When Israeli fighter aircraft dominated the airspace over Tehran, Isfahan, and other major cities, the initial euphoria among many supporters of Iran’s Islamic regime faded quickly as Iranian forces struggled amid the ensuing chaos. The central question emerging from the 12-day conflict between Iran and Israel is whether Iran’s long-standing strategic endgame has now reached its conclusion.

Understanding this requires revisiting Iran’s core strategic objective, which has remained largely unchanged since the establishment of the theocratic state. Tehran has long recognised the futility of engaging in direct military confrontation with the West, given the latter’s overwhelming superiority. Instead, Iranian strategists have pursued alternative methods of resistance, centred on regime preservation—seen as essential to Iran’s long-term aspiration of becoming a dominant regional power. The establishment of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which oversees extensive covert operations and supports proxy groups under the banner of Shia solidarity, remains central to this strategy.

The trajectory that emerged after June appears harsher for Iran, as the war undermined its position in achieving its endgame in unprecedented ways. However, these setbacks are not compelling enough for a careful observer to dismiss Iran’s capacity to pursue its objectives of survival and leadership of the Muslim world.

Shi’ism As Tool Of Influence 

Iran’s use of Shi’ism to expand its influence in South Asia represents a subtle extension of its endgame beyond the Middle East. This rapport, carefully nurtured over decades, does not appear to have diminished after the 12-day war.

Article 154 of Iran’s Constitution affirms support for the “just struggles of the oppressed” worldwide—a principle used to legitimise Tehran’s influence abroad. While Iran’s proxy strategies in the Middle East, such as strengthening Hezbollah and the Houthis, are well known, its approach to South Asia is more nuanced and extends beyond traditional regional policy.

South Asia hosts the world’s largest Muslim population—approximately 586 million—making it a natural sphere of competition for influence in the Islamic world. Iran’s appeal in the region goes beyond typical soft power tools, relying instead on deep links with traditional Shia clerical networks and on encouraging Shia communities, particularly in the Indian Subcontinent.

Iran’s ability to mobilise Shia sentiment in South Asia was visible when large anti-Israel protests erupted in major Indian cities following Israeli attacks in Gaza. Policies adopted by successive Indian governments to counter traditional anti-India sentiment among Sunnis faltered when Shia groups openly demonstrated, prompting authorities to book several Shia mourners under the UAPA Act. Anti-Israel slogans chanted by Shia protests after the killing of a Hezbollah leader in 2024 further underscored this solidarity.

Extending Influence: Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Bangladesh

Iran’s Shia influence extends well beyond India. In Sri Lanka, where Muslims have been predominantly Sunni for centuries, Tehran strengthened its ties during the civil war era, enabling it to embed cultural and religious influence within the island’s Muslim communities. Analysts suggest that Iran’s approach resembles the Saudi-funded spread of Wahhabism in the 1980s, including the formation of groups backed by significant financial support.

Operating from Valachchenai on Sri Lanka’s eastern coast, Shia clerics have exerted notable influence, particularly in mobilising strong anti-Western protests. The Iranian Cultural Centre in Colombo has discreetly played a central role in organising anti-Israel demonstrations, with its reach extending into the Palestinian Solidarity Movement in Sri Lanka. The establishment of an Al-Mustafa University branch in Colombo further illustrates Tehran’s efforts to consolidate influence.

The cases of Sri Lanka and India reflect only part of the picture. Iran’s reach in Pakistan and Bangladesh remains equally significant. To understand how these alliances support Iran’s broader strategy, it is necessary to revisit the approach championed by General Qassem Soleimani. Under his leadership, the Quds Force cultivated networks beyond the Middle East, including the Fatemiyoun Brigade (Afghan Shiites) and the Zainebiyoun Brigade (Pakistani Shiites), both embodying Iran’s ambitions in South Asia.

Though Iran has not directly targeted Indian interests, its covert role was evident in the attack on an Israeli diplomat in New Delhi. Similarly, security concerns surrounding Israeli tourists in Sri Lanka last year suggested that Iranian proxies possess the operational capability to target Israelis on Sri Lankan soil, highlighting the extensive reach of Tehran’s networks.

Iran's Influence Intact

Iran’s influence among Shia communities across South Asia represents an additional layer reinforcing its position in the Muslim world—one that has not been decisively weakened by the 12-day conflict. On the contrary, anti-Israel and, in some cases, anti-Western sentiments among South Asian Muslims have intensified, offering Tehran new opportunities to leverage these emotions in favour of its strategic endgame.

Iran’s long-standing approach—survival, indirect confrontation, and expansion of influence through Shia solidarity—remains intact. The 12-day war may have altered the regional landscape, but it has not fundamentally diminished Iran’s capacity to act.

(The author is a lecturer at the Faculty of Law, General Sir John Kotelawala Defence University, Sri Lanka. Views expressed are personal. He can be reached at punsaraprint10@gmail.com.)