The ISI–LeT nexus remains the most destabilizing factor in South Asia’s security architecture. With Pakistan actively leveraging its ideological networks in Bangladesh, the region faces the prospect of a renewed wave of cross-border terrorism. The alignment of extremist elements across Pakistan and Bangladesh not only threatens India’s national security but also endangers the stability of the entire subcontinent.

Iran’s influence among Shia communities across South Asia represents an additional layer reinforcing its position in the Muslim world—one that has not been decisively weakened by the 12-day conflict. On the contrary, anti-Israel and, in some cases, anti-Western sentiments among South Asian Muslims have intensified, offering Tehran new opportunities to leverage these emotions in favour of its strategic endgame.

Perhaps the gravest failure of the UNFCCC process is its lack of accountability. As Guterres stated, “It’s no longer time for negotiations. It’s time for implementation.” But what happens when countries do not implement? Seventy-nine countries have yet to submit their 2025 NDCs—even after extended deadlines. Surprisingly, this includes India, the only major economy not to submit revised NDCs, and the only South Asian country (excluding Afghanistan) yet to do so. These NDCs were critical for initiating the New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG).

Walk into a gathering of South Asians abroad, in the U.S., the Gulf, Europe, and you will see Akhand Bharat in its simplest form. People do not ask, “Are you Indian or Pakistani?” They connect over language, food, festivals, music, accents, humour, and the familiar comfort of shared culture. A Tamilian and a Sindhi, a Bengali and a Pashtun, a Punjabi Hindu and a Pakistani Muslim, outside the subcontinent, they all recognise the common civilisational thread instantly. What divides them here, unites them there.

Handing over strategic projects in Balochistan to China or the US raises serious concerns of neo-colonialism. Both states pursue imperialist designs and expansionist ambitions to protect their own interests, which could further inflame the insurgency and unrest in the province. The state is playing with fire and must carefully reconsider its approach to such a sensitive region.

The condition of Afghan women remains a moral boundary influencing the extent of India’s cooperation. And Afghanistan’s strategic relevance—access to Central Asia, regional security, and geopolitical influence—remains as important as ever. India’s present policy appears guided by the belief that sustained presence and dialogue, rather than isolation, offer the best chance of protecting long-term stability, influence, and national interests. 

The Yunus regime insists that general elections will be held in February 2026. Few serious analysts believe this promise. There is a growing belief that Yunus, with backing from Pakistan, Turkey, segments of the EU, and parts of the US establishment, plans to remain in power indefinitely. Barring secular and leftist parties from participating is part of this plan. The election timetable is a smokescreen

When minorities feel alienated or discriminated against, their distrust of state institutions grows, undermining the social fabric essential for national security. Strengthening this fabric involves upholding constitutional equality and ensuring no community feels marginalised. By fully integrating minorities as valued members of the national community, India can diminish the impact of radical ideologies and foster a genuinely resilient society united against terror threats.

Beyond India–Bhutan relations, the visit conveys a wider message to South Asia: cooperation grounded in respect, development, and stability remains essential in an uncertain global environment. As the region evolves, India appears to recognize the importance of maintaining strong partnerships without pressuring smaller neighbors or escalating strategic competition.  

The involvement of four doctors, one of whom allegedly executed the Red Fort blast, indicates a model that blends 'inspired' radicalisation with limited external facilitation. Interactions with certain outfits, Kashmiri terror commanders, and external handlers—if confirmed—point to an infrastructure that encourages attacks while maintaining plausible deniability.

It is time for India, along with like-minded nations across Asia, Africa, and Latin America, to articulate a shared agenda of non-alignment 2.0, not as a posture of neutrality but as a strategy of autonomy. The original Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) emerged from the Cold War’s bipolar tension; its modern counterpart must respond to multipolar volatility. 

The world over, as is evident from the Atlas of endangered languages, there is a thrust of the dominant languages taking a precedence and most of the endangered languages are likely to disappear by 2100. Soon, possibly in the near future, the grand and great grand-children of the present generation may not be able to tell the story of their own mother tongue. Some of these languages will be lost forever and will only be limited to the pages of gazetteers and history books.

Only by asserting ownership over data and algorithms can the South escape serving as the North’s digital underclass. The path forward demands digital decolonization—a reimagining of technology not as an instrument of extraction, but as a platform for justice, inclusion, and shared prosperity. The struggle for sovereignty has moved from the soil to the server.

India provides valuable lessons. Despite its complex religious, linguistic, and ethnic diversity, India has preserved unity through a robust constitutional framework, civic nationalism, and legal consistency. Even contentious debates from population balance to cultural identity are ultimately rooted in democratic institutions. Western democracies can learn from this: pluralism prospers only when supported by strong governance and well-defined civic responsibilities.

After an uprising in 2024, Bangladesh is currently walking on the path to its national election in early 2026. If the ousted Awami League and its allies remain ineligible to participate in the next parliamentary election, ultimately, the central question remains: how will their huge number of supporters exercise their right to vote? Excluding a major political ideology from the electoral process risks making the election less inclusive and could generate new tensions