The new initiatives of Indian Navy are being undermined by government indifference

The recently concluded Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) held in New Delhi attracted as many as 31 of the 33 littorals - Iran and Pakistan apart. This is a commendable initiative by the Indian Navy (IN) to chart a new course for the tricolor in the 21st century. It is rare that as many as 26 naval chiefs come together for a conclave and this is indeed a mini diplomatic coup. The IN remains the most credible navy within the Indian Ocean region (IOR) and this despite the reality that it is the Cinderella service as compared to its peers - the Army and the Air Force.

But from all accounts, not everybody in Delhi was on board - and a familiar Indian malaise apropos the harmonization of the political, diplomatic and military strands of national security issues was evident. Drift and institutional dissonance detracted from the rich professional content of the symposium. At the outset, many of the participants were perplexed as to why the Ministry of External Affairs was not adequately represented at this first-ever major naval initiative.

The External Affairs Minister was listed as a speaker in the inaugural session but was unable to attend. The only cabinet representation was by the Ministry of Defence. Navies are essentially instruments of state policy and the IN is seeking to create a synergistic cooperative security framework for the IOR in keeping with Indian politico-strategic orientation that eschews military alliances. In this regard the IN has elicited generous international praise for its consistent professionalism.

But the moot question is does India have a macro national politico-strategic grand policy? IONS 2008 tried to provide some intellectual ballast towards this end - but the results were alas muddied. While Manmohan Singh provided an unexceptionable overview and urged the conclave of naval chiefs to "develop a comprehensive cooperative framework of maritime security" and the Indian naval chief made a very persuasive case for 'inclusiveness' as the leit motif of the 21st century in the IOR, the dissonance was soon evident.

In his remarks Defence Minister AK Antony was steering a different course. His central exhortation reflected a throwback to the insular Indian response of the mid 1970's when he noted: "I would like to exhort all present and future members of the 'IONS Initiative' to resist the temptation of trying either to provide a prescriptive set of answers to a prescribed set of problems or challenges. I would caution them against seeking to import extra-regional template. I would, instead, ask them to tap the huge intellectual and innovative resources available within the IOR littoral."

This divergence of views was the major issue of discussion between sessions among the participants. Is India seeking to keep all extra-regional powers out of the new maritime initiative it is trying to embark upon? And here the unstated reference was to the two major powers of this century - the USA and China which have their own grand national security strategies in which the maritime dimension with specific reference to the IOR is an integral component.

It is a tenet of maritime history of the last 500 years that all great or major powers have sought to maintain credible naval 'presence' or dominate two of the three navigable oceans of the world. In the colonial era of history the IOR had a certain salience and subsequently in the Cold War period, the global maritime focus shifted to the Atlantic-Pacific combine. In the post Cold war and more recently in the post 9-11 years, this focus has transmuted to the Pacific-IOR combine and this is an inviolable strategic-maritime reality. Hence India has to evolve appropriate national policies that are cognizant of these realities and harmonize its security and diplomatic initiatives.

Regrettably India is blind to its abiding maritime interests and the Navy often ploughs a lonely furrow in the national grid. Paradoxically it is only in the naval domain that China concedes the advantage that India has over it - but this opportunity has not been maximized in any consistent manner by Delhi.

The IN is a modest but credible capability in the national quiver and it has an inherent trans border quality that can nurture or further many aspects of the abiding national interest. Specific to the IOR these areas of maritime empathy relate to India's ' Look East policy' and the nascent 'Look West (Asia) policy'. But these will remain unrealised if there is lack of apex clarity about where the IN is headed in a politico-diplomatic sense - and IONS tried to provide these answers but was blunted by Delhi's characteristic dissonance.

DNA India, 26 February 2008, http://www.dnaindia.com/report.asp?newsid=1152764