Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, head of Myanmar’s military junta and sworn in as the country's 11th President on April 10, 2026, following a cautiously engineered parliamentary vote, toured India from May 30 to June 3, 2026. This was his first international visit since assuming the presidency, and his formal invitation to New Delhi by Prime Minister Narendra Modi indicates New Delhi's pragmatic approach to engaging whoever heads Myanmar as part of securing India’s volatile eastern frontier, managing cross-border insurgencies that have evolved into terrorism, and checking Chinese influence, despite ongoing international criticism over the regime's anti-democratic credentials.

This anti-democratic stance has been reflected in several ways. The military overthrew the elected government in February 2021, imprisoned the country’s de facto leader, Aung San Suu Kyi, and banned her party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), which had achieved a landslide victory. The junta brutally cracked down on peaceful protesters and pro-democracy advocates, killing thousands and displacing millions across the country. The military then orchestrated elections that critics and international bodies such as the UN and EU denounced as a sham. These elections permanently reserve 25 percent of parliamentary seats for the military and ban legitimate opposition parties, serving merely as a smokescreen to disguise continued military rule.

Security Imperatives and Border Management

India shares a highly sensitive 1,643-kilometre porous border with Myanmar. Min Aung Hlaing provided explicit assurances to India’s Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) that Myanmar's territory would not be used for activities detrimental to India’s national security.

With counterterrorism cooperation being a predominant concern, discussions heavily featured collaborative measures against anti-India terrorist camps in the Sagaing and Kachin regions.

Myanmar’s heavy dependence on, and complex relationship with, Beijing necessitates New Delhi maintaining calibrated engagement with whoever is in power in Naypyidaw.

Myanmar remains an indispensable anchor for India's Act East Policy and Indo-Pacific connectivity. Discussions included progress on vital infrastructure and trade initiatives such as the Kaladan project. For New Delhi, while engagement with Myanmar is a crucial component of its Act East Policy and a strategic counterweight to China’s growing regional footprint, securing its northeastern frontier remains equally important. On this issue, Hlaing assured India that Myanmar territory would not be used for anti-India terrorist activities.

Expanding Economic Engagement

With bilateral trade amounting to around $2.5 billion, the leaders agreed to enhance trade in their respective national currencies—the Rupee and the Kyat—thereby reducing reliance on the US dollar.

Both sides also explored expanded cooperation in healthcare, agricultural machinery, rare earth mining, and energy.

While the state visit is being viewed as one that provides international legitimacy and therefore amounts to a major diplomatic victory for Myanmar, it has also sparked frustration and anger among Myanmar’s democratic opposition and civil society groups, including the National Unity Government (NUG), which claims India’s actions legitimize military rule.

The five-day visit featured three distinct segments. Hlaing began by landing at Bodh Gaya, where he visited the Mahabodhi Temple, the holiest and most revered site in Buddhism. In New Delhi, he held key bilateral meetings with Prime Minister Narendra Modi to discuss trade and security frameworks. In Mumbai, business and industry interactions were held to further commercial engagement.

Myanmar’s Search for Legitimacy

Since the 2021 takeover, Western nations have largely isolated the junta, forcing Myanmar’s leadership to seek partnerships with neighbouring states and allies such as Russia. Hlaing’s India visit is being closely watched because it is considered important for Myanmar’s efforts to rebuild regional respectability and ease years of diplomatic isolation.

By engaging with India, a major democracy, the military-backed government hopes to normalize ties abroad following the 2021 coup. The visit grants the junta much-needed validation on the global stage as it navigates internal civil conflict.

The Balance of Power Inside Myanmar

Four years after the junta's 2021 coup, a broad coalition of anti-junta resistance groups, comprising more than 15 major factions, technically outweighs the military in both controlled territory and personnel. Together, these forces control up to 42 percent of the country, while the junta’s control has reportedly dropped to roughly 21 percent.

The primary forces opposing the Tatmadaw include:

(a) Well-established ethno-nationalist rebel armies such as the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) and the Karen National Union (KNU), which hold the majority of liberated territory. The Three Brotherhood Alliance has notably led major coordinated offensives to capture key border regions and towns.

(b) People’s Defence Forces (PDFs), numbering tens of thousands of fighters, which are pro-democracy civilian-led militias serving as the armed wing of the National Unity Government (NUG). They operate across the country alongside various Local Defence Forces (LDFs).

