf.

Northern Cyprus (Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus – TRNC)
Ankara has maintained a long-standing, military presence in Northern Cyprus since 1974. It is imperative to mention that it is a de-facto overseas force. Official Turkish and international sources regard this deployment as permanent.

Northern Iraq — forward training/deployment (Bashiqa and other sites)
Turkish military presence and its training centres in northern Iraq specifically in Bashiqa is used for training local forces and as a forward deterrent against PKK or Kurdistan Workers’ Party affiliated groups.

Libya (2019 onward — naval and military aid and basing agreements)
Turkey sided with the UN acknowledged GNA with arms, drones, advisors and naval deployments. Even though Turkey has not explicitly publicized a permanent “base” in western Libya, its military and logistical presence in form of its assets (ports and local facilities), naval access and basing agreements is apparent of its effective influence across the central Mediterranean.

Other reported or proposed projects (Chad, potential Sahel presence and training hubs)
There have been reports and available source maps indicating agreements, planned facilities or increased cooperation in parts of Africa (Chad, Niger, Sahel states) and maritime security pacts. These are sometimes announced as training assignments, defence cooperation pacts, or proposed bases.

Diplomatic leverage & soft power: Turkey has been providing infrastructure aid, provision to build hospitals, educational exchanges and mosque/construction projects along with the military training to extend its influence package.

Intelligence Footprints And Proxies

MIT (Turkish intelligence) activity and the use of local proxies (Syrian opposition forces, local militias in Libya, partner units in the Sahel) reinforces Ankara’s pursuit of it strategic interest without engaging in the conventional deployments. Independent government reports (EU/German domestic security offices) have flagged these covert activities in several host countries.

Congressional Research Service (CRS) reports and U.S. government briefings have also documented Turkey’s increasingly global activity and have listed the selected Turkish military presence sites. Additionally, Turkey's actions in the Eastern Mediterranean, Syria, and Libya are driven by the "Blue Homeland Doctrine"(Mavi Vatan). The doctrine is Ankara’s maritime strategy, which asserts Turkey’s right to a larger share of the Black Sea, Aegean, and Eastern Mediterranean, including its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and other sovereign rights.

Turkey’s 'Consultancy' Services

SADAT International Defence Consultancy, founded in 2012 by retired Turkish Brig. Gen. Adnan Tanrıverdi, is believed to be a key actor. In plain sight it places itself as a consultancy for Islamic nations and is known to provide ideological and tactical military training. Critics and investigative reports, however, allege its involvement in scouting, recruiting and transporting fighters from various nations where it has engaged, such as Libya and Syria, to foster Turkish interests.

According to the UN Panel of Experts reports (S/2021/229), SADAT supervised approximately 5,000 Syrian fighters deployed to the Government of National Accord (GNA) in Libya. After tracking the activities, it was evident that SADAT had financed, trained fighters and transported them to targeted locations via Turkey. SADAT reportedly managed contracts and payments, travel documentation and tactical training of these foreign fighters, presumably working as middleman or handler.

In 2021 Nordic Monitor also mentioned the issues raised by the UN documents highlighting the recruitment of minor or child fighters. UN reports (2019–2021) have clearly indicated SADAT’s involvement in recruiting and deploying Syrian fighters to Tripoli. This was similarly reported in the case of Azerbaijan during the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict (2020) where the SADAT-trained fighters were believed to have engaged. Syrian fighters under SADAT were sent to secure Turkish projects in Niger and Sahel. These deployments were facilitated through Turkish cities like Kilis and Gaziantep.

In 2022, reports of SADAT trained mercenary groups being deployed to Palestine and Kashmir had emerged. These reports were ascertained when the Syrian National Army (SNA) militia commander, “Sulayman Shah Brigades,” Muhammed Abu Amsha, declared the displacement of some of their units to the Kashmir region.

According to reports from Nordic Monitor, the units were to be repositioned from the city of Şiyê near the Afrin region. Afrin is one of the three original regions of the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria. Amsha also mentioned an initial remuneration of $2,000 to the recruits.

Further reports of similar recruitment activity spreading to Azaz, Jarablus, Bab, and Idlib have made news. SADAT has been interacting with various jihadist groups in South Asia especially with Kashmir-born terrorists. Syed Ghulam Nabi Fai, a convicted felon, has been a close associate of SADAT. Fai had been seen at a SADAT meeting prior. He has praised SADAT’s Islamist mercenaries and jihadist fighters as heroes while comparing them to the volunteers, fighters, and mercenaries sent to Ukraine. Mesut Hakkı Caşın, President Receip Tayyip Erdogan's advisor on security and foreign policy, and Pakistani Senator Muhammad Talha Mahmood, have reportedly attended SADAT meetings. 

Foundation for Human Rights and Freedoms and Humanitarian Relief is an NGO run by İnsan Hak ve Hürriyetleri ve İnsani Yardım Vakfı, or IHH, on the Pakistani side of Kashmir. IHH has been connected with terror outfits, such as al-Qaeda, and has direct links with the now banned Popular Front of India (PFI) (now operating under different names such as SIO etc). With Turkey openly supporting Pakistan against India, the level of threats and risks against Indian nationals and diplomats is concerning.

Furthermore, on December 12, 1992, three members of a terrorist outfit – Tevhid Selam, a proxy group handled by Iran’s Quds Force, detonated a bomb in the car of an Indian diplomat Yash Paul Kumar in Ankara. After the investigations it was revealed that Ferhan Özmen, the mastermind behind the attack, wanted to convey a message to India concerning the events in Kashmir. The recent links to a handler in Turkey to the Indian Red Fort blast in 2025 has also been exposed through the NIA investigation.

Turkey’s Alleged Role

Investigations by India’s National Investigation Agency (NIA) and Delhi Police in the recent Delhi bombing have indicated the plausibility of a transnational chain of coordination, linking operatives in India with handlers abroad, including individuals based in Turkey. NIA investigations identified a handler, codenamed 'Ukasa', reportedly located in Ankara, Turkey. Travel records confirmed several accused in the case of having visited Turkey between August and September 2022, where they reportedly met Syrian operatives while communicating with Pakistan-linked handlers.

Investigators allege a triangular chain which is initiated with Pakistan-based terror networks who worked with Turkey-based handlers, who in turn coordinated with the Indian sleeper cell. Outfits linked to Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) and other Pakistan-based handlers reportedly leveraged Turkey as a meeting and logistics hub.
Turkish authorities have denied all allegations, labelling media reports on 'Ukasa' and the Red Fort case as "disinformation".

Recently, FBI affidavits in the Mark Lorenzo Villanueva case (2025) reveal that ISIS used intermediaries in Turkey to access funds sent from the U.S. Total transactions reached $1,615, used to fund operations in Syria and Lebanon.

Similarly, in Jimenez-Guzel Case (FBI Criminal Complaint, 2025), exposed how on 11 November 2025, Jimenez purchased a round-trip ticket to Istanbul to use Turkey as a gateway for “entering Sham (Syria) through Turkey”.
All the supporting evidence gathered confirms the ideological commitment and coordination of the individuals with intermediaries in Turkey.

Numerous investigations conducted by international and national agencies such as the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), India’s National Investigation Agency (NIA), and United Nations Security Council panels have brought up Turkey’s consistent links in jihadist and proxy militancy networks, findings that Ankara has consistently sought to deny. 

(The writer is the Co-Founder of The Strategic Perspective and an independent researcher and analyst specializing in Af-Pak affairs, counterterrorism, and regional security. Views expressed are not necessarily shared by editors of South Asia Monitor)