Given India's high dependence on imported oil, these circumstances encourage greater engagement with South American producers such as Venezuela, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador and Guyana. The increase in Indian imports of Venezuelan oil during the current year provides a clear example, following a period in which imports from this country had been practically discontinued.
One highlight is VinFast, Vietnam's electric vehicle producer, announcing an investment commitment of US$500 million for a manufacturing plant in Tamil Nadu in south India. The company has also engaged its Indian supply chain with more than 300 local suppliers, aligning with the host country’s domestic industrialization agenda.
Sri Lanka is already seeing signs of higher inflation together with expected slowdown in overall GDP growth during next two years. But the worst impact is going to be gradual shrinking of the middle class and increase in poverty.
ASEAN–India integration through digitalization is therefore not merely a technical choice. It is a strategy to strengthen competitiveness, expand economic self-reliance, and build a stronger position within the Indo-Pacific economic order.
While Wang Yi’s India visit and PM Modi’s upcoming China visit may signal a degree of creeping normalcy at the bilateral level, Beijing’s expanding footprint in South Asia is set to intensify regional competition, requiring careful assessment of its implications for the overall India-China relationship
Over the past decade, India’s strategic landscape has grown increasingly complex. Beijing has not diluted its consistent strategy of constraining India. Whether through deepening ties with Pakistan, or expanding influence in India’s periphery, China’s approach remains adversarial. Beijing’s assertive regional posture underscores the urgency for India to rethink both its economic and security policies.
What began with a coup in 2021 has devolved into a theater for China’s energy security, India’s border anxieties, Russia’s arms sales, and America’s China strategy. Each external actor pursues its narrow interests; none has the incentive to restore genuine stability. The losers, inevitably, are Myanmar’s people.
Chinese emperors, especially those of the Manchu-led Qing Dynasty, recognized that control over Tibetan Buddhism offered a powerful form of soft power. By leveraging religious authority, they could exert indirect political influence over Buddhist populations beyond China's borders.
Development diplomacy remains India’s strongest soft-power tool in the Indian Ocean. The contrast between India’s low-interest, grant-based infrastructure projects and China’s debt-heavy Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has not gone unnoticed. The Maldivian pivot back to India is partly driven by this contras
It risks turning a bilateral infrastructure issue into a trilateral diplomatic flashpoint, where India would have to thereafter balance its upstream anxieties with downstream responsibilities. In this context, Beijing’s growing hydrological footprint is not only being viewed as a strategic challenge in New Delhi, but also as a potential disruptor of its regional diplomacy in South Asia.
The broader strategic ramifications of the India–UK FTA are profound. It strengthens bilateral cooperation in areas such as defence, technology, renewable energy, and education, reinforcing both countries’ strategic footprints in the Indo-Pacific region.
China’s presence in South Asia has expanded considerably since the launch of the BRI in 2013. Beyond trade and infrastructure, it has emerged as a provider of military hardware and a key influencer in education, media, and policy discourse. China's outreach in smaller South Asian countries is multifaceted, ranging from party-to-party diplomacy to soft power tools like Buddhist cultural ties and influence operations.
In a media interview, Khandu strongly refuted Beijing’s territorial claims and emphasized Arunachal’s historical relationship with Tibet, a nation forcibly occupied by China in the 1950s. He pointed out that Arunachal Pradesh shares roughly 1,200 km of border with Tibet, around 100 km with Bhutan, and 550 km with Myanmar. His remarks were a pointed rebuttal to China’s repeated claims over Arunachal Pradesh, including renaming it as “Zangnan” or “South Tibet.”
The Tibetan diaspora must now take the lead in mobilizing global opinion. The Dalai Lama has issued a clarion call — not only to uphold Tibet’s spiritual and cultural values, but to defend the right of a people to decide their own destiny.
There are multiple reasons why the MEA doesn’t dare to say “no one except Dalai Lama can decide his successor”, some of which could include External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar fears getting snubbed during his coming visit to Beijing
China’s strategy for building a regional order in Central Asia converges with its playbook in sub-regions across the Global South, like Latin America, Africa and South Asia. The substance and optics of its Latin America Summit and Xi Jinping’s tour of Southeast Asia in the last few months reflect this strategy.
Contrary to the longstanding popular expectation that the Dalai Lama could announce an interim successor until a reincarnation is determined after his death, he has chosen the option that sets the stage for a long-term conflict between Beijing and the institution of the Dalai Lama. It is clear now that the next Dalai Lama will be from outside China and Tibet.
While SCO saw ministers invoke "mutual trust" and “overall development” in public, Chinese actions reveal a twin-track approach toward India—maintaining diplomatic channels and economic engagement in public, while simultaneously tightening its grip on sectors where India remains dependent.
China's geographic proximity and growing power remain the core reasons ASEAN clings to its long-standing hedging and neutrality strategy. Fear of retaliation—whether economic or military—has deterred ASEAN from adopting a firm position against Beijing, which could compromise the region’s economic survival.
