The Ganga Water Sharing Treaty between India and Bangladesh is up for renewal, presenting a window of opportunity to rethink not only the allocation of river water but also the governance of shared rivers in South Asia. The 30-year agreement dated December 12, 1996, deals with the sharing of Ganga waters at the Farakka Barrage in West Bengal. The agreement ends in December 2026. 

Bihar’s demand that its water-security issues be resolved before the agreement is renewed has added a new dimension to the dispute. But the escalating political tussle risks turning the issue into a battle between the water rights of Bangladesh and the interests of Bihar. This framing overlooks the more fundamental question of whether a river can be managed sustainably with a structure that primarily partitions available flows without adequately addressing the broader basin.

There's a lot riding on this. The Ganga, known as Padma downstream, is essential for Bangladesh’s navigation, fisheries, dry-season agriculture, and ecological stability of some parts of the southwest region. Bihar is linked to the river in terms of future industrial growth, livelihoods from agriculture, drinking water supply, flood vulnerability, and sedimentation. These issues are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Their collision is a classic example of a governance problem in which political boundaries shape discussions, but floods, water, and silt travel across them.

Disadvantages of a Bilateral System

The treaty signed in 1996 was a major diplomatic success. In the lean season, when demands on the river become especially intense and competing, it replaced ambiguity with a controlled allocation method. Article II provides for emergency consultation if the flow is below 50,000 cusecs for a ten-day period but has a different allocation schedule for different flow amounts at Farakka. But the treaty does not guarantee Bangladesh a minimum flow unconditionally in all hydrological conditions. That’s why its extraordinary scarcity provisions leave so much room for negotiation right at the moment when water is most contested.

The main flaw in the deal is not that bilateral treaties are useless in principle. Rather, it is because the various processes that determine the condition of the river cannot be resolved by allocation at a single point. The treaty governs the distribution of water that flows to Farakka, but not upstream withdrawals, storage throughout the basin, sediment flows, floodplain management, or the aggregate effects of changing rainfall patterns.

Thus, the end of the treaty is a chance to reexamine its institutional and geographical scope. Meanwhile, the Ganges is still governed by a particular bilateral water-sharing treaty, although the larger Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna basin contains many transboundary rivers, as noted in the Asian Development Bank’s report on the deal. The hydrological relationships of the river are larger than the structure for joint management. The distinction is important because the management of a river and the allocation of water are two different activities. A diplomatic arrangement could be preserved by an agreement that merely reproduces the current allocation formula and does not sufficiently consider the reasons for continued water insecurity.

Bihar's Case Should not be Ignored

Bihar’s demands have now added a big domestic element to the negotiations. Political leaders have blamed the pact and the operation of the Farakka Barrage for water shortages, siltation, and floods in the state. They have also requested that future plans should take into account the future needs of Bihar for industry, drinking water, and irrigation. It is not enough to wave away these issues as political roadblocks. River management is a big issue for Bihar, and its development needs have to be considered. A state that has to face the problem of frequent floods and competing demands on water supplies, while catering to future industrial growth, has every reason to seek greater say in decisions affecting the Ganga. But not every causal claim made in their name is automatically validated by reasonable concern. 

In October 2026, Mongabay-India reported that experts had questioned whether the treaty was responsible for water troubles in Bihar. The state has different amounts of water available to it, and the physical factors affecting the rivers are different. Flooding can be exacerbated by a combination of sediment deposition, channel instability, embankments, restrictions to drainage, flows from upstream, and heavy rainfall. The precise role of the Farakka Barrage in some Bihar issues is still debated.

This is important because a more demanding policy response may be replaced by a politically acceptable justification. Major factors are sedimentation and management of the floodplains. So, changing the distribution of water at Farakka may not be a solution. Besides, a demand for a larger share does not automatically determine how much water Bihar can sustainably consume, store, or distribute in the dry season. Bihar’s case, therefore, is one that requires transparent hydrological evidence, independent evaluation, and a clear distinction between the barrage’s consequences, the treaty, and broader failures in basin management. In the absence of that distinction, negotiations will more likely devolve into a battle of competing political assertions rather than a process informed by scientific assessment.

