One of the more perplexing aspects of the recent limited conflict and military stand-off between India and Pakistan after the horrific terror attack in Pahalgam, which claimed 26 lives and injured several others, at least from New Delhi’s perspective, has been the ostensible ability of the Pakistani state to gather international support and affect public opinion. India is the preponderant power in South Asia and participates in a significant number of global and regional diplomatic collectives across a range of issues, and offers much more in terms of trade and economic benefit as well as military heft to its partners.

Yet, as the conflict with Pakistan was unravelling, there were few backers of India’s position on the conflict and those willing to indict Pakistan for its use of cross-border terrorism, with the exception of Israel. On the other hand, Turkey, Azerbaijan, and China publicly backed Islamabad’s position. There were also serious concerns, arguably overblown, regarding the re-hyphenation of India and Pakistan and the internationalisation of the Kashmir dispute.

To remedy this deficit of understanding, New Delhi launched a diplomatic offensive. The Indian government assembled seven all-party delegations of Members of Parliament to brief foreign leaders, media, think tanks, and influencers across more than 30 countries, especially in Islamic-majority nations, to counter Pakistan’s narrative and underscore India’s zero tolerance for terrorism. Shashi Tharoor led a key tour—particularly to the United States—to articulate India’s stance on terrorism and Operation Sindoor. Other notable heads included Ravi Shankar Prasad (BJP), Baijayant Panda (BJP), Sanjay Kumar Jha (JDU), Kanimozhi Karunanidhi (DMK), Supriya Sule (NCP), and Shrikant Eknath Shinde (Shiv Sena).

This has proved useful for New Delhi, so far. For example, Malaysia rejected Pakistan’s bid to cancel India’s programmes, with its government allowing all outreach events to proceed. Colombia issued a statement sympathetic to Pakistan after civilian casualties, but reversed that posture following Tharoor’s delegation meeting — effectively neutralising Pakistan’s messaging. In London and Madrid, top ministers echoed strong UK and Spain support for India’s counter-terror posture. The Sanjay Kumar Jha-led tour (Indonesia, Malaysia, South Korea, Japan, Singapore) also garnered official condemnations of the Pahalgam attack and won praise for India’s restraint during the ceasefire. Such efforts were particularly needed to tackle Pakistan’s superior outreach to international media during the crisis, which seems to have limited India’s ability to build favourable international public opinion.

Pakistan Plays Both Sides

But these overtures are unlikely to result in long-term gains as it doesn’t counter Pakistan’s ability to maintain seemingly contradictory alliances and rhetoric without immediate or catastrophic consequences. Pakistan has historically demonstrated incredible adeptness to play opposite sides to its benefit. Even as it displays blatant contradictions and hypocrisy (and occasionally comedic relief). During the Cold War it was able to cosy up to the Chinese as well as the Americans, drawing military aid from the latter, while still re-assuring the former that it was only trying to balance India’s equities in the region. More recently, Pakistan nominated US President Donald Trump for a Nobel Peace Prize even as it condemned US attacks on Iranian nuclear sites and apparently even offered the cover of its nuclear devices to Tehran for deterrence. India has been unable to play opposing sides with such obvious inconsistency. During the Cold War this was owing to non-alignment, and now strategic autonomy. Just as India balances and hedges its interests and principles between allies and partners when they find themselves on opposing ends (egs. US and Russia), so do its allies and partners balance and hedge their support for India in similar circumstances with Pakistan. So, why is Islamabad seemingly punching above its diplomatic weight?

One of the reasons this is possible is because of Pakistan’s ability to offer external powers tactical advantages, even at the cost of its sovereignty and ideology. Pakistan doesn’t need to be consistent in its foreign policy as long it serves a more pressing transactional purpose. On terrorism, for example, even as Islamabad carries out cross-border terrorism on Indian soil, it simultaneously supports US efforts to neutralise terror targets in the region. This diminishes India’s ability to label Pakistan as a terror hub. This was the rationale behind top US military commander, Army General Michael E. Kurilla’s comments, before the House Armed Services Committee in Washington DC, wherein he described Pakistan as a “phenomenal partner” in anti-terrorism operations. While this understandably drew ridicule from the Indian commentariat, Kurilla cited specific instances, such as the combating of ISIS-Khorasan and the voluntary Pakistani extradition of the mastermind behind the Kabul airport suicide attack in August 2021 that killed 13 American military personnel, Mohammad Sharifullah.

