Washington’s naval vessels traverse the chokepoints in Southeast Asia waters. Beijing observes and develops alternative transport corridors on land. It is a “point-counterpoint” strategy by the two superpowers.

The center of global geopolitics, today, is the China-US rivalry, particularly in the Indo-Pacific region. Guided by the 1940s doctrines of naval strategist Nicholas Spykman, a founder of the classical realist school in American foreign policy, Washington continues to embrace his arguments regarding a fear of Russia and controlling Eurasia -- known eventually as the "godfather of containment.”

As a consequence, Wasington continues to pursue a foreign policy strategy, whereby, controlling the seas and coasts of Eurasia is critical to deterring potential rival powers from threatening American sea commerce.

From Beijing’s perspective, such a foreign policy has existential overtones. China’s survival is reliant on dependable flows of energy and trade. Its leaders understand their country’s vulnerability – heavy reliance on maritime corridors that could be choked off in a crisis. To preclude this possibility, Beijing has spent the past 15 years developing an alternative strategy: creating diverse supply routes and building goodwill through vast infrastructure projects abroad.

South Asia has emerged as the pivotal component in Beijing’s plan to extricate itself from American containment. The region has proven less susceptible to Western hegemony than the South China Sea area and equally strategic; while the region offers geopolitical risks, India in particular and the region in general have substantial economic opportunities to better enable China’s objectives.

Map of The First and Second island chains in America's Island Chain Strategy

The Malacca Concern

One of the world’s most vital maritime chokepoints is the Strait of Malacca. The waterway stretches 805km between Malaysia, Singapore, and Sumatra, Indonesia; it is a mere 2.8km at its narrowest. Each year roughly a quarter of global maritime trade (est. 90,000 merchant vessels) pass through these waters. Rystad Energy reports that in 2024 about 65 million bpd for oil and petroleum and 24.8 bcfd for LNG transited the strait, much of it bound for the world’s largest energy importer – China.

These stats illustrate just how indispensable and yet, dangerously vulnerable Malacca is to maritime upheavals. In fact, as of 2022, China imports about 74% of its crude oil and 35% of its LNG through this single corridor. The sheer concentration of flows exposes Beijing to significant risks: a naval blockade, political upheaval from coastal nations, or American pressure backed by significant US military presence in the region. Washington frames this as a “guarantee freedom of navigation” mission -- Beijing sees it as a potential existential threat to the survival of 1.4 billion Chinese.

But the concern goes beyond just China. Petroleum volumes transiting Malacca amount to roughly a quarter of global seaborne demand. For Beijing, reducing dependence on this vulnerable access is not just important – it is survival.

Map of the Strait of Malacca. © Wikipedia

China’s response

Beijing’s response to Malacca’s vulnerability has been extensive in scope. Launched in 2013, its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) now extends across more than 150 countries, underwritten by massive overseas investments.

The first six months of 2025 saw Chinese contracts surge to a record $124 billion, according to the Green Finance & Development Center. Of this, $66.2 billion went into infrastructure projects – ports, pipelines, highways – while another $57.1 billion supported investments across energy, technology, and manufacturing.

Without a doubt, energy has been the centerpiece. More than $42 billion was committed in 2025; while most of it was for oil and gas, nearly $10 billion went into wind and solar projects, pushing installed capacity close to 12 gigawatts.

This reflects Beijing’s twin objectives: securing reliable supplies of fossil fuels while cautiously broadening into green alternatives – its operating principle being diversification.

Political rhetoric aside, China’s strategic objective is three-fold: build alternative routes, reduce exposure to chokepoints, and create long-term leverage through infrastructure.

Clearly, the Strait of Malacca is China’s point of vulnerability -- South Asia could enable a viable alternative. The region is undergoing redevelopment via Beijing’s political and economic initiatives. Through investments in ports, pipelines, and corridors, China is developing routes that could bypass both Malacca and American naval hegemony.

Corridor to the Arabian Sea

Pivotal to China’s strategy is an alternative route through Pakistan. The China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) – worth more than $62 billion – connects the Arabian Sea port of Gwadar to China’s western province of Xinjiang. This tangible land-based alternative to Malacca provides Beijing direct access to petroleum and trade – without significant countervailing American influence.

Yet, it does not come without risks. Pakistan has been plagued by violence targeting Chinese interests: in 2024, terrorists struck major infrastructure projects, from nuclear facilities to hydroelectric plants, forcing temporary shutdowns. Security remains CPEC’s Achilles’ heel – but Beijing voices no indication of hesitation -- its existential need for energy is a strong motivation.

'Saudi Arabia Of Lithium'

Since the US’s messy withdrawal from Afghanistan, the scope of China’s strategic interests now includes the Taliban-run country. It contains immense mineral wealth – lithium, copper, rare earths – estimated at more than $1 trillion. A 2010 Pentagon memo even labeled Afghanistan “the Saudi Arabia of lithium.”

The calculus is evident: secure access to critical minerals while gradually reintegrating Afghanistan into the regional South Asian economy. There are, of course, substantial risks involved: political volatility, fragile security issues, and continued political rivalry between Washington, Beijing, and Moscow.

Alternative corridors

Beyond the above routes, Beijing is pursuing additional but more cumbersome navigations. In Myanmar, the China–Myanmar Corridor centers on the deep-water port of Kyaukphyu and a 770-kilometer oil and gas pipeline cutting across to Yunnan province. Meanwhile, the Bangladesh–China–India–Myanmar Economic Corridor (BCIM-EC) remains a possibility, though political rivalries with India could hamper progress.

The countries constituting South Asia are weighing their economic interests with China, but remain cautious about sovereignty in an increasingly unstable political environment. China’s interest in South Asia unfolds against a complex background: escalating economic and technological competition with the United States.

Washington, for its part, has upped the ante. The US imposed aggressive tariffs on Chinese goods, while semiconductors and electric vehicles face strict regulatory hurdles. The US aim is explicit: curb China’s economic growth and protect American industry.

China has turned to diplomacy with a multipolar vision of the future. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) recent summit and the expansion of BRICS is a sign of China’s growing power through its rising economic and political clout. Moreover, China's GDP accounts for 60% of the BRICS+, showing its dominance over the group (ChinaPower Project, 2023).

For America’s allies in Europe, pressure works. But in a burgeoning, more multipolar Global South, the US message is more difficult to sell.

Not just a blueprint

China has built more than software schematics. From Gwadar to Mongla, from pipelines through Myanmar to investments in Kabul, Beijing is laying down a lattice of routes meant to loosen America’s grip on its lifelines. The logic is pure: diversify, spread risk, and make any US attempt at a blockade less effective – more costly.

For now, Washington still holds the advantage at sea. Its fleets and bases across the Indo-Pacific keep Malacca under watch, reminding Beijing that maritime power remains America’s strongest card. But on land, China is advancing incrementally, building assets and leverage that could at some point tilt the balance.

The contest between the American thalassocracy and China’s continental reach has only just begun. South Asia is no longer just India’s backyard – it is the new front line of great-power rivalry.

(The writer is Dr. F. Andrew Wolf, Jr. is director of The Fulcrum Institute. Views expressed are personal. He can be contacted at fandrewwolfjr@yahoo.com).