Russian President Vladimir Putin’s recent visit to India signals the emergence of a new geopolitical and geo-economic phase in the Russia–India–China (RIC) trilateral relationship. Against the backdrop of renewed tariff threats and economic nationalism under a potential second Trump presidency, the RIC framework highlights a growing determination among these three powers to pursue strategic autonomy and national interests, rather than submit to external economic pressure.

Contrary to popular perception, China is not merely an economic burden for India, nor is Russia an insignificant economic partner. On the contrary, both have become critical pillars supporting India’s growth trajectory, industrial expansion, and macroeconomic stability.

China’s Role In India’s Industrial Take-off

Large-scale imports from China are often portrayed as a vulnerability for India. In reality, they have played a decisive role in nurturing new industries and accelerating economic growth. Imports of critical components from China have enabled the rapid expansion of India’s electronics, telecommunications, and automobile industries—now among the country’s fastest-growing manufacturing and export sectors.

From mobile phone manufacturing and telecom equipment to electrical machinery, Chinese components and intermediate goods form the backbone of India’s industrial supply chains. What was once considered a trade “blemish” is increasingly viewed as a growth enabler.

At present, three industries—electronics, telecommunications, and automobiles—are driving India’s manufacturing and export momentum. In each, China remains the largest supplier of essential inputs. In 2024–25, China accounted for nearly 40 per cent of India’s electronic goods imports, 38 per cent of electrical machinery imports, and 27 per cent of auto component imports, even though Japan remains the largest investor in the automobile sector.

Reshaping India’s Export Basket

Chinese imports have also been instrumental in reshaping India’s export profile. Electronics and engineering goods together accounted for 34.4 per cent of India’s total exports in 2024–25, up sharply from just 15.3 per cent in 2000–01. In contrast, traditional sectors such as textiles, garments, and agriculture have seen their share shrink to around one-tenth of the export basket, down from nearly one-fourth two decades ago.

India’s electronics industry witnessed explosive growth between 2014 and 2024, with production expanding sixfold and exports rising eightfold. By 2024–25, electronics had become India’s third-largest export category. Notably, the United States emerged as the single largest destination, absorbing 37.2 per cent of India’s electronics exports.

This success, however, remains closely linked to imports of critical components from China. India’s electronics imports from China more than doubled over the decade—from US$19.8 billion in 2014–15 to US$40.5 billion in 2024–25.

India’s engineering sector has grown in tandem with the automobile industry, which contributes 7.1 per cent to GDP and nearly 46 per cent to manufacturing GDP. While Japanese investment has been central to this expansion, China has played a crucial supporting role by supplying auto parts and intermediate inputs.

By 2024–25, China had emerged as the largest source of imported auto components, accounting for more than one-fourth of India’s total auto parts imports. Government initiatives such as the Productivity Linked Incentive (PLI) scheme and strong domestic demand further reinforced this momentum.

India–China Political Reset 

Beyond trade, 2025 witnessed cautious but meaningful political efforts by India and China to reset bilateral relations amid global geopolitical and geo-economic turbulence triggered by Trump-era tariff wars.

On August 31, 2025, Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Xi Jinping met in Tianjin on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit. The meeting prioritised development cooperation over long-standing border disputes. Prime Minister Modi raised concerns about India’s widening trade deficit, while President Xi emphasised development as a foundation for restoring economic relations, even as boundary issues remain unresolved.

China soon signalled its intent by easing export restrictions on key items such as urea fertiliser, rare earth materials, and tunnel-boring machines. In response, India reopened tourist visas for Chinese nationals after years of restrictions.

These developments culminated in Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s visit to India in August 2025, underscoring renewed diplomatic engagement. Reinforcing this trend, reports suggested that India’s Adani Group was exploring potential collaborations with Chinese electric vehicle giant BYD to manufacture batteries in India.

Russia’s Resurgence As Economic Partner

A similar revival has occurred in India–Russia economic relations, which had weakened after the collapse of the Soviet Union. While Russia long remained India’s principal defence partner and political ally, Western sanctions transformed it into a major economic partner—particularly in energy.

Russia has now overtaken OPEC members to become India’s largest crude oil supplier. In 2024–25, India sourced nearly 35 per cent of its crude oil imports from Russia, compared to just 1 per cent in 2021–22. Overall, Russia supplies more than one-third of India’s total crude oil imports.

Oil plays a critical role in India’s domestic economy and export structure. Nearly 30 per cent of India’s energy consumption is oil-based, and petroleum products accounted for 14.5 per cent of total exports in 2024–25. Russia has therefore become indispensable to both India’s internal economic stability and its external trade performance.

RIC Trilateralism A Strategic Opportunity 

Against this backdrop, the evolving Russia–India–China trilateral relationship presents a growing challenge to the United States and its aligned economies. More importantly, it represents a strategic opportunity for the three countries to coordinate policies, counter external economic coercion, and assert greater autonomy in pursuit of national interests. 

Putin’s visit to India thus goes beyond symbolism. It reflects a broader realignment in global power equations, where emerging economies are increasingly willing to collaborate outside Western-dominated frameworks to shape their own economic and strategic futures.

(The writer is an Indian trade consultant and analyst. Views expressed are personal. He can be contacted at subratamajumder0604@gmail.com)