Henry Kissinger, of all people, has declared in a recent OpEd published in the Washington Post and elsewhere, that the US would do well to recognize that "the internal structure of Pakistani politics is essentially out of the control of American decision-making." This is truly a remarkable statement coming as it does from one who in his heyday rivaled John Foster Dulles in doing his utmost to assure that the internal structure of Pakistani politics remained subservient to US strategic interests and anathema to India's.

This is a testament to how far US South Asian diplomacy, not so much by choice as by necessity, has mellowed since the heady old days of Cold War hubris that Mr. Kissinger embodied. Here we have the ironical spectacle of the Nixon era's architect of the policies which enabled dictator Yahya Khan to wage genocidal war against the people of Bangladesh for the 'crime' of wanting political self-determination; who ordered a carrier task force into the Bay of Bengal to try and intimidate Indira Gandhi into aborting her military mission to save the Mukti Bahini from annihilation; who contemptuously labeled India a "soft state" because it was unwilling to be part of the anti-communist crusade; who said to U. S. envoy, William Saxbe, as he was leaving for India to take up his assignment as Ambassador, "Once you get to India I don't want to hear from you again," now advising the most hawkish administration since that of his boss, Richard Nixon, not to meddle in the democratic political process which, if successful, has a chance to circumscribe the power of the military dictators who had always been his favorite people!.

Mr. Kissinger's conversion to political self-determination for Pakistan has its caveats, however. The US must not just throw President Pervez Musharraf and all he represents to the wolves of civil society. America must remember the "valiant support" which General Musharraf rendered to the American war on terrorism since 9/11 as well as his alleged efforts to confront jihadist fundamentalism at home.

Apart from questions about the sincerity and thoroughness of Mr. Musharraf's and the Pakistani generals' opposition to Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism (certainly not when it is pointed towards India and subserves Pakistani strategic interests in the region), there is also the matter of just how far Mr. Kissinger thinks the US should be prepared to go to assure the attainment of democracy in Pakistan. It's OK to promote democracy in Pakistan, he avers, but not so far as to risk US security interests. This seems to say that civil society is fine up to a point, but America must not condone completely eliminating those potential military dictators lurking in the political wings who throughout the country's history have been prepared to abort the democratic process whenever it seemed to be "getting out of hand," which means, from the standpoint of American strategic interests, allowing the emergence of political groups that might decide to pursue really independent courses of action.

We have seen a hint of this unwelcome independence in actions which the winning parties in the Pakistani elections have taken in the run-up to forming a government and getting the parliamentary process underway. There is a report that the US was piqued by PPP co-chairman Asif Ali Zardari's refusal to form a working relationship with President Musharraf and what is left of the PMLQ party that would obviously reinforce the General's attempt to hold onto power, an outcome favourable to America's perceived interests that run counter to the Pakistani public's wishes. US officials, says the NY Times, met three times with Zardari and twice with Nawaz Sharif, urging both to work with Musharraf.

It turned out, according to Aziz Haniffa (India Abroad, Feb. 29 - p. A22), that by meeting in Islamabad with US Ambassador Anne W. Patterson, soon after the elections, Zaradari "nearly committed political suicide." What saved him from this show of "obsequiousness" to the Americans was that it "prompted soul searching within the PPP, and resulted in the decision to enter into an alliance with Sharif." Small wonder in the face of the fact that, as Lahore University political scientist, Rasul Baksh Rais, puts it, "I've never seen such an irrational, impractical move on the part of the United States. The whole country has voted against Musharraf. This was a referendum against Musharraf." (Feb. 29)

In a sense this in essence validates Kissinger's already alluded to contention that the structure of Pakistani politics is out of American control. Clearly this attempt to intervene proved to be counterproductive. The same is probably destined to take place regarding the impending confrontation between Musharraf and the judiciary. It is an open secret
that the US would prefer that the incumbent political parties do not make changes in the composition of the Pakistan High Court, and the rules governing its authority, whose outcome would be the invalidation of Musharraf's presidency. Yet this is precisely what is in the cards. All indications are that the first order of business following the convening of the new National Assembly will be to restore the justices, including Chief Justice Chaudhury, whom Musharraf removed and replaced with sycophants when the sitting justices refused to ratify the powers that would enable him to function as a de facto dictator able to undermine at his whim the legitimate governance of the country.

Some predict that a new constitutional crisis may develop should a restored judiciary rule that Musharraf must step down. This would undoubtedly be a test of whether the military can be kept out of politics, thereby assuring that the Pakistani people's new-found clamor
for viable democracy can at last be realized. Dr. Walter Anderson, Acting Director of the Johns Hopkins School of International Studies, rightly concludes that the military is the key. "The chief of army staff, Ashfaq Kayani, is trying to keep the military out of politics and is not likely to back Musharraf..." If this proves to be the case, then Pakistan will indeed have taken the steps toward the attainment of civil society that are long overdue and so richly deserved.

Whatever the outcome, however, it will not be the United States whose intervention determines it. Certainly, and inevitably, US power in the region will have a say; no one can deny this. But it will not be the same as yesteryear. If democracy succeeds in Pakistan, diplomacy, bargaining, and consensus among political equals will more and more replace the paternalism and cultural and historical ignorance which the now (partially) recanting Henry Kissinger once embodied.

Dr. Harold Gould is Visiting Scholar at the Centre for South Asian Studies, University of Virginia. He can be contacted at harold.gould4@verizon.net.