Similarly, Pakistan also collaborates with China on countering Uyghur separatists such as the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM). Pakistan’s intelligence service (i.e. ISI) has cooperated in monitoring and restriction of ETIM-linked individuals, especially in northern Pakistan and former FATA areas. There have also been reports of Uyghurs being deported or quietly handed over to China. Pakistan has taken steps to limit religious or educational links between Uyghur communities and Pakistani Islamist groups to avoid Chinese irritation and also stifled anti-China protests or pro-Uyghur activism, even by its own Islamist groups or citizens. So, one reason Pakistan gets away with contradictions is because the global system rewards “transactional” relationships over ideological consistency. Pakistan simply plays the same game others do, just more overtly and desperately, and in the process exacting leeway for its duplicity on cross-border terrorism in Kashmir, and India more generally.

Giving Mixed Signals

This client-state relationship is critical for the illusionary perseverance of Pakistani relevance. Pakistan becomes indispensable not because it is reliable, but because it's situationally useful. The US, China, and Gulf states don’t expect consistency, they expect deliverables. As long as Pakistan delivers (or threatens to disrupt), it retains leverage. Moreover, it shows that Pakistan uses its very low credibility in international politics as an advantage. When Pakistan contradicts in behaviour, it’s expected. Because these states don’t expect Pakistan to act like a stable liberal democracy or a predictable ally; its contradictions are discounted rather than punished. I refer to this as the “Pakistan Discounting Effect” or a phenomenon in international politics where Pakistan’s erratic or contradictory behaviour is tolerated or dismissed by major powers due to its perceived structural weakness, utility, or lack of alternative partners, resulting in lower reputational or material costs for actions that would normally carry serious diplomatic penalties.

Second, Pakistani military and civilian leadership often operate on different tracks, allowing mixed signals that can be attributed to “institutional dysfunction” rather than duplicity. One of the most distinctive features of Pakistan’s foreign policy is the disconnect between its military and civilian leadership, especially in areas involving national security and relations with India, Afghanistan, the US, and China. This institutional bifurcation produces incoherent or contradictory signals to the outside world, but they are often interpreted not as deceit—but as a symptom of institutional dysfunction. The Pakistani Army has independent and direct foreign contacts—sidestepping its foreign ministry. It was Pakistan Army Chief, Field Marshal Asim Munir who visited Trump to receive commendation on the resolution of the India-Pakistan conflict after Pahalgam and not Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif. The civilian government in Pakistan can say one thing to appease foreign donors or allies, whilst its military does the opposite to pursue strategic depth, proxy warfare, or geopolitical hedging.

Pakistani incoherence is often interpreted by outside powers as chaos or incompetence, not calculated deceit—allowing Pakistan to avoid serious diplomatic penalties. Even as the Pakistani government claimed to be an ally in the "War on Terror", the Pakistani ISI provided sanctuary to the Afghan Taliban, Haqqani Network, and sheltered Osama bin Laden. When questioned, Pakistan deflects by blaming internal communication breakdowns or rogue elements. This fragmentation confuses external partners and makes Pakistan’s contradictions seem like bureaucratic chaos, not strategic duplicity. And chaos gets forgiven more easily than malice. Famously, even A.B. Vajpayee blamed the Pakistani Army under Musharraf for the Kargil War rather than Nawaz Sharif for betrayal after the signing of the Lahore Declaration.

Pakistan's Asymmetric Polity

Certainly, this does not mean that there are no consequences for Pakistan. It suffers quiet, chronic consequences, but not catastrophic ones. It does not face sanctions, isolation, or military retaliation. But it is economically stagnant (reliant on IMF bailouts), has little regional influence despite its size and population, foreign investment is minimal despite China’s CPEC push, and repeatedly frustrates allies with its security failures. It’s not exactly thriving, but rather, it is merely surviving because of its ability to exploit these contradictions under conditions of constant decay. 

Pakistan’s inconsistent foreign policy reflects and reinforces internal political instability and sharpens the divide between the military and civilian governments. For India, this asymmetry in Pakistan’s material relevance on the global stage and schizophrenic diplomatic conditioning is the primary challenge. Beyond the recent diplomatic offensive, that’s where potent counter-options will have to be found.

(The writer is Managing Editor at Statecraft Daily and has read for DPhil (PhD) in Area Studies at the University of Oxford. Views expressed are personal. He can be reached at singh.ameya95@gmail.com. )