Will West Bengal State Elections Test India-Bangladesh Ties?

Economic ties are significant for both West Bengal and Bangladesh due to cultural linkages and geographic proximity. West Bengal acts as a gateway for Bangladeshis seeking access to medical facilities, education, and business opportunities. Significant trade also takes place through land ports. Hence, the first response of the BNP-led government would likely be to minimize any chances of a downturn in ties. New Delhi, too, will continue to prioritize Bangladesh, especially at a time when Dhaka has outlined defense modernization plans with likely Chinese help. 

Rituja Ghosh Apr 29, 2026
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As the results of the critical elections in India's West Bengal are awaited on May 4, Bangladesh will watch the ensuing political developments closely. Popular domestic narratives on both sides, as well as public opinion and dominant perceptions, can test the progress made in India-Bangladesh ties recently following the swearing-in of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP)-led government in February this year.

For the country's ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), the West Bengal elections are particularly significant. West Bengal still remains one of the states that the BJP has not conquered. First, the state’s ruling All India Trinamool Congress (TMC) exerts considerable influence on the course of national legislation with 22 Members of Parliament in the Lok Sabha (the lower house of Parliament), making it the second-largest opposition party. Second, as a state that saw a long period of rule by the Communist Party of India (Marxist), this is an ideological battle for the BJP in expanding its Hindu nationalist ideology in a state hitherto associated with communism. Many of the BJP’s own ideologues, such as Shyama Prasad Mukherjee, belong to the state. Third, as a border state, there are security concerns emanating from the conduct of elections in West Bengal. Sustained unrest and lapses in law and order can be worrying for India. West Bengal is susceptible to violence along religious lines, based on its demography and record of high instances of political violence. The deployment of 2,407 companies of Central Armed Police Forces (CAPF) shows the elevated security concerns attached to the election. The Murshidabad riots of April 2025 and cycles of political violence, even at the local level, have made the BJP-led Union government attach great significance to the law and order and security aspects of the election.

Polls and Perception

The Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls declared nearly 9 million persons as illegal voters in West Bengal. The accelerated push for SIR in the state was termed by many as an electoral tool employed by the BJP. The SIR exercise became a rallying point for the BJP to crack down on "illegal Bangladeshis" in West Bengal. The campaign pitch by the BJP has centered on providing jobs, welfare, and security, which it argues have been impacted due to illegal migration from Bangladesh. The SIR exercise particularly generated widespread anxiety among the migrant labour population in West Bengal regarding disenfranchisement and, in extreme cases, deportation to Bangladesh. Such narratives place Bangladesh at the centre of domestic politics in India.

For Bangladesh, the West Bengal election holds special significance as popular narratives in the run-up to the polls have focused on demographic anxieties arising from alleged illegal migration from Bangladesh—something Dhaka has consistently denied. The BJP has often alleged that the TMC-led state government has aided the illegal settlement of persons of Bangladeshi origin, particularly Muslims, in West Bengal. It has also flagged concerns over the religious persecution of minority Hindus following Jamaat-e-Islami winning a majority of districts in Bangladesh bordering West Bengal. This has been used by the BJP as a plank to consolidate votes in border districts.

In the age of social media, especially in the post-2024 Gen Z protests era in Bangladesh, narratives and rhetoric on Bangladeshi migration to India spread quickly, generating animosity and, in extreme cases, instances of public discrimination and violence. Incidents of communal violence in Bangladesh produce emotionally charged public reactions and sympathies for minority Hindus in West Bengal. The immediate impact of any downturn in ties between India and Bangladesh is often felt in West Bengal. The local economy and social interactions are often the first domains where this becomes visible. This was particularly evident in 2024 when Sheikh Hasina was ousted from power. Local businesses, including hotel associations, began to informally deny Bangladeshis access in West Bengal. In the current state elections, which are fraught with communal undercurrents, Bangladesh will continue to feature prominently in dominant narratives.

Ties A Delicate Balance

For the newly elected Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), responses to any domestic escalation within West Bengal will be a test. The Sheikh Hasina-led Awami League became unpopular among large sections of the Bangladeshi population due to its perceived closeness with India and, in many cases, for not taking stronger diplomatic stances. The BNP also faces pressure from Jamaat-e-Islami, which has historically challenged India’s engagement in Bangladesh as an erosion of its sovereignty. The new generation of Gen Z politicians in Bangladesh has also used narratives of India’s overreach as a means of consolidating political support.

Economic ties are significant for both West Bengal and Bangladesh due to cultural linkages and geographic proximity. West Bengal acts as a gateway for Bangladeshis seeking access to medical facilities, education, and business opportunities. Significant trade also takes place through land ports. Hence, the first response of the BNP-led government would likely be to minimize any chances of a downturn in ties. New Delhi, too, will continue to prioritize Bangladesh, especially at a time when Dhaka has outlined defense modernization plans with likely Chinese help. 

Earlier this month, the BNP Secretary General visited China, signalling growing ties and Beijing’s role as a key partner in these efforts. Moreover, the ouster of Sheikh Hasina has been followed by growing closeness between Dhaka and Islamabad—developments that are a concern for New Delhi, particularly after Operation Sindoor in May 2025. Domestically, increased cultural engagement with Pakistan also indicates a perceptible shift in Dhaka’s outlook.

Another crucial factor is the issue of extraditing former Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, which remains a potential trigger for deterioration in ties—something both countries would prefer to avoid. The BNP government has maintained a calculated evasiveness on the issue to balance domestic pressures while preserving goodwill with New Delhi. For India, extradition is a sensitive matter involving reputational costs, legal complexities, international scrutiny, and the risk of a sharp downturn in ties with Dhaka.

Bangladesh will continue to feature as an important factor in West Bengal elections and in India’s broader electoral calculus. Whether this impacts bilateral ties will depend on the responses of political leaders and the management of perceptions, particularly during instances of domestic communal escalation amplified through social media.

(The writer is an independent researcher. Views expressed are personal. She can be reached at rituja1803@gmail.com / @RitujaGhosh7.)

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