Neutrality and balance — Colombo’s habitual vocabulary — have yielded little economic benefit. Ultimately, Sri Lanka slid into bankruptcy. Given this background, the land link is not merely a strategic starting point but a necessity. India’s strategic position on Sri Lanka is perennial; whether the bridge is built or not, India’s concerns remain fundamental. As an immediate neighbour and rising global power, India will not allow rivals to use Sri Lanka as a base.
If India and China choose collaboration by setting aside strategic suspicion in the climate domain, they could fundamentally reshape the trajectory of the 21st century, as they have already demonstrated individually through their pursuit of clean energy over the past decade. More importantly, such a coalition could revive the COP28 fossil-fuel phase-down pledge, which stalled at COP29 in Baku and appears to be drifting further at COP30 in Belém.
Increased industrial activity in India could generate demand for raw materials, intermediate goods, and services from countries such as Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka. Bangladesh’s textile industry could strengthen its links with Indian manufacturing networks, while Sri Lanka may gain from expanded opportunities in tourism, logistics, and services.
ADB’s role has evolved beyond financing into shaping India’s structural transformation into a high-growth, technology-driven, and climate-conscious economy. Compared to other multilateral institutions, it offers a more agile, implementation-focused, and regionally attuned approach. As India moves toward becoming one of the world’s largest economies, this partnership will play a defining role in shaping not only India’s growth trajectory but also the broader economic future of Asia.
The evolving Russia–India–China trilateral relationship presents a growing challenge to the United States and its aligned economies. More importantly, it represents a strategic opportunity for the three countries to coordinate policies, counter external economic coercion, and assert greater autonomy in pursuit of national interests. Putin’s visit to India thus goes beyond symbolism. It reflects a broader realignment in global power equations
China remains central to the 2025 NSS, particularly in the Indo-Pacific. The strategy strengthens U.S. denial capabilities along the First Island Chain, deepens integration with allies such as Japan, Australia, the Philippines and Taiwan, and increases pressure on partners to reduce economic and technological dependencies on China.
As two large maritime nations with aspirations to be global leaders, and who have also been identified as contributors to both these problems (China in both cases and India in relation to plastic pollution), if Beijing and Delhi are committed to equitable global governance, their actions on the ground must harmonize with their policy rhetoric. The oceans offer an opportunity to pursue their own initiatives – GGI in the case of China and the Mahasagar vision for India
The 75th anniversary of India–China relations offers a rare diplomatic opening. In a world of strategic rivalry, climate change and air pollution represent a shared threat where national interests converge. Environmental cooperation provides a low-politics entry point for rebuilding trust—through joint work on crop-residue management, high-density air-monitoring networks, and clean-energy transitions. Moreover, the Himalayan region—the planet’s “Third Pole”—is acutely vulnerable to black carbon and atmospheric pollutants from both sides of the border. Cooperation on air quality is therefore an act of Himalayan stewardship, protecting the water security of over a billion people.
At the same time, MBS has skilfully leveraged China as a strategic counterweight, signalling that any American hesitation could push Riyadh towards deeper military and technological cooperation with Beijing—an outcome the United States would prefer to avoid. China has already become Saudi Arabia’s largest trading partner, while the United States remains its primary arms supplier and security guarantor.
If Taiwan were to fall, Japan’s security architecture would be fundamentally compromised. The First Island Chain would fracture, opening a northern pathway for Beijing toward Okinawa and Kyushu. Takaichi recognised this reality and voiced what many regional strategists have long acknowledged: Japan has little choice but to act, even at the cost of Beijing’s displeasure.
While low-level clashes may continue, the possibility of a large-scale conflict, as projected by recent U.S. intelligence reports, remains far-fetched. Both countries are acutely aware that they stand to lose far more than they can gain. Despite uneasy relations, several factors actively discourage conflict
The two incidents in India and Pakistan over the course of a week have shown that the coverage of terrorism by the Chinese media ecosystem largely reinforces the state’s foreign policy narratives and preferences for alignment in South Asia. Pakistan emerges as a clear preference for the public, which is reinforced by commentators and opinion makers on non-state news media platforms.
CPEC 2.0 is expected to serve as a major leverage tool for China to access Afghanistan’s untapped natural resources and enhance connectivity to Pakistan and Central Asia. However, for Afghanistan, the initiative may be more of a challenge than an opportunity. Countries such as Sri Lanka and the Maldives have already faced severe economic consequences from poorly structured Chinese-funded projects.
China's rise has, in the consensus view of most international relations scholars, fundamentally changed South Asia. The old, India-centric region is gone. Pakistan has tied its future to Beijing, seeing China as its ultimate guarantor. Bangladesh has played a smart game, using Chinese money for national development while maintaining its "friendship-to-all" foreign policy. The Teesta project shows Dhaka's new confidence in following its own national interest. For India, the challenge is immense, as it must now compete for influence in its own backyard.
India's increased naval exercises, combined with its Indo-Pacific ambitions and Western partnerships, indicate a shift from coastal defense to regional management. For smaller coastal states, such patterns can readily translate into worry, not from an impending threat, but from an inferred sense of power. When a major power operates near contested or shared spaces, the neighbors are obligated to interpret purpose through action.
Xi Jinping's focus remains on projecting steady-handed leadership, reinforcing that China does not seek to replace the US but demands recognition of its legitimate sphere of influence. The Chinese approach is less about the symbolism of meetings and more about playing a long game, similar to the ancient strategy of Go (Weiqi): patient, adaptive, and quietly expansionist.
China has become Bangladesh’s top development partner, providing the capital and engineering expertise. It provided funding and construction for the $4.63 billion Padma Bridge Rail Link. This project connects the underdeveloped south to the capital. China also built the $2.48 billion Payra Thermal Power Plant, a critical piece of energy infrastructure. It constructed the Bangabandhu Tunnel under the Karnaphuli River in Chittagong, the first of its kind in South Asia.
The Indo-Pacific has indeed been relatively more stable compared to many other geopolitically contested regions. The QUAD plays a role in deterrence and in norm setting, but its impact is partial. India, through its constellation of policies—Act East, SAGAR, IPOI, MAHASAGAR, etc.—contributes significantly to that peace
The convergence of instability in Myanmar, fragility in Bangladesh, and external meddling by China and Pakistan threatens to form a volatile arc along India’s eastern flank. The challenge for New Delhi is not to pick sides in Myanmar’s internal war but to manage outcomes—to stay present, relevant, and nimble while others overreach. Because when the last ballot is counted, Myanmar will likely look the same: weary, divided, and ruled by men who mistake fear for order. The generals will call it normalcy; the world will call it tragedy.
