India’s wars since independence have been primarily about territorial defence. The principle of orthodox offensive and defensive doctrine has consistently underlined India’s conventional conflicts. This approach is all about applying military force based on large army formations. However, in the context of technological advancements, the modus operandi to wage wars has been constantly changing, and much rapidly in recent times. The future wars will be contested in more dimensions alongside the conventional ones. The dividing lines between war and peace are increasingly blurring and the notions of victory have altered.

Non-contact wars of kinetic and non-kinetic varieties have become the new normal, which raise the skepticism regarding large, massed militaries guarding territories, alongside the one-dimensional military doctrines. Yet this does not mean that advanced nation states will not need a sizeable military. The concept of offensive realism argues about maintaining a credible military deterrence and this also applies to India and the Indian military must be prepared for a broad spectrum of military activities, from surgical operations to full-scale conflicts.

The Indian military experienced an eventuality of modern warfare firsthand, during operation Sindoor in May 2025. Operation Sindoor saw the employment of long range precise strikes against multiple terrorist camps both in Pakistan and Pakistan occupied Kashmir. Notwithstanding India’s earlier military responses to Pakistan sponsored terror, Pakistan had not at all been deterred. In Op Sindoor, India went for imposition of meaningful material costs to Pakistan, to at least degrade its capacity, showcasing that India is willing to use punishment as a part of its deterrence doctrine.

The operation saw an escalation over four days and was indeed a headline moment for three reasons. First, it redefined India's red lines. Second was the high standards of jointness between the three services in target selection and in the conduct of the operations. Third, was about the combination of military force and political intent. India’s measured response during the Operation Sindoor and adversary’s response was indeed a microcosmic representation of future conflicts that India must be prepared for. The lessons from Operation Sindoor, both positive and negative, need to be built upon in shaping security doctrines, keeping in mind that the future conflicts may not be as short as Op Sindoor.

The tenor and dimensions of the wars ahead, call for a whole of the nation approach. In the Indian context, directives emanate from national political leadership to the military strategic leadership. Military force should be applied with clear, well-defined, and achievable objectives. The disconnect between political aims and military objectives can undermine the overall effectiveness of military action, which underscores the imperative of having a written National Security Strategy (NSS) to be culled into a National Military Doctrine by the military. The proposed document could be in two variants- classified and unclassified. The military leaders have to be involved in the national security decision making at the national level.

The office of Chief of Defence (CDS) as primary advisor to the Defence Minister does fulfil the role of a responsive and empowered interface between the political and military leadership at the national and strategic level. However, it is felt that in order to further enable a seamless coordination and to further improve the structure of the higher defence organisation, there is a case of positioning CDS within the architecture of National Security Council (NSC) and with the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS).

Multi-domain nature of future wars makes integration of all the three services an inescapable imperative - for shortening the decision-making cycle and an optimal utilisation of resources. Operation Sindoor demonstrated that the time between an incident happening and the response to the same is now measured in days, and not in weeks or months. There is a requirement of having a joint integrated structures already in place when a crisis happens or even during the pre-emptive stages. The office of CDS is most suitably positioned to facilitate such integration. These aspects are repeatedly emphasised upon by the Indian policy makers; however more than five years since the creation of the office of CDS, critical reforms in this respect are pending.

A new doctrine needs to align with India’s broader national security objectives, based on a realistic threat assessment. The development of doctrine should involve a diverse range of perspectives from military leaders, strategists, technologists, academics etc to ensure a comprehensive and forward-looking framework. An integrated expeditionary capability is a necessity. The Integrated Battle Groups (IBGs) concept and the recent inception of limited numbers of Rudra brigade and Bhairav battalions, may require further consolidation to match futuristic power projection goals.

The conventional military doctrine based on guarding territories by large land formation requires to diversify and adopt the postulates of non-contact warfare. In the context of the multi-domain nature of conflicts in the backdrop of modern technologies, the military needs to fight in a dispersed and decentralised manner. The requirement of technically-enabled junior leadership is paramount, making directive style of command pertinent.  

The force modernisation has to be tactics and strategy led rather than technology led. The said approach to modernisation enables the combatants to lead the process by identifying shortfalls and addressing them. In India at present, technology-led modernisation is followed. The prevalent system of acquisition of a capability is based on a technology that already exists - a system in which we always remain behind the curve when compared to modern militaries.

Operation Sindoor has drawn new redlines vis-a-vis Pakistan sponsored terrorism. The caveat in this regard is that any enunciated policy should not cage the government in a commitment trap and restrict the available options in future. Protracted covert operations may be a more pragmatic approach than going overt each time a terror act manifests. Also, the gaps experienced in the information domain during Operation Sindoor warrant evolving robust capabilities that address the gaps.

The greatest challenge of our times is to be able to make correct and timely assessments of the changes taking place in the strategic environment, the nature and extent of the challenges and threats, and the best methods to combat them. Given the challenges concerning security that India faces, this is the time to press pause, contemplate, refashion and reset.

(The author is an Indian Army veteran and currently an Associate Professor of Practice with OP Jindal Global University. Views expressed are personal. He can be contacted at shashank.ranjan@jgu.edu.in)