With China tightening hold on South Asia, Maldives a wake-up call for India

Muizzu’s regime in the Maldives in conjunction with Pakistan could be potentially sitting on China’s lap for decades, along with a pro-China government in Nepal, and Myanmar annyway drawn into China’s strategic sphere since the military coup in Nay Pyi Taw in February 2021.

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China-South Asia (Representational Photo)

Maldives President-elect Mohamed Muizzu told Chinese Communist Party officials last year that his party’s return to office would script a further chapter of strong ties between the two countries. Chinese President Xi Jinping has congratulated Muizzu and pledged to deepen ties with the Maldives. China’s foreign ministry statement says, “China is willing to work with the Maldives to consolidate the traditional friendship, deepen mutually beneficial cooperation and push for continuous new progress that would take place in the future-oriented comprehensive friendly cooperative partnership between the two countries”.

Muizzu was a coalition candidate of the Progressive Party of Maldives (PPM) and People’s National Congress (PNC) whose leader, former president Abdulla Yameen, is serving an 11-year sentence for corruption. Muizzu served as a minister both under President Mohammed Waheed and President Abdulla Yameen, overseeing several infrastructure projects including the China-Maldives Friendship Bridge (Sinamale Bridge) connecting Malé to Velana International Airport on Hulhulé. Muizzu became vice president of PPM in 2019 and in 2021 the mayor of Male, the capital city.   

The PPM-PNC coalition rode high on an anti-India wave. In election speeches, Mizzu blamed the outgoing Ibrahim Solih government for decisions taken by a “foreign power” (India), said he would “counteract threats to Maldives' independence”, “protection of the country's independence should get priority over development projects” and  “presence of foreign troops even for civilian purposes will not be tolerated”.

Maldives' strategic importance

India announced $1.4 billion in assistance to the Maldives in 2018 for community/development projects. Muizzu wants India to remove naval helicopters and personnel meant to evacuate the sick from the 1000-odd islands in the archipelago. Under Muizzu, India-Maldives defence cooperation may be toned down including Indian assistance to set up a Coastal Radar System in the Maldives. Muizzi is committed to getting the unabashedly pro-China Yameen out of jail and Yameen will continue to influence Muizzu.     

Located 600 km off the coast of India, 750 km off Sri Lanka and astride three most important SLOCs (sea lines of communication) through which most of India’s trade passes, Maldives is important for the security of India and the region. China has always aimed a transshipment port in Maldives; which is a euphemism to establish a naval presence. This should be viewed together with the Chinese military presence in Gwadar (Pakistan), Hambantota (Sri Lanka), and Chittagong (Bangladesh), the latter under the pretext of training and maintenance of submarines gifted to Bangladesh.

As of June 5 last year, Maldives took MVR 37 billion ($2.4 billion) loan from China in the past four years while  India’s Exim Bank  sourced MVR 19 billion ($1.2 billion) to Maldives. Tourism makes a significant contribution to the economy of Maldives and a large number of Chinese tourists visit Maldives annually.

Muizzu’s regime in the Maldives in conjunction with Pakistan could be potentially sitting on China’s lap for decades, along with a pro-China government in Nepal, and Myanmar anyway drawn into China’s strategic sphere since the military coup in Nay Pyi Taw in February 2021. Moreover, India-China relations have deteriorated since the Chinese aggression in Ladakh and the continuing standoff since then along the entire Line of Actual Control.  

China tightening noose

Are Indian policymakers focusing more on global issues at the cost of India’s immediate neighbourhood despite the sloganeering of “Neighbourhood First”? Is giving financial assistance for community and other projects enough looking at developments in Afghanistan and now Maldives? Have we learned anything from China’s foreign policy, like covert PLA presence in all projects abroad, people-to-people contacts, information warfare and psychological operations – not just focused on bribing and debt trapping?

The anti-India campaign was more than evident in Maldives for some time. Located on historical maritime routes, Maldives was inhabited by diverse ethnic groups including Sinhalese speakers from Sri Lanka, Arabs, Africans, and Tamils and Malayalis from Kerala in India. Did we try to optimize this resource? How do we integrate people-to-people contacts with national security? How is it that we let an anti-India sentiment develop and grow in Maldives which facilitated a pro-Beijing regime?

The expected response would be to term the above a storm in the teacup given the euphoria over India having arrived on the world stage, a bridge between the West and the Global South and a ready mediator in regional/ global quarrels and conflicts. But sidetracking the above issues would be naïve. China is tightening the lariat around us and should the opposition come to power in Bangladesh, which appears to be the US aim also, the noose would be complete. The earlier India adopts a more holistic and rounded foreign policy the better it would be.  

(The author is an Indian Army veteran. Views are personal)

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vinod aggarwal
Sun, 10/08/2023 - 09:32
very well written & full of hard facts and not useless 'gyan'. Loved it.