Less than three weeks after the Chitrakonda attack, armed cadres of the Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-M) attacked the Special Operation Group (SOG), Orissa's elite anti-Naxalite force on July 16. Seventeen personnel were killed in the landmine explosion triggered by the Maoists in Malkangiri district of southern Orissa. This was the second major incident after the Nayagarh police station attack on February 15. Earlier, in the Chitrakonda incident 38 Greyhound commandos of Andhra Pradesh were killed in the Balimela dam on 29 June when their boat was pounded by the Maoists with LMG and automatic weapons fire from a hillock.

The meticulous ambush on the Greyhounds, the famed anti-Naxalite forces of Andhra Pradesh, and the SOG by the Maoists indicate the continuity of mobile warfare phase in Orissa. It is believed that for the first time the Maoists had used RDX to attack on the security forces. The impact of the explosion was so intense that the anti-landmine vehicle was thrown up more than 20 feet in the air. Six months back the Maoists were looking for RDX to form a suicide squad.

The target and message of the attack was clear. The Union Home Ministry has been suggesting other Naxalite affected states to follow the 'Andhra Pradesh model' of anti-naxalite operation. It is believed that the Greyhound played major role in making the Andhra model successful, primarily by flushing the armed cadres out of the Nalamala forests, Telengana and Palnad region. As a result of which, many senior Maoist leaders have been camping in Malkangiri district of Orissa, bordering Andhra Pradesh.

The Greyhound model or military approach to resolve the conflict was also replicated in other States in different names, which emerged as major obstacles for the Maoists to improve the movement to a decisive level. They were, in fact, looking for an opportunity to demoralize the Greyhound by carrying out a major attack and sending a clear cut message to the Union Home Ministry that military approach can not resolve the vexed conflict. Therefore, the combing operation in Janbai area of Malkangiri district, which has been virtually declared 'liberated zone' by the CPI-Maoist, gave opportunity to take a lethal strike on security apparatus. The impact of these attacks was so severe that these special forces will take another six months to overcome from that trauma.

Undoubtedly, these incidents reflect strong support base of the CPI-Maoist vis-a-vis poor intelligence of Orissa police in Malkangiri district. The state police has been consistently failed to collect intelligence in southern Orissa due to complete lack of police- public relationship. People, largely, have lost faith over state mechanism due to factors such as absence of civil administration in remote areas, collapse of justice system, exploitations of tribal by contractors and rich people and failure of police to provide minimum security to civil populace. In the last four months, the Maoists have killed more than 12 persons by branding them as police informer in Malkangiri district. Local people have been facing problems due to frequent strikes called by the CPI-Maoist. The Maoists have been virtually running parallel government by creating political vacuum either killing village headmen or driving out influential persons from the villages. In fact, their domination was visible when the Naxalites called four day strike in Malkangiri on 22 May in response to the killing of two of their cadres earlier that month.

Maoist's attack preparation within a short period indicates their area domination, and military capability. The Greyhound troops entered into that area three days back, even though the Maoists did know about their moves. They also knew about their return route as the greyhound troops earlier requested for a mechanized boat from the irrigation department to cross the reservoir. Similarly, the 16 June incident happened while a Landmine Protection Vehicle (LPV) was carrying the SOG personnel was on its way from MV 126 to MV-41. The SOG personnel were returning from the place where the house of a BJP leader was attacked by the Maoists in previous night.

The similarities of these two incidents indicate a new tactics are being adopted by the Maoists to letting the SF to get into the liberated areas and attack on return path. Since the Maoists are well aware about topography, they can attack very easily once the enemy is in their territory. In the last incident, in fact, they had deliberately created some violence in that village, because they knew that the security forces (SF) will be passing through the culvert. As part of the plan, they did not set up mines while SF entered into the area by sending a message that the area was free from Maoist attack so that the SF would be bit casual while returning to the camp. They have also been attacking on the SF when they are vulnerable or less prepared to counter attack.

The CPI-Maoist took a decision at the 9th Congress in January 2007 to develop the movement to from present guerilla warfare to mobile warfare and urban warfare as central policy. In fact a recently circulated CPI-Maoist pamphlet on the Nayagarh attack, named 'Operation Ropeway', said the Nayagarh attack was first incident in India, where central policy was executed. Interestingly, as part of mobile warfare tactics, the CPI-Maoist Orissa State committee adopted that the outfit will stop major attacks like Nayargargh. 'ambush attack' on police will replace 'planned guerilla' attack. The attack will continue almost everyday. The SF will be engaged by Maoists either killing someone or attacks on both private or government property.

However, theoretically, bigger or company level formations are another feature of the mobile warfare. Mobile warfare also needs high quality technique and sophisticated weapons. Although the Orissa Maoists have acquired sophisticated arms from the Nayagarh attack, they are yet to reach that stage (bigger formation), which is very essential for mobile warfare. The company level formation is delayed due to shortage of dedicated armed cadres in Orissa. It is learnt that the central committee has deputed around two hundred Maoist cadres from Chhattisgarh and Andhra Pradesh to Orissa for organization building in Malkangiri, Koraput, Kalahandi, and Nawarangpur. They have been trying to set up a corridor from Kalahandi-Nuapada and Bastar. Most importantly, it is believed that the Balimela attack was carried out by Malkangiri division, which functions under the Andhra Pradesh- Orissa Border (AOB) Special Zone Committee, with support of Orissa State Committee, and Poplur squad. Therefore, the phenomenon reflects an occasional mobile warfare or initial phase of mobile warfare in the eastern provinces of India.