Responsibility Towards Bangladesh’s Needs

The same evidentiary discipline must apply to India’s responsibilities vis-a-vis Bangladesh. From Dhaka’s point of view, sustained dry-season flows are more than a diplomatic plus. They impact livelihoods downstream, river ecology, fisheries, and agriculture planning. The Ganga’s flow is affected by rain, abstractions upstream, interaction with groundwater, and general climatic variability. Reduced dry-season flows in some parts of southwest Bangladesh could exacerbate existing pressures, such as saline intrusion. 

But one cannot attribute all these effects to the treaty or the Farakka Barrage alone. The key issue is how the uncertainty is distributed. And when river flows decline, a downstream country reliant on negotiated allocations is very vulnerable. If the treaty’s emergency provisions call for more consultations rather than a sufficiently clear and predictable solution, the parties may have difficulty agreeing when the consequences of delay are the most severe.

Thus, a successor agreement should clarify how decisions will be made when conflicting needs cannot be met concurrently, improve drought contingencies, and create transparent processes for unusual low-flow periods. It should not be seen as an external obstacle to India’s internal development. They have the same water problem as well. Any lasting arrangement will also have to address India’s legitimate domestic needs. Sustainable cooperation cannot be built on one nation ignoring the needs of the other nation. We need confidence from the public on both sides. We need a clear, scientifically sound, and adequately predictable allocation mechanism.

Far from Dhaka and New Delhi

The argument also points to a structural weakness in India’s transboundary water diplomacy strategy: the disconnect between national river governance and international obligations. While the Union government can negotiate with Bangladesh, decisions on water management impact communities and states with different objectives. Bihar has its own problems of flooding, water consumption, and sedimentation, but West Bengal has direct stakes in the Farakka system and downstream Hooghly. Water management decisions of other states in the larger Ganga basin affect the river. Nepal is also important for the watershed hydrology and possibilities of cooperation upstream.

This does not mean that every state of the basin should formally join the bilateral agreement. Bangladesh and India are still parties to the treaty, and their international obligations cannot be held hostage forever by competing domestic agendas. Domestic consultation and basin-wide coordination should guide the bilateral process, rather than being seen as afterthoughts.

This is a particularly important distinction since a treaty cannot substitute for good domestic water governance. Bihar needs evidence-based flood control, better drainage, proper sediment management techniques, and a realistic projection of future water demand. Bangladesh needs a better protection against severe low-flow situations and secured allocations. Coordination of forecasts, better ecological monitoring, and sharing of hydrological data would be beneficial to both countries. A broader governance framework could also help to differentiate between issues that need bilateral negotiations and those that need domestic investment or collaboration among a number of basin states.

What the Agreement Requires

No country should be in a hurry to renew just because the clock is ticking, only to reinforce the flaws of the past. And there should be no possibility of opening up the whole deal if there is not a viable substitute. Such a more robust structure would include changes that would adapt to the changing condition of the river as well as continuity in water-sharing obligations. Both governments should jointly commission a transparent and collaboratively verified assessment of current river flows, seasonal variability, and realistic climatic scenarios. Historical data may still be useful but should not be substituted for more recent hydrological data. 

Second, the agreement should establish more precise protocols for extreme droughts and abnormally low flows, including clear procedures for emergency modifications, data disclosure, and regular consultation schedules. In this assessment, the needs of vulnerable groups and ecological needs have to be considered. 

Third, India should institutionalize discussions with affected states like West Bengal and Bihar, while retaining its ability to meet its international obligations. Bihar's concerns need to be scientifically evaluated before being approved or denied on the basis of political expediency. Finally, besides allocation, the two countries need to cooperate in ecological protection, river monitoring, flood forecasting, and sediment studies, among others. These measures will not eliminate conflicting demands but may reduce confusion and assist in conflict resolution. 

To ensure the future of the Ganga, we cannot treat every scarcity as a zero-sum game. Borders or treaty provisions cannot fully contain the river system that links Bangladesh’s downstream interests and Bengal and Bihar’s water security. The aim is to create institutions that support both regional collaboration and domestic development, rather than forcing a choice between them.

The expiration of the 1996 treaty is more than a diplomatic deadline between the two parties. It tests whether India and Bangladesh can move from sharing a scarce water supply to managing the common risks that affect its availability. If the talks continue to be about mutually exclusive allocation requests, the region could renew the pact without addressing the fundamental issue. An ambitious deal would recognize that the first step to sustainable water-sharing is a greater awareness of the river itself, rather than negotiations.

(The author is a climate researcher and research analyst on ESG research and energy policy. The views expressed are personal. She can be contacted at anusreetadutta.23@gmail.com )