The last time Musharraf flexed muscles with a nuclear rhetoric was during the Kargil war, when he threatened an escalation of the conflict to a nuclear threshold if India crosses the LoC. India took his threat seriously and stayed within its territorial confines while flushing the intruders out. The inconsistent red lines defining Pakistani nuclear threshold have since been the greatest challenge to India-Pakistan deterrence equations. In fact, this has often hindered apt Indian responses to cross-border terror onslaughts. However, unlike the hype he generates with India, Musharraf has always gone the extra mile in Washington to project the safety of Pakistan's nuclear weapons. After years of this spin-doctoring, the General has now done a volte-face by citing the security of Pakistan's nuclear weapons as rationale for continuing the emergency.

Even as a stunned Bush administration explores all possible options to stabilise this volatile country, history is poking at its face for manipulating non-proliferation mechanisms to benefit its parochial goals. Just like the mujahideens turning against their mentors, the Pakistani establishment's roguery, which the U.S. had nurtured, is now hitting back at them. For years, every administration branded South Asia as the most dangerous place in order to target India's fledging nuclear capability while conveniently overlooking Pakistan's clandestine nuclear proliferation with China. It took the 9/11 catastrophe for the Americans to crackdown on these channels which eventually led to the Khan network expose. Realising the frangibility of Pakistan nuclear assets, Washington stepped up monitoring of the nuclear establishment, and also contemplated granting technological aids like the Permissive Action Links (PALS) to ensure fool-proof security, though it is unknown whether this technology made its way to Pakistan.

A stable Musharraf regime was always a key objective for the U.S. to endure its war on terror as also ensure professional military management of nuclear assets. With Musharraf pulling the rug on safety of nuclear weapons if elections are held in a "disturbed atmosphere", Washington now has lesser choices to manage Pakistan as well as the war on its northern fringes. In fact, the General is not misplaced in raising the pitch on nuclear safety. All these years of apprehensions of a post-Musharraf scenario when Jehadis take over or a rogue military regime assumes charge have suddenly become apparent. Besides the political unrest, the military regime is rattled by the loss of sovereign control over parts of North-West Province to pro-Taliban elements.

For the moment, the military is vigorously backing the General. The worry is on how long this would last. Pro-Jehadi elements in the military and the ISI are known to be hand-in-glove with extremist groups, many of whom have turned against Musharraf. The aftermath of a violent end to his government would be a dreaded scenario, as very few believe on the ability of democratic forces to ensure stability as long as the military remains an omnipotent force. Even a stage-managed transition to another military regime seems unlikely, though that might be the best option to ease anti-Musharraf sentiments while ensuring safety of the arsenal. Even if this is done, Washington has to extirpate pro-Jehadi elements in the military in order to stymie the perversion of nuclear resources.

By all means, the U.S. would inevitably be the primary target of potential nuclear terrorism. Therefore, it would neither want an extremist-controlled elected government nor a pro-Jehadi military ruler to take charge of the nuclear assets. Washington would find it difficult to engage a government backed by extremists, and thus be left with limited choices. One would be to initiate a multinational force to dethrone a rogue regime and install a U.S.-backed government, as done in Iraq. The other would be to abandon ship and leave it for regional powers like India and China to manage a failed Pakistani state. Though Beijing can play a key role owing to its proximity with Islamabad, it is unlikely to involve in a chaotic environment.

The Indian armed forces, on their part, have long been toying with plans to destroy terrorist camps inside Pakistani territory. The idea of hot pursuit or preemptive strikes, though often contemplated, had not been pursued owing to Pakistan's nuclear blackmail. A failed state or a rogue regime which raises the terror ante would give space for greater Indian involvement, either through a multinational platform, or single-handed if other powers withdraw from the scene. An abrupt end to U.S. influence in Pakistan would entail the first opening for an Indian politico-military effort that translates into an opportunity to countervail this blackmail and eradicate the terror infrastructure. Though India has to play the role of a stabiliser in the event of state failure, one of its key objectives should be to obliterate the existing negative deterrence equation.

However, crossing the border to destroy the terror infrastructure in Pakistan and play a role in securing its nuclear assets requires a high level of political determination and military preparedness. India has in recent years shied away from such roles and surrendered the management of its neighbourhood to external powers. For the moment, the U.S. is in the thick of things trying to manage Pakistan's uncertain transition. India has to thus wait for the right opportunity to help stabilise the Pakistani nation-state after obliterating its existential threats.

The writer is with IDSA, Delhi. The views expressed here are personal.