Sri Lanka Needs to Find a ‘Political Common Ground’ in Its Foreign Policy
Championing a rules-based maritime order in the Indian Ocean, which Sri Lanka has long called for since its 1971 ‘Indian Ocean Peace Zone’ (IOPZ) proposal and ensuring strict adherence to the provisions of the ‘UN Convention on the Law of the Sea’ (UNCLOS), will reinforce Sri Lanka’s credibility and also encourage cooperative stability in the Indian Ocean.

In seeking to discern Sri Lanka’s behaviour through classical International Relations theory, it is noted that post-2009 Sri Lanka’s foreign policy posture has been palpably fluid, with successive political administrations moving away from the time-tested non-alignment and having adopted varying strategies – balancing, bandwagoning, neutrality and hedging, particularly in dealing with the major power rivalry in the region. The ensuing contestation and resulting polarisation between the major powers seeking to engage Sri Lanka – China, India and the US - while being highly transactional, effectively made it a ‘zero-sum’ game and brought pressure on Sri Lanka to join their respective, exclusive and joint ‘spheres of influence’.
Notwithstanding the material loss and emotional strain that had to be endured by the Sri Lankan polity, the politico-economic crisis of 2022 can be regarded as having been a positive disruption, albeit temporary, in arresting this trend of ‘pendulum swings’ in foreign policy and enabling Sri Lanka to re-gravitate to the middle. The international collaboration that was to emerge to enable the approval of the IMF Extended Fund Facility with help from all creditors, is proof that in a crisis Sri Lanka remains worthy of support from its international partners, despite the bilateral differences that may exist between the countries concerned.
Sustaining this momentum is a challenge and Sri Lanka presently stands at a crossroads. The ‘strategic space’ provided through the broad support received from these three countries, among others, in stabilising the economy might be nearing its end and the quest for ‘real estate’ is bound to resume. Following the ending of the one-year moratorium on research vessels entering Sri Lankan waters and the recent brief India-Pakistan armed confrontation, there is also a heightened sense of insecurity and vulnerability in the region.
Also, given the prevailing global uncertainties resulting from the recalibration of previously tested alliances and international practices,Sri Lanka could also face punitive shocks and increasingly become collateral in the great-power confrontations.
Over the past six weeks, the impermanence we have seen in the major power relationships themselves – whether triggered by tariffs, ending wars, or more idiosyncratic factors, re-enforces the truism of the merit of the need to hold one’s own in global affairs.
Key Ingredients
In such a context, I believe that rather than seeking to find theoretical labels as to what Sri Lanka’s ‘foreign policy posture’ ought to be, it would be more helpful to ascertain the key ‘ingredients’ a sustainable Sri Lankan foreign policy posture should include. The suggestions below are presented as a non-exhaustive list for such consideration;
‘Zero-sum’ Logic
i) Primarily, Sri Lanka’s foreign policy resilience will hinge on resisting the ‘zero-sum’ logic through which competing major powers/blocs try to force the island into their exclusive spheres of influence, with some Sri Lankans also supporting this cause. Instead, Sri Lankan diplomacy must create the space for the country to engage in transactions with all countries on the basis of Sri Lanka’s objective national interest—safeguarding the sovereignty, territorial integrity, economic sustainability, and national security of Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka cannot afford to forego its major export market in the US and Europe, as much as it is conscious that its future prosperity can be enhanced by hitching on to the Indian growth cycle. At the same time, it also has to depend on China (and also Russia) in the face of the multilateral affronts it faces in the realm of human rights. This is likely to remain so in the foreseeable future.
ii) Conscious of the externally influenced security challenges Sri Lanka has faced in the past, in ensuring national security, Sri Lanka cannot afford to drop its guard and to be over-dependent on any single outside power. It should refrain from signing long-term, defence and strategic-assets-related agreements. While retaining sufficient vigilance on the ground, it must also maintain close scrutiny in the realm of ocean security and air security, where impermeability will be vital to Sri Lanka’s strength—as both a state and an economy.
In order to guard against challenges and retain latitude, the onus will be on Sri Lanka to keep the contending parties equidistant, while making the choices it does in a transparent manner in order not to cause undue anxiety to any. The remedy is to offer predictability in regional security that we will be responsible about how we deal with our country and our territory, that can have a positive spillover effect and be a ‘win-win’ situation for all concerned.
iii) Sri Lanka must not leave cause for concern with respect to India’s legitimate security interests that could emanate from Sri Lanka.
In this context, given that perceptions do matter in diplomacy, the current demands for exclusivity could be averted through greater transparency in dealings so that when concerns arise, as happened during the final phase of the terrorist conflict with the LTTE, objective verifiable processes are in place to ascertain the veracity of the same and to troubleshoot where necessary. Conscious of the rapid advances in military technology and particularly the increasing propensity for dual-use technology, Sri Lanka must also strengthen its own technical capacity to assess and determine the veracity of any concerns raised speedily, so that in the future such issues do not impede Sri Lanka’s development, affect bilateral relations with friendly countries, nor tarnish Sri Lanka’s global image.
Championing a rules-based maritime order in the Indian Ocean, which Sri Lanka has long called for since its 1971 ‘Indian Ocean Peace Zone’ (IOPZ) proposal and ensuring strict adherence to the provisions of the ‘UN Convention on the Law of the Sea’ (UNCLOS), will reinforce Sri Lanka’s credibility and also encourage cooperative stability in the Indian Ocean.
