The Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO), India's national space agency established in 1969, is facing a problem that many successful institutions eventually encounter: the very structure that helped it succeed may now be holding it back.

Experienced scientists and technologists are leaving. The government is attempting to slow the exodus by restricting routine resignations and voluntary retirements among personnel involved in critical national missions such as Gaganyaan.

But retaining people cannot be a substitute for reform.

The more important question is this: does ISRO still need to do everything it has traditionally done?

The answer is no.

Old Model is not Workable

India’s space sector has changed fundamentally. Private companies are developing rockets and satellites. Private consortia are being entrusted with major satellite constellation projects. Industry is being invited to manufacture launch vehicles and acquire technologies developed by ISRO.

The government itself has said that ISRO should increasingly focus on research and development and major scientific missions.

Yet the organisation continues to carry a wide range of responsibilities—technology development, systems engineering, integration, manufacturing-related activities, launch operations, satellite operations and maintenance.

This model made sense when India had little or no industrial capability in the space sector. It makes far less sense today.

Space Industry is Fast Changing

For decades, ISRO had to be almost everything. It had to develop the technology, build the hardware, test it, launch it and operate it.

That was not a luxury. It was a necessity.

India had a small industrial base and a limited number of companies capable of handling complex space hardware. ISRO therefore had no choice but to build capabilities internally.

But the situation has changed.

India now has companies capable of manufacturing rockets, satellites, electronics, structures and other space hardware. Public-sector companies such as HAL and L&T have significant engineering and manufacturing capabilities. New private space companies are developing technologies at a speed that would have been difficult to imagine a decade ago.

Yet ISRO continues to function as though the country has no industrial ecosystem outside it. That is no longer sustainable.

With a sanctioned strength of around 17,000 employees and around 16,000 currently on the rolls, excluding contract workers, ISRO must ask itself whether its manpower is being deployed in the most productive manner.

The question is not whether the organisation has too many people.

The question is whether too many of its people are doing work that can now be performed by others. 

Time to Separate the Roles

The answer, in my view, is a clear separation of responsibilities. ISRO should focus on research, technology development, systems engineering and complex national missions.

Production and large-scale manufacturing should increasingly move to industry. Commercialisation should be handled by NAIL.

Private companies should be allowed to develop and operate space systems wherever they have the capability.

The government should retain strategic control over critical technologies and national security-related capabilities.

This would not mean weakening ISRO. On the contrary, it could strengthen the organisation by allowing it to concentrate on what it does best.

Nuclear Sector an Example

India’s nuclear sector provides a useful example. Research institutions such as BARC and IGCAR focus on R&D, while NPCIL builds and operates nuclear power plants.

In the nuclear sector, there is no conflict of interest like space. In the space sector, the Secretary, Department of Space is also the Chairman of ISRO while the Secretary of Department of Atomic Energy does not run the operations of BARC/IGCAR/NPCIL and others.

The space sector need not copy that model exactly.

But the principle is sound: research and development need not be housed in the same organisation that builds and operates every product.

Danger of Being Operational Organisation

ISRO’s greatest strength has been its ability to convert research into operational systems. That strength must not be lost.

A complete separation between R&D and operations could be dangerous. Research organisations that are cut off from real-world operational challenges can easily become academic institutions focused more on papers than products.

ISRO’s scientists and engineers understand the practical realities of launch failures, satellite anomalies, systems integration and mission operations because they are directly involved in them.

That connection must remain. But maintaining the connection does not mean ISRO must continue to perform every task itself.

There is a difference between understanding operations and owning all operations.

ISRO should retain the expertise needed to design, develop, supervise and improve complex systems.

It need not necessarily manufacture every component, assemble every vehicle or undertake every routine operational task.

Technology Gap Cannot Be Ignored

There is another reason why ISRO needs to rethink its structure. Space technology is changing rapidly. The industry is moving towards reusable launch vehicles, methane propulsion, advanced electric propulsion, autonomous spacecraft, high-performance computing and large satellite constellations.

India cannot afford to be late in developing the next generation of technologies. The delayed transition towards new propulsion systems is a warning.

An organisation burdened with a large number of operational and production responsibilities may not have the flexibility to pursue disruptive technologies quickly enough.

The future of space will not be won by simply producing more versions of existing rockets and satellites. It will be won by developing technologies that do not yet exist.

That requires time, risk-taking and an organisational culture that rewards experimentation.

A scientist who spends most of his or her time dealing with production schedules, operational deadlines and routine integration work may not have the time to pursue radical new ideas.

Industry Must Be Given Responsibility

India’s private space sector cannot remain a contractor for ISRO forever. If private companies are only asked to manufacture hardware to specifications decided by ISRO, India will have created an outsourced production system—not a genuinely innovative space industry.

Private companies must eventually be allowed to develop their own technologies, take risks and build products for domestic and international markets.

That requires ISRO to move away from being the default owner of every major capability.

Public-sector companies can play an important transitional role.

Companies such as HAL can provide production capacity and reliability while the private sector matures. Experienced ISRO engineers can help industry build capabilities through collaboration and deputation.

But the end goal must be an ecosystem in which companies are capable of developing and producing space systems independently.

India Still Needs Public-Sector Backbone

This does not mean that everything should be privatised. A strong public-sector backbone will remain essential.

India cannot become completely dependent on private companies for critical space capabilities.

There will be times when commercial priorities conflict with national requirements. There will be emergencies in which the country will need assured access to launch, satellite and manufacturing capabilities.

A public-sector entity capable of producing critical hardware could provide that resilience.

The future model should therefore not be ISRO versus private industry. It should be ISRO plus industry. ISRO should be the technology engine. Industry should increasingly become the manufacturing and commercial engine. NSIL should become the commercial interface.

And the government should ensure that strategic capabilities remain under national control.

Government Must Make a Choice

The biggest problem is that India appears to be moving towards this new model without fully defining it. The country is transferring technologies, inviting private companies to manufacture launch vehicles and opening satellite programmes to industry.

But the institutional structure is still evolving.

India needs to decide what kind of space power it wants to become. It cannot indefinitely combine the American model of government-private collaboration, the European model of inter-governmental cooperation and strategic autonomy, and the Chinese model of close state coordination without creating institutional confusion.

India needs its own model. But that model must be clearly defined. ISRO Must Change Before Change Is Forced Upon It

The current debate over resignations and voluntary retirements should therefore not be treated merely as a manpower problem.

If experienced scientists are leaving in significant numbers, the government should ask why. Pay and career opportunities matter.

But so do organisational culture, autonomy, opportunities to work on cutting-edge technologies and the ability to see one’s work translated into meaningful products.

The answer cannot simply be to prevent people from leaving. An organisation cannot retain talent by making departure difficult. It retains talent by making staying worthwhile.

That is why the present moment offers ISRO an opportunity. Instead of trying to hold on to every responsibility, the organisation should decide what it wants to be in the next 25 years.

ISRO Needs to Become More Focused

ISRO should not remain India’s space contractor, manufacturer, operator, regulator (Chairman being the Secretary, Department of Space) and commercial agency all rolled into one.

It should become a focused, powerful R&D and advanced-mission organisation at the centre of a much larger national space ecosystem.

The manufacturing and commercial arms should grow outside it. Industry should be given genuine responsibility. The public sector should provide strategic resilience.

(The author is a Chennai-based veteran journalist who has been tracking the space sector for decades. The views expressed are personal. He can be reached at venkatacharijagannathan@gmail.com)