The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government in West Bengal has initiated a crackdown on illegal migrants with several of them being pushed into Bangladesh, on the other side of the international border. Such actions risk further complicating India’s already strained relationship with the neighbouring country, particularly during the presently limited ‘detente’ after the new government came to power.

Although the short-term consequences of India’s push-ins are diplomatic and humanitarian, the longer-term concern for New Delhi, however, is strategic. New Delhi’s precarious relations with Dhaka risks creating additional space for Beijing at a time when China is deepening its economic and infrastructural presence in Bangladesh. 

In the post-Hasina period, Beijing’s increasing engagement has coincided with New Delhi’s waning influence. Amid these developments, India’s pursuit of unilateral push-ins of undocumented migrants could have significant consequences for bilateral relations.

India and Bangladesh have established channels for identifying and returning their respective citizens. Therefore, one-sided push-ins of the undocumented migrants by bypassing the relevant diplomatic channels can potentially be perceived in Dhaka as an attempt by New Delhi to undermine Bangladesh’s sovereignty.

On August 5, the deposed former prime minister of Bangladesh, Sheikh Hasina, held an audio address to the foreign press in New Delhi. Exactly two years ago, it was the same day when her government was ousted and she took refuge in India. Dhaka reacted sharply by accusing New Delhi of complicity, despite prior knowledge of the event. India distanced itself by describing it as privately organised. The sequence of events could reinforce perceptions in Dhaka that New Delhi remains politically involved in Bangladesh’s internal affairs. The developments can trigger broader geopolitical ramifications in the region.

China's Expanding Footprints

Dhaka’s perceptions are worth considering in the backdrop of Beijing gaining prominence in the country. During the interim government’s tenure, China maintained relatively stronger engagement with Bangladesh than India. Beijing was involved in engagements on multiple fronts, including the securing of US $400 million for the strategically key Mongla Port among others.

The present government is also pursuing deeper engagement with China on several levels, as signalled by the Prime Minister Tarique Rahman’s Beijing visit. The visit came at a significant juncture, amid heightened tensions along the India-Bangladesh border over the reported push-ins through West Bengal. Rahman’s trip was a shift from the established convention of choosing New Delhi for the maiden visit. Dhaka’s securing of two key agreements with Beijing could further expose India to strategic vulnerabilities in the context of New Delhi’s concerns about a broader Chinese encirclement strategy.

Among the several agreements signed, for India the strategically most vital are the agreements for the Mongla Port Facilities Modernization and Expansion Project and the Teesta River Comprehensive Management and Restoration Project (TRCMRP).

During the Hasina reign, India was awarded the right to develop an economic zone adjacent to the Mongla Port. India delayed the construction, leading the interim government to scrap the project citing delays and lack of progress. Deteriorating bilateral ties likely contributed to India losing the project.

Chinese involvement in the economic zone near Mongla Port could potentially provide the People’s Liberation Army-linked state-owned companies with access to monitor the movement of Indian naval vessels through surveillance equipment. The distance from the Mongla Port to the Indian border is only 80 kilometers.

Chinese involvement in the Teesta Project could provide Beijing with greater visibility over strategic activity around the Siliguri Corridor, a narrow strip of land connecting the northeastern states with the Indian mainland. On the Bangladesh side, the distance from the Teesta river to the Indian border is less than 100 kilometers. Beijing’s involvement in the project would potentially bring it to the edge of the sensitive zone. 

New Delhi had previously persuaded Dhaka to keep China at bay in this vital project. This, however, does not necessarily mean that every Chinese project automatically translates into military leverage for Beijing. The increasing Chinese economic and infrastructural presence in Bangladesh has the potential to amplify Beijing’s strategic options in India’s periphery. Thus, New Delhi’s concern is more about the collective effect of the decline of Indian influence and expansion of China’s strategic options in Bangladesh than that of any individual Chinese project.

This is where the push-in issue acquires a wider geopolitical significance. India’s continuous push-ins of undocumented migrants into Bangladesh would stress the fragile bilateral ties into a dangerous position, including potential confrontations at the border. India’s unilateral “push-ins” challenge the sovereignty of a relatively smaller neighbour, reinforcing perceptions of Indian hegemony. It could also create political space for Bangladesh to deepen its strategic engagements with China, which has emerged as an alternative source of investment and infrastructure support. Hence, New Delhi must take into consideration China’s increasing strategic investments in Bangladesh during the present BNP (Bangladesh Nationalist Party) government.

Employ Established Mechanisms

For New Delhi, the danger is not that the push-ins would automatically push Dhaka closer to Beijing’s camp. Rather, it could become an additional factor in further weakening India’s political position in Bangladesh with China’s rapid strategic expansion in the country. A looming prospect is that Dhaka could use Beijing’s involvement in the Teesta Project as a counter-balance against the Indian predominance.

Therefore, New Delhi needs a pragmatic approach to the undocumented migrant issue. Bangladesh should acknowledge that many of its citizens are illegally residing in India and accept responsibility for their return. India should address the issue through established bilateral mechanisms instead of pursuing unilateral push-ins of the undocumented migrants into Bangladesh

Further push-ins could escalate into broader political and strategic uncertainties for India. Amid strategic challenges from Beijing in Bangladesh, New Delhi cannot separate border management with foreign policy. New Delhi should hold high-level dialogue with Dhaka and develop a cooperative roadmap to facilitate the identification and repatriation of undocumented migrants from India. 

For New Delhi, this could be a crucial step in preventing further erosion of its position as Beijing expands its influence in Bangladesh.

(The author is a Doctoral Researcher in the Department of Political Science at SRM University - AP, India. The views expressed are personal. He can be reached at sounakchowdhury94@gmail.com / www.linkedin.com/in/sounak-chowdhury-1661081bb. )