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The Future of the Coalition Government in Pakistan

Subrahmanyam Sridharan

It was remarkable that Pakistan could conduct, a largely, fair general elections amidst all the violence, and achieve the formation of a new coalition government. There has been general rejoice that democracy has at last dawned on Pakistan. While a single sparrow does not a summer make, is the coalition government even a sparrow heralding a new summer?

Coalition politics is a brand new concept in Pakistan, a country where democracy itself has not taken roots even after six decades of independence. A successful spell of coalition governance demands adjustments and accommodation among the disparate constituents of the coalition. This cannot come about unless and until the political leaders have clarity of purpose, understand the nuances of coalition politics and are willing to sacrifice their ego at the altar of political stability. Even a stronger democracy is India struggles with coalition push and pulls frequently. With a fragile democracy, where no Prime Minister has ever completed his/her full term and no Parliament, except the just concluded one, has lasted the full five years, a big question mark looms as to whether the new experiment will be successful in Pakistan. The situation is complicated by the fact that an all powerful President, with the dreaded Constitutional Clause 58(2)(b) that enables him to dismiss the Government and dissolve the National Assembly and the Senate, is still in power.

Pakistan has been a feudal country where powerful elites, bureaucracy, landed gentry, clerics and the Army, have ruled it ever since Independence. Adding to this is the biradari system of clannish affinities as well as the jirga system of dispute resolution in most parts of the country. The elites leveraged these systems as their instruments to govern the country. The very first general election with universal adult suffrage took place a full 23 years after its Independence and it soon led to the break-up of the country. The country has seen three Constitutions with countless amendments and is still far from perfect as a Constitutional Republic. The Military has practically ruled the country all these years. At various junctures, leaders of political parties including the mainstream PPP and PML as well as Islamic clerics, had requested the Army to take over. Every time there was a coup, the masses always welcomed the Army rule as though they were saviours to prevent the country slipping into the abyss. It is therefore difficult to expect that the various players will exhibit the maturity on an unprecedented fashion and behave contrary to what they are accustomed to, in order to make the coalition governance a success, a proposition that is difficult even in a more stable and natural democracy.

A further complexity in the current arrangement is that the two largest parties have formed the coalition. Normally, successful coalitions will have a single dominant party with a multitude of smaller ones. The present combination is therefore a serious cause for concern as there are two centres of gravity with a possible rupture point in between as they pull apart. If one traces the history of events that culminated in the current coalition, it was dominated by mistrust between the two leaders, Ms. Bhutto and Mr. Nawaz Sharif. While initial meetings between these two leaders in early 2007 at Jeddah, generated a lot of optimism, they were soon dashed by the clerical parties of the MMA leading to Nawaz Sharif and Ms. Bhutto parting ways. Possibly Musharraf engineered the split hoping to woo Ms. Bhutto, a more acceptable choice for him and the Americans, than Nawaz Sharif. Unfortunately, other forces upset the calculations and Ms. Bhutto was assassinated resulting in an entirely unanticipated dynamic leading to the present coalition. While, it is remarkable that Zardari and Nawaz Sharif could strike an alliance, the intial flush of enthusiasm may already be ebbing.

The very first appearance of dissension was over the wordings of the Murree declaration. Certainly, Zardari has a softer corner for Musharraf who not only rehabilitated his wife but also withdrew all cases against the couple both within Pakistan and abroad. On the other hand, Nawaz Sharif was unwelcome and re-exiled as recently as September 2007. The National Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO) does not let Nawaz Sharif off the hook as it does the Bhuttos. This is already a clever wedge that Musharraf has driven. The next immediate breakpoint came in the choice of the Prime Minister. While PPP favoured Makhdoom Amin Fahim, Nawaz shot it down because of his 'supposed' proximity with Musharraf. With PCO-appointed judges in the Supreme Court, Nawaz Sharif has no chance of coming to power anytime soon. This and his natural anxiety to redress the 1999 coup by Musharraf, incite Nawaz to look at the restoration of judges in a light different from that of Zardari. While PPPP also wishes to re-establish the dismissed judges, it wants to do it in a way that would not be threatening to the Presidency, a far cry from Nawaz's direct and confrontational approach. With the self set deadline of April 29 for this issue, and PML(N) unrelenting on any face saving formula, a serious situation is already brewing.

Recent divergent utterances from Zardari and Nawaz Sharif on the Kashmir issue are another pointer to the likely divisions that are to emerge. While Zardari wants trade and other relations to be given primacy, Nawaz is still harping on the old Pakistani policy of UN resolutions. The handling of the terrorists is a likely source of another flashpoint between Zardari and Nawaz. Zardari, more susceptible to US pressures, might toe a different line from a deeply conservative Nawaz who is certainly not pro-US.

Zardari, anticipating troubles ahead, has joined hands with MQM. Though both PPP and PML(N) have disliked MQM, the former seems to have based its relationship with MQM on tactical reasons. PML(Q) is waiting in the wings as well to save the PPP, if PML(N) withdraws its support. Zardari therefore may not be pressurized by Nawaz beyond a point. Nawaz, who is untainted by the tag of US puppet amidst all the anti-US sentiment sweeping Pakistan now, may up the ante hoping to cash in more and putting Zardari in a spot, and thereby climbing a rung on the escalation ladder. The lawyers' movement, even if it has lost a lot of steam, may then turn against Zardari in spite of being led by a PPP loyalist Aitzaz Ahsan. There are reportedly differences between the two on the judges' issue, especially over Iftikhar Chaudhry. As the initial euphoria wears out, and more cracks develop, Zardari may remember all the trumped up narcotics charges against him by Nawaz Sharif and the resultant solitary incarceration for a long time.

The inescapable conclusion therefore is that Pakistan is heading towards political instability and more alienation of the society. The unsettled period can be exploited by the terrorists in the meanwhile. The people of Pakistan who had reposed so much faith in their leaders may be disappointed yet again by their myopic behaviour leading to Army intervention at another opportune time.

The more things change in Pakistan, the more they remain the same.


The author, an engineer by profession, is a keen observer of South Asian politics. He has earlier written a research article on the "Indus Water Treaty", published in the Bharat Rakshak. He can be contacted at raptorss@gmail.com.



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