Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's rehabilitation package for the conflict-affected Kashmiri migrants announced on April 25th has brought back the limelight on the status of Kashmir Pandits and possibilities of their return to the Kashmir valley. The relief measures declared by Manmohan Singh underscored the continuous efforts by the government to ensure early return of displaced Kashmiri Pandits to their habitat.

Significantly, Manmohan Singh noted that the benefits of the package will apply to all Kashmiri migrant families who had had been "forced to leave their homes in the wake of unfortunate events" with "bag and baggage after 1989 and have not been able to return." However, despite the hyped announcement by the Prime Minister, Kashmiri migrants do not seem to be very keen on the government offer and in returning 'home'. Even after 18 years of displacement, a vast majority of Kashmir Pandits feel that nothing has changed in Kashmir and their safety and livelihood in the valley is not safeguarded by such declarations.

Violence against Kashmir Pandits started after the outbreak of militancy in Kashmir in the late 1980s. Many Pandits were killed in the ensuing violence which included the infamous massacres of Pandit families in the Telwani and Sangrama villages of Budgam and women were raped by the militants. Properties of Pandits were either destroyed or taken over by militants or by local Muslims. They were forced to leave their homes in the valley. Around 300,000 Pandits fled to safer places due to fear of persecution. Those who belonged to affluent social strata migrated to other countries or metropolitan cities like Delhi, but the majority had no option but to remain displaced in their own land.

Ever since their exodus, which also embodied the process of ethnic cleansing in Jammu and Kashmir, the plight and sufferings of Kashmir Pandits have continued despite the governments' rehabilitation measures. Most of them live in Jammu (some 200,000) or Delhi (around 100,000). Apart from being worst victims of the militancy in Kashmir, majority of Pandits became "part of the neglected statistic of 'internal refugees'" even today.

However, only 49,760 are registered as displaced families. They have undergone great misery to protect their lives and culture. They still live in abysmal conditions with families of five to six people often huddled into a small room in squalid camps. The sense of deprivation and alienation is very apparent among the Pandits, especially for those who are still living in camps. The incidence of problems such as insomnia, depression and hypertension has been reported high among the Pandits.

The government provides minimal humanitarian relief for the displaced Pandit families. According to the Kashmir government (2000 report), the Indian government spends 26 million rupees (U.S.$597,000) per month just on financial and food aid for the displaced in Kashmir alone, that has totaled some 2,741 million rupees (U.S.$62.9 million) since 1990. Both the state and central governments have periodically made futile efforts to inspire the exiled community to return. These attempts were unsuccessful so far due to various reasons. First, successive government in New Delhi and Srinagar had failed to protect those who had stayed back in valley over the years. As a reason, security is a primary apprehension which stymies Pandits' return. Political parties and politicians have consistently failed to address this problem. They are also only treated as vote bank elements and are remembered only at the time of elections in the state. The promises that are made at the time of elections are often not carried out.

Second, lack of any improvement in the security situation in the state discourages the displaced Kashmiri Pandits to go back to their homes. The growing self-perception of the Kashmiri Pandits as a distinct ethnic group with legitimate claims for separate territory, 'Panun Kashmir' or autonomy within the state of Kashmir, was perceived as a threat by Muslim secessionists to their goal of seeking an independent nation and the 'Islamisation of Kashmir'. Third, the state and central governments also lack the political will to negotiate a settlement. There has been no significant confidence building measures to facilitate their return to the valley for the past one decade. Fourth, despite three legislations, the state government is unable to check the distress sales of Pandits property.

In this context, the recent rehabilitation package announced by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh also falls short of the Pandits expectation. Unless there are major incentives including improvement in the security environment, the possibility of Pandits' return seems remote. If the government is sincere about resettling the displaced Kashmiri Pandits in the Kashmir valley itself, then it may need to take few more tangible steps.

As a first step, the government must first make efforts in rebuilding the confidence and harmony between the majority Muslims and Pandits. Second, it should provide full-proof security for the Pandits who are living in the valley or are planning to move in. Third, the state government should not permit any change in the revenue documents pertaining to the properties of Pandits in favour of other communities. Fourth, if there is no resettlement at their original place of residence, the government should open camps for them in the Valley, and provide them necessary protection and essential amenities, including schooling for their children.

This would give them a feeling of being settled in their own environment. Finally, economic reconstruction of the community is the most vital factor in re-assimilating the Pandits into Kashmiri society. Waiving of business loans, paying compensation for loss of income from agriculture and incentives for the unemployed youth may be some of the measure the government can undertake before facilitating their return.

If the above mentioned confidence building measures are not put into practice, the possibility of Pandits rejecting rehabilitation proposals is a far gone conclusion. As they may not prepare to become 'cannon-fodder' for officials or politicians who they feel cannot guarantee their security. Hence, it is amply clear that the Pandits may not go back till the security conditions in Kashmir improve. At the minimum level, their security to life and property must be taken care by the government.
As any government proposal in the past aiming to ensure the return of Pandits to the Valley has usually been followed by targeted terrorist attacks. The killing of 24 Kashmir Pandits at the Nadimarg Village (District Pulwama), on March 23, 2003 is the worst of the many examples of the terrorists' tactic to block any proposal for the return of migrants including Pandits to the Valley.

Hence, the government should initiate a dialogue with the Pandits and study the feasibility of their return in the present conditions. Packages declared after such realistic assessments would increase their credibility and effectiveness and ensure subsequent return of Pandits to the valley in a phased manner. A properly devised timeframe and relocation plan in 'secured' areas in the Valley would be a pragmatic first step to bring this displaced community to their homeland.

Instead of such realistic and well studied projects, devising rehabilitation packages with an eye on elections would fetch minimal return and in turn increase the cynicism among the displaced Pandits on the seriousness of various governments to their cause. Manmohan Singh's latest announcement could be used as an opportunity to make such a new beginning by both the Kashmir Pandits and the government in thinking about realistic solutions.

Dr. M. Mayilvaganan is Associate Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. Views expressed are personal.