Need to diversify external markets
iv) Within this strategic backdrop, given that geopolitics is inseparable from geoeconomics, while continuing international collaboration with the IMF and all creditors in managing the debt burden, Sri Lanka must urgently diversify its external markets for trade, aid, investment, tourism, and labour, in order to regain latitude and to help guard against punitive shocks or being caught as collateral in great-power confrontations.
In this context, the US reciprocal tariffs issue has been a “wake-up call” of the country’s limited flexibility, particularly with a bulk of Sri Lanka’s exports dependent on the West, and lack of complementarity in what we have to sell and buy from regions beyond. What the next product or service that will complement the foreign exchange presently raked in by the apparel sector, and how the sustainability of both will be sustained through expanding their respective backward linkages within Sri Lanka, remains a challenge.
As for investment, keeping the ‘Colombo Port City’ genuinely open to investors from all quarters will be an important barometer in this quest.On all these aspects, there are plenty of studies done and there is no need to re-invent the wheel, but to make the hard calls.
v) In order to reposition itself internationally and regain latitude in its international relations, Sri Lanka must also ensure greater engagement with the ‘middle powers’, to whom sufficient proactive attention has not been paid in recent times, bordering on being neglected, given our pre-occupation with the contestation between the Major Powers, Sri Lanka must also ensure greater engagement with the ‘middle powers’; Japan, Indonesia and Australia to the East, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Iran and South Africa to the West, and also, Brazil and Argentina in the Latin American continent.
This is bound to pay rich dividends not only economically, but also politically, as witnessed during the period of Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaike. This broad basing of contact must also extend to the Overseas Sri Lankan Community (OSL) and Non-State Actors (NSAs) in order to harness their diverse skills, knowledge, expertise, and resources, and to facilitate their integration into the national development agenda.
vi) Following a more realistic appraisal of issues, Sri Lanka must also tangibly address the more credible human rights concerns that are being raised in the Human Rights Council, while resisting and calling the bluff on excessive impositions that seek to subserve non-humanitarian agendas of its advocates. To do so, it must regain the support of the Global South, including that of India. Given the rapidly changing global dynamics, in order to press for such an outcome and enable the return to a more principled stance concerning the multilateralisation of Sri Lanka’s human rights issues in Geneva,Sri Lanka must regain the moral high ground.
vii) To this end, mindful of its global responsibilities and obligations,Sri Lanka’s foreign policy posture must enable engagement across the full canvas of international issues—both pursuing its immediate national interest, as well as engaging on issues which have broader resonance and bearing. Sri Lanka must proactively re-project its historical global role played in areas such as disarmament, counter-terrorism, peacekeeping, and international law development, including the Law of the Sea; economic development, including South-South Cooperation; as well as in addressing emerging priorities such as migration, Climate Change, intellectual property, and the regulation of Autonomous Weapons Systems (AWS), on which it has developed expertise in recent times.
This will assist Sri Lanka in regaining credibility in the eyes of its external partners and overcome the looming political challenges and in rebuilding the economy. Having done its fair share, Sri Lanka would then be better positioned to demand fair play from other states, international organisations, and non-state actors.
viii) Sri Lanka must also protect against the emerging practice where resident/visiting foreign dignitaries use Sri Lankan soil to mount propaganda campaigns against third countries—a trend that risks dragging the island into diplomatic crossfire.
Public sensitivities over competing external footprints must also be managed carefully, lest disgruntled powers, together with their domestic allies, could resort to overt retaliation or covert destabilisation. Also, as the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East, as well as the tensions in the South China Sea and Taiwan Straits, remind us, peace in this region cannot be taken for granted.
Hence, Sri Lanka Foreign Policy needs to anticipate scenarios and vulnerabilities that it could be presented with in the future, over which it would have little control, and hence also develop policy options and levers to deal with such eventualities.
Need to Develop Domestic Consensus
xi) Operationalising most of the above-mentioned elements would require that Sri Lanka develops a clear ‘domestic consensus’ on its own perspectives and interests, in order to engage in careful negotiations with relevant interlocutors. At present there appears no effort among political parties at evolving such a consensus on a Sri Lankan Foreign Policy posture that would meet the country’s vital needs in a sustainable manner.
However, it is noteworthy that such consensus did emerge among at least the Southern political groups in the first decade of the 21st Century with regard to defeating terrorism, and more recently there was broad consensus seen in Parliament on seeking IMF assistance, notwithstanding the differences that were to emerge on the nuances of the eventual deal itself and aspects of its operationalisation. These provide hope that achieving consensus might be possible if we work hard enough on foreign policy as well.
However, if unable to find a broad national consensus, at least ‘political common ground’ needs to be found on some aspects of it, while ‘bracketing’ others where we need to work harder to reconcile our disagreements internally. In the interim, all political parties must take a principled position not to allow their internal differences to adversely affect the image of our Sri Lanka abroad.
x) To this end, Sri Lanka should also consider codifying its foreign policy perspective through the enunciation of a ‘White Paper,’ which possibly for the first time in post-independence history can set out some well-defined parameters that have broad domestic multi-party consensus and within which Sri Lanka’s foreign policy could operate. This will necessarily reduce the distortion of Sri Lanka’s actions presently exploited by interested parties and, in the long term, also contain the proclivity of ‘foreign policy adventurism’, sometimes indulged in by Sri Lanka as well.
(Excerpted from the keynote address by the author, a former Foreign Secretary of Sri Lanka, delivered at the inauguration of Asian Geopolitics, Sustainability and Peace Council in Colombo on August 20, 2025)
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