Unrest continues to prevail in Gilgit-Baltistan, the Indian mountainous region under Pakistan’s illegal occupation, with 2026 beginning on an unsettling note. Political uncertainty has intensified following the postponement of the Gilgit-Baltistan Assembly elections, originally scheduled for January 24, 2026, as well as the local bodies’ elections set for February 14. No revised dates have been announced, at this writing.

The postponement constitutes a violation of the Gilgit-Baltistan Empowerment and Self-Governance Order - which came into force in 2009  and through which the government of Pakistan grants a measure of self-rule to the people of the region - and related election laws, which mandate that elections be held within 60 days of the dissolution of the local assembly upon completion of its five-year term. With the assembly dissolved in November 2025, January 24, 2026 was the final permissible date for the polls. The official justification—severe winter conditions and heavy snowfall posing logistical challenges—has failed to reassure the local population.  

Protests And Violence

The immediate trigger for fresh protests in early 2026 has been the composition of the caretaker government installed after the assembly’s dissolution. Headed by former judge Yar Muhammad Nasir, the caretaker administration was mainly meant to oversee the electoral process. However, controversy erupted over the formation of a 14-member caretaker cabinet comprising 12 ministers and two advisers. Allegations that partisan considerations influenced some appointments, with the intent of shaping future electoral outcomes, have sparked demonstrations. The protests are being led by the Gilgit-Baltistan Youth Movement, whose leader, Azfar Jamshed, has warned of sustained agitation if youth are excluded from consultations. At the same time, residents in several areas, including Hunza, have launched protests demanding basic rights such as access to water and electricity.

These developments are rooted in the sustained instability that marked 2025. Throughout that year, Gilgit-Baltistan witnessed a rapid succession of protests and violent incidents reflecting deep public discontent. In early January 2025, residents staged a six-day protest against crippling power shortages, with outages lasting up to 22 hours a day. Demonstrators blocked key roads, including the strategically vital Karakoram Highway, before the agitation ended following government assurances to reduce power cuts. Soon thereafter, traders in Sost, Hunza, staged a sit-in over taxation and customs-clearance issues, again blocking the Karakoram Highway.

The security situation deteriorated further in 2025. A terrorist attack on a Gilgit-Baltistan Scouts checkpost resulted in two fatalities and one injury, heightening tensions. Protests later resumed in Sost, disrupting trade between Pakistan and China via the Khunjerab Pass. The year culminated in two high-profile attacks on October 5, when unidentified gunmen ambushed Maulana Qazi Nisar Ahmed, Ameer of the Ahl-e-Sunnat wal Jamaat in Gilgit-Baltistan and Kohistan, near the police headquarters in Gilgit, injuring him and several others. On the same day, Malik Inayat-ur-Rehman, the Chief Court Judge of Gilgit-Baltistan, narrowly escaped an assassination attempt near the City Hospital. The then chief minister and the local army commander rushed to the injured cleric’s side, highlighting concerns over the fragile Shia-Sunni balance.

Shia Mistrust, Chinese Presence

At the heart of the crisis lies a deep and enduring mistrust between the Shia-majority population of Gilgit-Baltistan and Islamabad’s political and administrative establishment, rooted in the region’s historical association with Jammu and Kashmir. Decades of repression, sectarian engineering, and selective disenfranchisement—particularly since the late 1970s following Iran’s Shia revolution—have intensified this alienation. These dynamics, compounded by Islamabad’s prioritisation of strategic imperatives, most notably China-backed projects under the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), have further marginalised local communities. As a result, serious questions persist regarding Gilgit-Baltistan’s political future and its long-term stability.

(The author is a veteran journalist and analyst who specialises in the study of India's border regions, particularly Jammu and Kashmir. Views are entirely personal.  He can be reached at pushpsaraf@yahoo.com)