Neutrality and balance — Colombo’s habitual vocabulary — have yielded little economic benefit. Ultimately, Sri Lanka slid into bankruptcy. Given this background, the land link is not merely a strategic starting point but a necessity. India’s strategic position on Sri Lanka is perennial; whether the bridge is built or not, India’s concerns remain fundamental. As an immediate neighbour and rising global power, India will not allow rivals to use Sri Lanka as a base.
If India and China choose collaboration by setting aside strategic suspicion in the climate domain, they could fundamentally reshape the trajectory of the 21st century, as they have already demonstrated individually through their pursuit of clean energy over the past decade. More importantly, such a coalition could revive the COP28 fossil-fuel phase-down pledge, which stalled at COP29 in Baku and appears to be drifting further at COP30 in Belém.
Increased industrial activity in India could generate demand for raw materials, intermediate goods, and services from countries such as Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka. Bangladesh’s textile industry could strengthen its links with Indian manufacturing networks, while Sri Lanka may gain from expanded opportunities in tourism, logistics, and services.
ADB’s role has evolved beyond financing into shaping India’s structural transformation into a high-growth, technology-driven, and climate-conscious economy. Compared to other multilateral institutions, it offers a more agile, implementation-focused, and regionally attuned approach. As India moves toward becoming one of the world’s largest economies, this partnership will play a defining role in shaping not only India’s growth trajectory but also the broader economic future of Asia.
China-based Hubei Huachangda Intelligent Equipment Company, Universal Enterprise Limited, and Xi’an Longde Technology Development Company Limited (also known as Lontek) are sanctioned for having “knowingly transferred equipment and technology” to Pakistan, which is not a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) group, Miller said.
The intensification of geopolitical competition in the Bay of Bengal region may affect the healthy interaction between China and Bangladesh. Bangladesh, strategically located at the crossroads of South Asia and Southeast Asia, is a significant factor in the geopolitical and geoeconomic landscape of the Bay of Bengal.
The historical manipulation of Tibet's relations with Monyul is a front that China plays against India on the China-India border dispute over the Indo-Tibet border. China has misinterpreted the history of Tibet's relations with Monyul to assert its territorial claim in the region.
“One of the hardest things to keep in mind is that India is also a great power and it has its own beliefs, its own interests”, he said.
Recalling the 26/11 Mumbai and the 2016 Pathankot terrorist attacks. they called for “bringing the perpetrators of these attacks to justice without delay”. This explicit mention of terror attacks on India, purported to be engineered from Pakistani soil, is seen as a strong backing by Quad partners of India's stand on cross-border terrorism which New Delhi says is promoted and supported by the Pakistani State.
China's rising military and economic involvement in the region provides India with a strategic challenge to formulate a foreign and security policy blueprint for the Indo-Pacific.
The participation of Indo-Pacific partners in the NATO summit epitomizes the breaking of traditional geopolitical barriers, ushering in what is often referred to as "the new geometry" of international relations.
India introduced the Agnipath system of recruitment in its military, denying regular recruitment to thousands of Nepalese Gurkhas into the Indian Army, not only aggravating unemployment in Nepal, but more importantly, shattering the strong bond between the Indian and Nepalese armies.
From the Indian standpoint Prime Minister Modi may like to keep the Tibetan issue on the foreign policy agenda of his third term while dealing with a recalcitrant China. Its particular reference to the Tibetan issue remaining unresolved in accordance with international law may provide some opening to New Delhi to work on given the historical sensitivities of India's border dispute with China.
If NDA 3.0 wanted to show assertiveness to China, why were representatives of the Central Tibet Administration not invited for the osth-taking ceremony at Rashtrapati Bhavan on June 9, as they were invited in 2014 for the swearing-in of the then new NDA government.
New power tools being used by China to expand regional dominance have heightened regional security dilemmas and sparked arms races. They have also caused systemic wariness among nations of the Indo-Pacific who will long for the status quo of a stable rules-based order.
The potential implications of recent protests in New Caledonia are best understood in the context of a broader framework of China’s increasing presence in the South Pacific island countries.
This new bloc is vital for both the US and regional players, especially the Philippines which is not part of the original Quad. For Australia and Japan, this new partnership represents a more focused security arrangement with greater on-the-ground ease of conducting military activities as compared to the more bureaucratic Quad.
Bangladesh must exercise caution when considering the adoption of the Indo-Pacific Strategy advocated by the US and its regional allies. This move could potentially strain Bangladesh's friendship with China.
Over half of these 'research vessels' operated in the South China Sea, but their growing presence in the Indian Ocean has stirred regional tensions and is a matter of growing concern to India.
