Interestingly, though the theme for the just concluded Combined Commanders’ Conference was “Year of Reforms - Transforming for the Future”, in the Indian Ministry of Defence press release dated 17 Sep 2025, there is not a word on theaterisation. The concept of “theatreisation” — unifying military forces under a single theatre commander responsible for all operations in a geographical area — has gained prominence in defence reforms worldwide. Nations like the United States, Russia, and China have adopted this model, citing efficiency, clarity of command, and operational synergy. In India, too, the proposal has been actively debated since the creation of the post of the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) in 2019.

However, while theatreisation appears logical on paper, its suitability for India must be carefully assessed in the light of our unique geography, security challenges, and diverse terrain. Unlike the global powers that inspired the model, India does not operate in multiple, clearly demarcated global theatres. Our threats are contiguous, interlinked, and intertwined with political, cultural, and geographical complexities. In such circumstances, rigid theatreisation risks oversimplification and may even weaken operational flexibility.

Concept of theatreisation

Theatreisation of military, while conceptually appealing, is not a one-size-fits-all solution. India’s strategic geography — with two contiguous adversaries, interlinked land-sea challenges, hybrid threats, and extraordinarily diverse terrain — does not lend itself to neat theatre divisions.

refers to the integration of the Army, Navy, and Air Force under unified commands, each covering a defined geographical “theatre of operations.” The theatre commander has complete control over all resources within that theatre, ensuring unity of command and eliminating inter-service silos.

In the US system, for example, INDOPACOM, CENTCOM, EUCOM, AFRICOM each handle specific regions separated by oceans or large geographical divides. The model is attractive because it avoids duplication, fosters joint planning, and gives political leadership a single point of military advice of crises arising at a particular geographic point at any given time.

India’s strategic context

In the context of threats to India with at least two adversaries who are geographically contiguous the strategy is not the same as that for the USA or any other power looking to dominate away from its coasts. India’s two principal military challenges, Pakistan and China, are land neighbours. Their collusion is growing, and any conflict on one front can quickly spill into the other. This differs drastically from the US, where Pacific and European theatres are independent. If India were to divide commands rigidly — say, a western theatre for Pakistan and a northern theatre for China — it may be impossible to separate resources when simultaneous two-front contingencies arise. India’s maritime and continental domains are interlinked. India’s Indian Ocean Region (IOR) is vital for its security. But maritime challenges cannot be isolated from continental ones. China’s naval expansion in the IOR is directly linked to its continental posture in Tibet and along the Line of Actual Control (LAC). Thus, separating land and sea into rigid theatres may undermine synergy rather than strengthen it.

India also faces internal insurgencies in the Northeast, left-wing extremism in central India, and cross-border terrorism in Jammu & Kashmir. These challenges are not limited to one “theatre” but interact with external threats. For instance, insurgent groups in the Northeast may receive shelter or support from neighbouring states like Myanmar or China. Theatreisation does not account easily for such hybrid overlaps.

India’s diverse terrain

Geography is the single greatest reason why theatreisation may not fit the Indian context. The country’s military terrain is varied and interconnected. The Himalayas in the North and North East the terrain is characterized by high altitude, extreme weather, and fragile logistics. The adversary, China along the LAC can challenge with operations in Ladakh which cannot be isolated from those in Arunachal Pradesh, as China may shift pressure across sectors.

The terrain in the West is mostly deserts of Rajasthan and the plains of Punjab with the adversary Pakistan along the Line of Control (LoC) and international border. The challenge is fast-moving armoured operations here that demand air support, which also overlaps with requirements on the Northern front. Moving South the Indian Ocean littoral presents open sea and island territories (Andaman & Nicobar, Lakshadweep). The challenge, besides Pakistan with whom we share the Arabian sea, is also from Chinese naval presence, piracy and maritime terrorism. The challenge for maritime operations is to coordinate with land-based missile systems and air power, especially in case of a two-front war.

In contrast the Northeastern hills and jungles are full of dense forests, river valleys posing difficult for connectivity. The adversaries are China (Arunachal) and Myanmar border insurgencies. The operations require specialized light infantry, air mobility, and cross-border coordination. The central and urban India offers a mix of cities, forests, central plateau, threatening insurgency (Naxal) and cyber/space warfare requiring functional and not geographical, commands.

Because threats can spill across these terrains rapidly, drawing hard theatre boundaries may paralyse the armed forces. For example, in a war with China, India cannot afford to keep the Navy confined to a maritime theatre alone — it will be critical in blockading Chinese shipping through the Malacca Strait to relieve pressure on land.

Theaterisation

The arguments in regard to theatreisation of the military in India are varied: 

Potential benefits: To be fair, theatreisation does have potential benefits beside establishing a Unified Command removing inter-service rivalry and ensuring one commander is accountable. Pooling resources reduces duplication of logistics and planning. Encourages services to think together, not separately with joint training and doctrine.

Potential drawbacks: India’s challenges are contiguous, not separated by oceans or continents and so lacks distinct geographical theatres. Hence, dividing forces into rigid theatres may be artificial and counterproductive. The diverse terrain obtained in the areas of potential conflicts, from high-altitude warfare to desert armour battles to maritime operations, India’s forces must often shift between terrains. Theatreisation may reduce this flexibility. Unlike the US, India does not have overwhelming surplus resources. Splitting scarce assets like fighter squadrons, AWACS, or submarines into rigid theatres risks sub-optimal deployment. Theatreisation may create new command layers, slowing decision-making in crises where agility is vital.

India already has integrated structures like the Andaman & Nicobar Command and the Strategic Forces Command, as well as the CDS. Functional integration (air defence, logistics, cyber, space) may serve better than geographical theatreisation.

Alternative approach: Indian model of integration

Instead of blindly copying foreign models, India should develop its own approach by focusing on functional Commands like Air Defence Command, Maritime Command, Cyber & Space Commands, and Integrated Logistics Command. This allows forces to flow across sectors dynamically under central planning without geographical restraints.  Shared training, doctrines, and interoperable systems will enhance Jointness. This model will also ensure political leadership can direct resources seamlessly without rigid theatre boundaries.

India Should Pursue Jointness 

Theatreisation of military, while conceptually appealing, is not a one-size-fits-all solution. India’s strategic geography — with two contiguous adversaries, interlinked land-sea challenges, hybrid threats, and extraordinarily diverse terrain — does not lend itself to neat theatre divisions. A rigid model risks diluting flexibility and may even weaken India’s ability to fight a two-front war.

Instead, India should pursue jointness without rigidity: integrated functional commands, shared logistics, and unified doctrines. The goal must be to harness synergy, not to impose artificial boundaries. Theatreisation is valuable only when adapted to Indian conditions, not transplanted wholesale from foreign experiences.

In short, the Indian way must be integration without fragmentation, harnessing jointness across diverse terrains while retaining the flexibility demanded by our unique security environment.

(The author is an Indian Army veteran and a contemporary affairs commentator. The views are personal. He can be reached at kl.viswanathan@gmail.com)