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India's indigenous missile defence: are we really there?

A. Vinod Kumar

Very few knew about an indigenous ballistic missile defence (BMD) programme being pursued by Indian scientists until DRDO announced in November 2006 that it had undertaken a successful 'exo-atmospheric' interception with the Prithvi Air Defence Experiment (PADE). Hence, it came as a surprise when the agency decided to announce in advance details of its December 2007 test for an 'endo-atmospheric' interception capability, which reveals a predetermined confidence of achieving a successful interception.

For an agency which has struggled to successfully complete development of many projects envisaged by the Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme (IGMDP), the DRDO's claims of achieving interception capabilities in the initial phases of BMD development raises many eyebrows. The agency is supposedly developing interception technologies for a two-tier architecture where medium-range missiles could be intercepted outside the Earth's atmosphere by the PADE, while shorter range missiles would be intercepted at 20-40 kms over the protected area, well within Earth's atmosphere by the endo-atmospheric interception system called the Advanced Air Defence (AAD). These systems if successfully deployed in a nationwide layered architecture could be able to tackle short-, medium- and intermediate-range airborne threats.

The first experiment conducted last year was claimed to have achieved an exo-atmospheric interception - a rare achievement if true, as even advanced countries have struggled for years to achieve precision interception in initial attempts. Classified for the lower exo-atmosphere, the PADE, when successfully developed, might be able to match the capabilities of advanced systems like the THAAD (Theatre High Altitude Area Defence) or the Arrow-II, both of which operate at the threshold of Earth's atmosphere. While the Arrow II, Patriot (PAC-3) and Standard Missile-3 of the U.S. and the Russian S-300 and S-400 are the only systems currently operationalised for upper endo-atmospheric and lower exo-atmospheric interception, the THAAD system is still undergoing development - after 6 failures and 3 successful intercepts.

Most of these systems, including the U.S. Ground-Based Mid-Course Defence System (GBMDS) for mid-course interception, which had only 6 successful intercepts out of 11, are limping towards technological maturity after years of development failures and Congressional insinuations, resulting in major budgetary cuts. Like its counterparts in U.S., the DRDO had undertaken last year's PADE test under controlled conditions, which might not resemble an actual battlefield environment including use of counter-measures. Above all, precision interception has been a major stumble for India's air/theatre defence projects like the Akash and Trishul, which are still under development nearly two decades after initial design. Hence, achieving interception in the first few attempts creates astonishment as even offensive systems like Prithvi and Agni had struggled for years to achieve successful launches.
The Indian BMD experimentations, which surfaced last year through the PADE test, was warranted by the reluctance of countries like U.S. and Russia to grant systems like the Arrow and S-400 for India's BMD plans. Washington had offered the lower-tier PAC-3 while Russia was willing to share the S-300 system, which is an advanced air defence system with limited BMD capability. Though India could have benefited from these systems to close the gap created by Akash's procrastination, we still need reliable upper-tier systems to tackle medium and interim range missiles from the neighbourhood. The PADE and the AAD, once successfully developed, could satiate India's requirements for upper endo-atmospheric and lower exo-atmospheric interception. For, a comprehensive missile defence shield should always strive to intercept and destroy the incoming threat as farther out in order to pre-empt an enemy attack as well as ensure minimal collateral damage to the protected area if the incoming projectile carries a nuclear warhead.

While the DRDO strives to achieve upper-tier interception, focus should also be drawn on the state of lower-tier air defence systems like the Akash and Trishul. Though these systems are said to be in final development stages, their future is uncertain as the armed forces are known to have lost interest on them and are exploring foreign acquisitions for lower-tier air/theatre defence applications. In fact, the government reportedly cleared an Indo-Israel joint venture for a Medium Range Surface-to-Air Missile with 70-km range, which would presumably replace the Akash. The Navy has signed up with Israeli companies to produce the Barak system to chip in for the Trishul. The Army, for its part, is planning to acquire short-range Quick Reaction SAMs to replace the OSA-AK, while the Air Force is eager to supplant the Pechoras with the Aster or Spyder systems. Though the DRDO has termed its BMD programmes as air defence experimentations, it should realise that the air defence spectrum needs stronger emphasis and cannot be merely addressed by upper endo- or exo-atmospheric systems. A comprehensive shield should be an all-inclusive architecture which can tackle all airborne threats.

The DRDO has also declared intentions to attempt mid-course interception. An ambitious goal considering that even the U.S. is struggling for years on mid-course technologies. While preparing for the laurels of another 'successful' interception, the agency should spare a thought for the monetary resources and time spent on undelivered projects of the IGMDP, especially when the AAD would gobble hundreds of crores for achieving a technological capability on which DRDO has already expended a fortune. While planning for future programmes, the agency has to consider assimilating technological inputs from external sources so as to compensate for the lost years.

The writer is Associate Fellow at IDSA, Delhi.



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