In early February 2026, political controversy erupted in the Lok Sabha, the lower house of the Indian Parliament, when Leader of the Opposition Rahul Gandhi attempted to cite an unpublished memoir of former Army Chief General M.M. Naravane. He alleged that during the 2020 India–China standoff, political leaders failed to issue clear directives when informed of advancing Chinese armour. The government dismissed the reference as unverified and procedurally improper.

The parliamentary dispute, however, distracts from a more fundamental question: has India’s long-standing “bulletless” border doctrine unintentionally enabled Chinese coercion along the Line of Actual Control (LAC)?

For decades, India and China have managed a contested boundary without sustained exchange of gunfire. The 1993 Border Peace and Tranquillity Agreement, followed by the 1996 Agreement on Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs), explicitly prohibited opening fire or conducting blast operations within two kilometres of the LAC. Subsequent agreements in 2005 and 2013 reinforced commitments to “maximum self-restraint.”

These mechanisms were designed to prevent escalation. They succeeded in doing so. But they also created a structural asymmetry—restricting firearms without preventing violence.

PLA’s Calibrated Escalation Model

The Communist Party of China (CPC) and its military arm, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), operate through calibrated assertiveness: pressure without declared war, coercion without formal escalation. Beijing combines infrastructure build-up, psychological signalling, deception, and incremental territorial manoeuvres to alter facts on the ground.

The PLA has not fought a major sustained war since the 1979 Sino-Vietnam conflict. Yet along the Himalayan frontier, it has refined a doctrine of controlled aggression—remaining below the firearms threshold while steadily shifting operational realities.

Physical intimidation, tactical surprise, feigned withdrawals, camouflage, rapid infrastructure construction and multi-pronged probing actions form part of what may be described as a “five-target” approach to incremental advantage.

Restraint, when reciprocated, stabilizes borders. When exploited, it erodes deterrence.

1967: A Forgotten Precedent

The 1967 clashes at Nathu La in Sikkim remain instructive. When Chinese troops opened heavy machine-gun and artillery fire on Indian soldiers laying a wire fence, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi authorized decisive retaliation. The Indian Army’s artillery response reportedly inflicted heavy casualties on the PLA and reset the tactical equation.

After 1967, direct large-scale firefights largely ceased. Whether by coincidence or calculation, Beijing appeared to internalize the cost of escalation when confronted with credible force.

The post-1996 period, however, introduced a new dynamic. The prohibition on firearms created predictability—but also opportunity for calibrated coercion.

Galwan: Brutality Within a Legal Framework

On June 15, 2020, in the Galwan Valley, that structural vulnerability became evident. PLA troops attacked Indian soldiers with improvised spiked clubs and nail-studded rods. Twenty Indian soldiers, including the Commanding Officer of 14 Bihar Regiment, were killed.

Indian troops did not use firearms, adhering to existing agreements—even as the spirit of those agreements was violated.

China officially acknowledged four fatalities. Independent assessments suggested significantly higher Chinese casualties, many resulting from close combat and the freezing river.

Galwan was not merely a tragic clash; it exposed the limitations of a regime that restricts bullets but not brutality.

Buffer Zones and Shifting Equilibria

The aftermath saw disengagement processes that produced buffer zones in multiple friction areas: Galwan (PP-14), Gogra-Hot Springs (PP-17A), Pangong Tso’s North Bank, and continued restrictions in Depsang. These arrangements reduced immediate tensions but also constrained Indian patrol access to areas previously reached.

Satellite imagery indicated expanded Chinese infrastructure, strengthened positions, and improved logistical connectivity.

Officially, India maintained that no territory was lost. Strategically, however, many analysts described the situation as a shift in the status quo—an altered operational environment in which access, patrolling patterns and tactical depth were recalibrated.

Disengagement stabilized flashpoints. It did not restore the earlier equilibrium.

Kailash Range: Leverage and Limits

In August 2020, Indian forces pre-emptively occupied key heights along the Kailash Range, overlooking Chinese deployments at Spanggur Gap and Moldo. For a brief period, India possessed significant tactical leverage.

The February 2021 disengagement required vacating these heights as part of mutual withdrawal. While the move contributed to de-escalation, critics argue that India relinquished a hard-won advantage without securing broader restoration of patrol rights elsewhere.

Meanwhile, China continued force consolidation and infrastructure expansion across Eastern Ladakh.

The Deterrence Dilemma

For nearly six decades since 1967, the PLA has not faced sustained Indian firearm retaliation along the LAC. India has demonstrated discipline and respect for agreements—even under provocation.

India’s military modernization, indigenous defence production, and enhanced readiness are undeniable. Yet deterrence rests not only on capability but on perceived willingness to employ that capability when red lines are crossed.

The central strategic dilemma is this: can a framework designed for mutual restraint remain effective if one side systematically exploits its constraints?

Agreements that prevent escalation are valuable. But agreements that prevent proportionate response while enabling incremental coercion may undermine deterrence.

Rethinking the “Bulletless” Paradigm

Reassessment does not imply recklessness. Nor does it advocate automatic escalation. It requires doctrinal clarity.

If the PLA engages in violent incursions that violate both the letter and spirit of existing agreements, India must retain the option of calibrated, proportionate use of firearms under defined rules of engagement. A credible posture—clearly communicated but responsibly managed—may restore deterrent balance.

The objective is not escalation for its own sake. It is the restoration of equilibrium.

The 1967 precedent suggests that decisive response can compel recalibration. The 2020 experience suggests that unreciprocated restraint invites probing.

Confidence-building measures remain relevant—but they must not become instruments that lock one side into permanent asymmetry.

A border regime that prevents bullets yet permits bloodshed cannot be strategically sustainable.

The question is not whether India values restraint. It does. The question is whether restraint, in its present form, sufficiently protects national interest.

If deterrence is to endure along the LAC, it must be credible—not merely declaratory.

(The author, a strategic affairs analyst and former spokesperson, Defence Ministry and Indian Army, can be contacted at wordsword02@gmail.com, https://www.linkedin.com/in/anil-bhat-70b94766/ and @ColAnilBhat8252, https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCPJKaZOcAt9K8fcDkb_onng )