Despite outweighing the junta in manpower and territory, the anti-junta coalition faces a strategic stalemate. The military retains a significant advantage in heavy weaponry and counters rebel gains through sophisticated drone operations and aerial bombardment. Additionally, the resistance suffers from coordination challenges and occasionally shifting allegiances influenced by neighbouring countries.

Rare Earths and Renewed Conflict

In May 2026, Myanmar’s military launched renewed offensives in Kachin State in a bid to recapture territory from the KIA. Hlaing—who transitioned from junta chief to President in early 2026—spearheaded these campaigns to reclaim a lucrative heavy rare-earth mining belt along the Chinese border.

The strategic significance of the offensive lies in control over Kachin State’s heavy rare-earth deposits, which account for roughly half of the world’s supply and are critical for electric vehicles and wind turbines. The KIA took control of these lucrative mining areas near Pangwa and Chipwi in late 2024 and has since heavily fortified its positions.

The renewed fighting comes shortly after Hlaing issued a 100-day ultimatum for ethnic armies to enter peace talks—a proposal rejected by the KIA and several other groups.

Alongside Kachin, the military has intensified aerial bombardments and aggressive ground campaigns in Chin State bordering India and Karen State bordering Thailand in an effort to crush resistance forces and regain critical border trade routes.

The United States Factor

The United States significantly increased its interest in Myanmar between 2009 and 2012, shifting from a policy of isolation and sanctions to one of diplomatic engagement and support for democratic transition.

Under the Obama administration, Washington conducted a major policy review, concluding that sanctions alone had failed. Recognizing internal reforms, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced a targeted easing of sanctions in 2012 to allow American investment. The US normalized relations, appointed an ambassador, and provided nearly $1.5 billion in assistance.

Following the military coup, however, Washington reverted to targeted pressure, issuing executive orders and enacting the Burma Act to sanction military leaders and junta-linked businesses. Beyond concerns over democracy and human rights, the US continues to engage in the region to counter China’s growing political and economic influence.

India’s Strategic Dilemma

Indian military and security agencies have closely monitored foreign movements in the Northeast to safeguard territorial integrity. Concerns over external interference often overlap with India’s efforts to manage the Myanmar civil war and prevent anti-India activities along the fragile border.

Myanmar’s multi-ethnic landscape requires India to maintain a delicate balancing act. New Delhi needs to engage not only with the central authorities but also with ethnic armed organizations such as the Kachins and Karens, particularly to secure vital infrastructure projects, limit China’s regional influence, and safeguard its borders.

Despite the challenges, India must engage with groups such as the KIA and various Karen factions, which control vast territories along the Myanmar-China border and the India-Myanmar frontier. Ignoring them risks undermining local stability.

Key connectivity initiatives, including the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transport Project and the India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway, pass directly through territories contested or controlled by these ethnic armed groups.

China maintains robust ties with both the Myanmar military and several ethnic armed organizations along its border. India requires comparable leverage to prevent its strategic interests from being eclipsed.

India’s official policy has traditionally prioritized deep institutional engagement with Myanmar’s central military government—the State Administration Council. This approach is driven by counterinsurgency cooperation and the need to ensure the safety of Indian personnel and investments.

Direct engagement with groups such as the KIA or KNU must remain cautious and, at times, discreet. New Delhi fears that overt engagement with anti-junta rebel groups could damage its longstanding relationship with Naypyidaw.

While India generally avoids formal alliances with these groups, local cross-border dynamics and intelligence-sharing mechanisms occasionally exist to manage regional security, especially given shared ethnic ties across the border in Manipur, Mizoram, and Nagaland.

A Broader Engagement Strategy

Engaging exclusively with the military junta is ultimately counterproductive. Broader engagement with Myanmar’s political and ethnic opposition is essential for New Delhi’s long-term security interests.

Although internal stability in India’s Northeast has improved considerably over the past decade, the region remains vulnerable to cross-border turbulence and persistent instability in neighbouring Myanmar and Bangladesh. Prolonged civil unrest in states such as Manipur also continues to pose significant diplomatic and security challenges.

(The author, a strategic affairs analyst, is a former spokesperson of the Defence Ministry and the Indian Army. The views expressed are personal. He can be reached at wordsword02@gmail.com)