The Indus Waters Treaty, signed in 1960 and brokered by the World Bank, was designed to resolve water-sharing disputes between India and Pakistan through a clear technical division of river systems in the Indus basin.

The arrangement allocated:

• Eastern rivers (Ravi, Beas, Sutlej) to India for unrestricted use
• Western rivers (Indus, Jhelum, Chenab) primarily to Pakistan, with limited defined usage rights for India

Within this structure, India is permitted:

• Run-of-the-river hydroelectric generation
• Limited irrigation
• Non-consumptive uses
• Small, regulated storage within specified engineering constraints

The treaty also created a Permanent Indus Commission, along with structured dispute resolution mechanisms, making it one of the most enduring water-sharing frameworks in the world.

The Core Reality: Hydrology Overrules Rhetoric

At the heart of the Indus system lies a simple but often misunderstood reality.

Even after decades of political debate, and even after India’s recent move to place the treaty in abeyance following the Pahalgam terrorist attack, the physical flow of rivers into Pakistan has not been interrupted. Water continues to move as dictated by geography, glacier melt, and monsoon cycles - not by administrative decisions.

This leads to the central reality of the system:

Even full utilisation of India’s permitted rights under the treaty cannot stop or materially deny the natural flow of the Indus basin into Pakistan. The treaty regulates usage, not ownership of the river itself. And the river system itself is far larger than any infrastructure that currently exists on it.

 What India Can and Cannot do

India’s rights on the western rivers are real but constrained.

They allow:

• Hydropower generation through run-of-the-river projects
• Seasonal regulation within design limits
• Limited storage for operational and irrigation needs

However, what they do not allow in practical terms is any capability to:

• permanently block flows
• significantly alter downstream availability at basin scale
• “turn off” water movement across the border

The distinction is crucial.

Hydropower structures do not function as control points over entire rivers. They are energy systems embedded within flowing water systems. The river remains continuous.

What India can do is optimise, regulate, and utilise flows more effectively within its territory. What it cannot do is fundamentally redesign the basin’s downstream hydrology.

Underutilisation and Structural Constraints

India’s utilisation of its rights on the western rivers has historically been partial.

Permitted storage and irrigation potential has not been fully developed due to a combination of:

• Himalayan terrain complexity
• high construction and maintenance costs
• environmental and ecological constraints
• prolonged disputes and objections under treaty mechanisms

As a result, significant volumes of water continue to flow downstream without full developmental use on the Indian side.

On the eastern rivers, however, India enjoys near-complete and unrestricted utilisation rights, reflecting the asymmetric design of the treaty itself.

 Hydropower Expansion and Emerging Projects

Recent years have seen renewed attention to hydropower development within treaty boundaries.

Sawalkot Hydroelectric Project (Chenab, J&K)

A major run-of-the-river project planned between existing installations such as Baglihar and Salal. It represents expanded generation capacity within the permissible engineering framework of the treaty system.

Salal Hydroelectric Project (Chenab)

An operational project whose efficiency has been affected by long-term siltation, highlighting the operational challenges of Himalayan river infrastructure.

Tulbul Navigation Project (Jhelum)

A long-pending proposal at the outlet of Wular Lake, intended not for large-scale storage but for seasonal regulation and navigation support.

Upper Chenab Basin (Himachal Pradesh)

The Chenab originates from the confluence of the Chandra and Bhaga rivers at Tandi in Lahaul- both glacier-fed Himalayan systems with highly variable flows.

In this region, small barrages and tunnel-based diversions are designed to:

• redirect limited flows
• support hydropower cascades
• improve efficiency of downstream generation systems

These projects reflect engineering adaptation to geography, not attempts to alter river continuity.

Perception, Politics and Engineering Reality

Hydropower projects on transboundary rivers often generate political reactions that are detached from engineering reality.

At times, public statements from across the border have even suggested that infrastructure such as projects on the Chenab could be targeted militarily or “destroyed” if they are constructed. Such rhetoric underscores the intensity with which water infrastructure is viewed in political discourse, but it does not alter the technical or hydrological constraints of the system.

These are not control valves over rivers. They are energy extraction systems that operate within continuous flow regimes. A run-of-the-river project cannot be “turned off” or “neutralised” in the way political rhetoric sometimes implies, because it is embedded in a much larger, continuously flowing natural system.

History offers similar examples of public misconceptions about infrastructure. When large dams such as Bhakra–Nangal were constructed, arguments circulated in parts of rural politics that electricity generation would somehow diminish the “strength” of water and, by extension, agricultural outcomes downstream. Such claims had no scientific basis then and do not today.

The Emerging Pattern

Across projects, geography, and policy, a clear pattern is visible.

India is gradually:

• expanding hydropower capacity within treaty limits
• improving utilisation of permitted irrigation rights
• modernising river infrastructure in challenging terrain
• strengthening internal water management systems

But this expansion operates within an unchanging physical boundary:

River flows are governed by hydrology; engineering can only work with them, not override them. This is the defining constraint of the system.

The Spine of the Issue

At a broader level, the Indus Waters framework is often interpreted through political language. But its real operation is shaped by two harder forces: geography and engineering.

This leads back to the central idea:

Even full development of India’s permitted hydropower and storage rights under the Indus Waters Treaty expands utilisation, but does not translate into control over downstream flows into Pakistan. The debate, therefore, is not about the ability to stop water. It is about how effectively each side uses what geography and law already permit.

Limits are the Real Structure

The Indus system is not defined by what states wish to do with it, but by what the river physically allows.

Within that system:

• law defines boundaries
• engineering defines capability
• geography defines limits

And within those constraints, India’s evolving hydropower and water infrastructure represent not a transformation of control, but a gradual optimisation of use.

The river continues its course regardless. And that is the reality that sits beneath all rhetoric.

(The author is an Indian Army veteran and a contemporary affairs commentator. The views expressed are personal. He can be reached at  kl.viswanathan@gmail.com )