Around a month after the military engagement between India and Pakistan ceased seems a good time to ask whether Operation Sindoor fulfilled the objectives it aimed to achieve. The Indian government’s equivocation on whether and how the Donald Trump-led US administration helped to broker that ceasefire has left the issue of what exactly happened to stop the ‘near war’ situation dangling.

After the ghastly terror attack on tourists in Pahalgam, India’s clearly stated objective for launching Operation Sindoor was to attack and destroy terrorist bases and infrastructure inside Pakistan. A total of nine such locations were targeted and considerable damage inflicted on buildings and personnel in them who, clearly, had the support of the Pakistani State, which has over the past few decades formalised the use of terror as an instrument of its foreign policy, particularly against India.

Reality and perception

Unfortunately for India, the narrative which played out after those strikes, especially across the western world, was of a belligerent India attacking civilian targets inside Pakistan. India also lost some of its strike aircraft in Pakistan’s counter-attack, as hostilities escalated to a ‘near war-like situation’ between the nuclear-armed neighbours.

As the theatre of the fireworks in the night skies shifted from news studios into homes, the Indian government, realising the critical nature of the perception of these events, decided to mount detailed official-military briefings, with Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri leading the official briefing and two lady officers, from the Army and the Air Force, Col. Sofiya Qureishi and Wing Cdr. Vyomika Singh, providing details of military operations undertaken. This injection of realism into the theatre of speculation helped to restore some credibility in the proceedings, despite them bypassing questions.

However, when US President Donald Trump, on his social media feed, announced that the India–Pakistan military engagement would cease, to allow for dialogue, the Indian government stated that there would be a cessation of hostilities, but would not confirm the role of the United States in bringing an end to the violence. India categorically stated that any dialogue would be between India and Pakistan and, as is its traditional position, no third-party mediation would be involved. Dates for any impending dialogue do not appear imminent.  

Re-hyphenation of India-Pakistan

So, despite political rhetoric intended for the domestic audience that dialogue would only be on Delhi’s terms, whether India actually achieved what it set out to do, in terms of eliminating the threat from state–sponsored terrorist groups in Pakistan, is unclear. What is clear is that the message it sent out, that terrorist attacks on its citizens would be countered militarily, appears to have removed the focus from the terrorist acts and brought back equivalence in the India-Pakistan relationship.

The Indian government’s prevarication around why it agreed to the ceasefire, and losses it incurred in the hostilities, has seen questions raised domestically and a re-hyphenation, globally, of the India-Pakistan equation.

Having largely succeeded in de-hyphenating the bilateral relationship after the 26/11/2008 outrage by Pakistan in Mumbai, Operation Sindoor has revived the India–Pakistan equation, on par, despite vast economic and developmental differences between the two countries.

India's poor strategic communication

Having taken on India militarily, Pakistan has found itself back as the cynosure of global attention. Islamabad received its due tranche of IMF aid and elevated Pakistan Army chief, Asif Munir, widely seen in India as the perpetrator of the Pahalgam outrage and coordinator of Pakistan’s military response, to the rank of field marshal, only the second in Pakistan’s history. To add to Delhi’s discomfiture, a key US military commander lauded Pakistan as a pillar of cooperation in the war against terrorism.

Forced onto the back foot and finding itself without firm backers globally, Delhi opted to send groups of parliamentarians to 33 countries to explain that India, and not Pakistan, was the victim of terrorism. However, given the level and nature of the interlocutors they encountered and the fact that Pakistan, as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council, has found itself in key anti-terrorism committees, becoming Chair of the 1988 Taliban Sanctions Committee and Vice Chair of the 1373 Counter-Terrorism Committee, the optics surrounding India’s outreach do not appear successful.

Within India, a special session of parliament was not convened to lay out for the domestic audience details provided to foreign interlocutors. Many voices within India have questioned why the government accepted the ceasefire, when it was ahead militarily.

Similarly, India’s chief of defence staff (CDS), Gen. Anil Chauhan, disclosed at a forum abroad that India had indeed suffered reverses and lost aircraft on day 1 of the operation. He also said Indian armed forces “remedied” and “rectified” their strategy thereafter and emerged on top, causing substantial damage to Pakistan’s military assets.

In sum, while there is no doubt that the Indian armed forces emerged ahead in the military engagement and got to test their battle-readiness in the modern theatre of war, in terms of perception, certainly, Operation Sindoor did not quite achieve what it set out to do.

Needed recalibration of Pakistan strategy

The global view has seen India move from being a possible counter to China to returning to a form of equivalence or re-hyphenation with Pakistan. Responding to terrorist attacks in India with retaliatory military attacks on targets inside Pakistan has assumed predictability -- that allowed Islamabad to prepare accordingly and put up a substantial fight back. The issue of Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir also remains unresolved, despite rhetoric.

The absence of any form of engagement with Pakistan other than military has narrowed India’s options substantially. As a sovereign state, Pakistan cannot be seen to nor will it bow to coercive tactics. The current Indian establishment’s perennially punitive approach to Pakistan and efforts to humiliate it as an object of domestic ridicule has not yielded any dividends.

Instead Operation Sindoor has clearly shown the need for a detailed re-calibration of its Pakistan strategy if India wants to regain a semblance of the global authority it aims to wield.

(The writer is a senior journalist and analyst. Views expressed are personal. She can be reached at nilovarc@gmail.com)