ASEAN’s Illusion of Power: The Limits of Neutrality and Consensus
ASEAN never had a strong common strategic identity that can override the conflicting national security calculations of its members. The region consists of vastly different political systems, developmental capabilities, geopolitical affiliations, historical experiences and perceptions of external threats.
The 49th ASEAN Summit and Related Summits in Manila remains yet another photo-op platform to showcase perceived resilience and unity, but risks to continue to be overshadowed by systemic shortcomings and risks.
The biggest dilemma for ASEAN at this summit will be to preserve the appearance of a functioning regional unity amid intensifying geopolitical and economic fragmentation.
ASEAN's traditional approach of strategic hedging and maintaining an equilibrium between the United States and China has been more difficult to sustain. For years, the bloc has sought to maximise the economic gains of China's rise while relying on the broader American security presence to ironically ward off the former’s increasing power reach and ambition in this region.
The economic-security divide is becoming increasingly blurred. The region's fundamental dilemma remains unchanged: it does not want to antagonise China, it cannot afford to lose America, and it does not possess the required strategic capabilities to protect itself without external help.
South China Sea: Consensus Without Consequence
The South China Sea will remain the clearest symbol of ASEAN's limitations, with profound differences between the needs and wariness of frontline maritime claimants and those of members who place greater emphasis on Chinese trade, infrastructure financing, investment or diplomatic ties.This has resulted in ASEAN's collective position being reduced to cautious formulations that preserve consensus without meaningfully changing the strategic realities on the ground.
The prolonged negotiations on the Code of Conduct is a case in point. The question is not whether ASEAN can produce an agreement, but whether that agreement will be substantive, consistent with UNCLOS, binding in nature, and capable of constraining destabilising behaviour. A politically convenient agreement that looks good on paper but lacks effective safeguards would offer little more than another diplomatic achievement on paper.
In the same argument, the Myanmar crisis has also demonstrated the limits, with the stalling of the Five-Point Consensus for years.
While greater trade and digital integration are expected, they do not automatically translate into collective security strength or geopolitical independence.
A Region Divided by Conflicting Strategic Interests
ASEAN never had a strong common strategic identity that can override the conflicting national security calculations of its members. The region consists of vastly different political systems, developmental capabilities, geopolitical affiliations, historical experiences and perceptions of external threats.
The Philippines views the American security alliance as the cornerstone to its national defence, with the need for deterrence in the South China Sea. Thailand is a formal US treaty ally but pursues a more flexible strategic relationship with China. Singapore maintains extensive defence cooperation with Washington while preserving strong economic relationships with Beijing.
Cambodia has cultivated deeply entangled strategic relations with China, while Vietnam wants to safeguard its interests through diversified partnerships.
Indonesia and Malaysia continue to emphasise strategic autonomy and non-alignment, amid the increasingly difficult intersection between Chinese economic influence and American strategic power.
These differences are shaped by geography, history, military capability, economic dependence and national survival strategic calculations. The resulting reality is that what constitutes a security threat to one ASEAN member may constitute a critical economic or strategic opportunity for another.
This is precisely why the South China Sea conundrum has remained a divisive issue for decades. The Philippines and Vietnam face different immediate pressures from those experienced by landlocked Laos or Cambodia. Hence, the willingness of individual governments to confront Beijing's maritime conduct varies at a stark level.
ASEAN's consensus mechanism therefore reflects the absence of a shared understanding of which threats the bloc should collectively resist.
ASEAN’s flexibility, however, allows countries with different political systems and affiliations to remain within a common diplomatic framework, but flexibility becomes a liability when it develops into permanent indecision.
When Neutrality Becomes Strategic Paralysis
Neutrality is one of ASEAN's most deeply entrenched problems, but it is also a symptom of something more fundamental, that is the bloc's lack of collective strategic strength, institutional decisiveness, and willingness to confront the costs of protecting its own interests.
Neutrality may preserve political flexibility, but it cannot automatically preserve national interests, prevent coercion and risks of conflict or guarantee regional security.
For decades, ASEAN has embraced the principle of engaging all major powers while avoiding explicit alignment with either side.
Individual countries seek Chinese capital, trade, infrastructure investment and market access while simultaneously benefiting from the regional strategic balance maintained by American military presence and security commitments.
This model has allowed ASEAN to enjoy the economic and security dividends provided without collectively assuming an equivalent burden of strategic responsibility but ASEAN is now under renewed pressure to maintain equilibrium without offending either side, while individual members are increasingly divided over the distribution of the costs and benefits of this balancing strategy.
This long held concept of ASEAN has now evolved from a doctrine of independent decision-making into a doctrine of avoiding difficult decisions altogether.
The South China Sea is a case in point where those facing immediate security risks may have to accept diluted collective positions, while those less exposed to these risks can prioritise preserving economic relationships.
Over time, this risks turning strategic neutrality into an advantage for the strongest external actor rather than a protective mechanism for Southeast Asia.
It is also worthy to note that neutrality alone does not explain ASEAN's limitations. The equally important weakness is that ASEAN has no collective and capable military deterrence architecture, and even if there is one, it remains vulnerable to the divergent and conflicting internal national interests of different members.
At present, ASEAN remains much more effective as a convenor than as an independent strategic agenda-setter. The presence of more external powers may increase ASEAN's options, but it does not necessarily strengthen its internal unity or reduce its core wariness and vulnerabilities. Instead, it can create divisions when individual members become increasingly aligned with different economic or security interests.
The result is that ASEAN may become more actively multi-aligned without becoming more strategically united.
Economic Might Without Strategic Sovereignty
With a combined economy approaching US$4 trillion and a population of around 700 million, ASEAN has substantial potential to become an increasingly important engine of global growth, but economic size should not be confused with economic sovereignty. It is in this same logic of how diplomatic prominence should not be equated with strategic power.
While ASEAN has made progress in trade liberalisation, internal rivalry still persists and worsens in some cases.
Intra-ASEAN merchandise trade represented approximately 20% of ASEAN's total merchandise trade in 2025, and vulnerability arises when dependence becomes concentrated in strategically sensitive areas and when individual countries lack the capacity to withstand economic coercion, supply-chain disruption or external security threats.
A richer and more technologically advanced member may regard these as partly manageable but for a less developed economy that is heavily reliant on a particular external partner, the same adjustment may carry far greater domestic political and economic costs.
The security divide is equally consequential where even when some agree on the principle of regional stability, they may disagree over which external power poses the greater danger, the aspect of how that danger should be addressed and who should bear the costs.
Economic cooperation can succeed in certain areas but cooperation cannot be expected to substitute indefinitely for collective security strength, and it cannot be the final destination.
(The author is a Kuala Lumpur-based strategic and security analyst. The views expressed are personal. He can be contacted at collins@um.edu.my.)

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