No country can progress economically in the face of threats to its security and well-being by neighbours inimical to its interests such as nuclear-armed Pakistan and China. Accordingly, India’s foreign policy cannot be static, but dynamic and capable of responding to dire security challenges. Regrettably, the country’s deeply flawed strategic vision has been riddled with a succession of blunders, missed opportunities and crass negligence. 

One need only recall how the then political dispensation gifted the UN Security Council seat to China after four permanent members – the US, Russia, the UK and France -- offered it to India, besides transferring the strategically located CoCo Island near Andaman and Nicobar Islands to Burma. It is now under Chinese occupation, having been leased to Beijing. Lastly, New Delhi’s reluctance to buy Gwadar Port in Balochistan when it was offered by the Sultan of Oman.    

Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel’s warning to Jawaharlal Nehru, India's first prime minister, about Chinese designs fell on deaf years. Nehru not only ignored his deputy’s advice but he also disregarded the counsel of Indian Army chiefs, Gen K.S. Thimaiyya and  Gen P.N. Thapar, who pleaded for bolstering defence preparedness, in the light of Chinese muscle-flexing in Ladakh and in then NEFA (Arunachal Pradesh).  Consequently, China invaded India in 1962 and inflicted an ignominious defeat.  India lost huge chunks of territory. Thousands of soldiers, clad only in cotton, died fighting to the ‘last man and last round’ in the unforgiving sub-zero temperatures on Himalayan peaks. 

Involve military 

In this context, it is pertinent to quote what Lt Gen P G Kamath, one of the foremost strategic thinkers and former Commandant of the Army War College, Mhow, observed:  “Marginalization of the Armed Forces continues even today; by keeping the  CDS and the three Service Chiefs out of the Cabinet Committee on Defence and Security (CCS), to the detriment of evolution of a cohesive national strategy and defence and security policy; based on which takes place the evolution of a robust foreign policy.”  

Therefore, any evolution of a foreign policy without the involvement of the CDS and the three service chiefs can never be coherent or a robust one, catering to the needs of taking on challenges in today’s fast-changing world and geopolitics. 

The inking of the Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Co-operation between India and the then USSR in August 1971 will go down as a masterstroke of then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. It paved the way for the Indian Army to inflict a crushing defeat on Pakistan and ensure the liberation of Bangladesh in 1971. Unfortunately, during the Shimla talks in July 1972, Gandhi not only faltered in regaining Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK), by using the 93,000 Pakistani PoWs as a bargaining chip, but also willingly agreed to their repatriation, against the express advice of then Army Chief, Field Marshal Sam Manekshaw, the architect of India’s victory over Pakistan in 1971. 

Opportunity lost 

Why did Gandhi let go of the opportunity to wrest control of PoK?  It is believed that she dithered on the issue of repatriation of the PoWs when Manekshaw insisted against giving in to Pakistan Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s demand. But some of the bureaucrats, allegedly at Washington’s behest, reportedly advised her to the contrary. They urged her to agree to the repatriation, as a gesture of magnanimity and goodwill, in her hour of victory and glory. Gandhi buckled.  

It is essential to identify nations that would stand by us in the hour of crisis. Washington has never supported India, given its past record. Its refusal to part with the locations of Pakistani invaders during Kargil is only too well known.   Bangladesh could be ruled out in extending any help or support to India in case of war with China and Pakistan.  Then Nepal, Burma, Sri Lanka and the Maldives would most likely turn pro-China. 

Which country can help India in such an eventuality? Russia has been India’s main supplier of military equipment for decades and even today. The rock-solid support during the 1971 war helped ensure India’s victory. It is thus imperative that India woos Russia and signs a treaty like the previous one in 1971. New Delhi should convince Moscow that China is no friend and will betray it just as Hitler did by invading the country on June 22, 1941, despite a non-aggression pact. China is eyeing to integrate Outer Manchuria, once part of it in the 19th century, but presently under Russian occupation.  

Cultivate Taliban 

It is said there are no permanent friends or foes amongst nations, but only permanent interests. India must explore ways to reach out to the Taliban in Afghanistan, however bitter it may sound, and establish a working relationship, by providing Afghans desperately needed supplies of food and medicines. New Delhi can cultivate the Taliban to its advantage and neutralize Pakistan. 

Iran has signed a staggering $400 billion deal with China in March 2021, including military cooperation. India lost whatever leverage it had over Tehran by way of developing Chabahar port. Nevertheless, the efficacy of our foreign policy would lie in regaining its confidence and getting back to the development of Chabahar port, besides the construction of an all-weather six-lane highway from Chabahar to Iranshahr-Zahedan-Zabol-Mashhad and beyond. 

There is an urgent and inescapable need to conclude a South-East Asian Nations Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Co-operation to resist and counteract Chinese hegemony in the region. As it is envisaged that Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei and the Philippines would be part of the treaty, the combined might of all these countries would be no match for China. India must be part of such a treaty. It is the only country in the Indo Pacific region that can act as a counterweight to China. It is now left to the collective diplomatic efforts of the South-East Asian countries, including India, to prevail upon Russia to join the treaty. 

(The author is an Indian Army (Bombay Sapper) veteran. Views are personal).