Faced with the choice of being a president bound by the constitution and being a chief of the army ruling by diktat, Musharraf chose khaki and force. His coup announcement is titled "Proclamation of Emergency declared by Chief of the Army Staff General Pervez Musharraf" and ends "I hereby order and proclaim that the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan shall remain in abeyance".

Musharraf complained in particular that Pakistan's courts, and especially the Supreme Court, were subverting the administration. His proclamation claims that the court's "constant interference in executive functions, including but not limited to the control of terrorist activity, economic policy, price controls, downsizing of corporations and urban planning, has weakened the writ of the government". It laments "the humiliating treatment meted to government officials by some members of the judiciary on a routine basis during court proceedings".

A particular concern was the Supreme Court taking up the cases of the hundreds of people picked up in recent years by law-enforcement agencies without warrants and held in custody, without charge or trial. The demands for due process and habeas corpus proved fruitless as officials simply lied to the courts about the people they were holding.

General Musharraf has also claimed that the courts are hampering his efforts to stem the Islamic militancy in the tribal areas, the creeping Talibanisation of NWFP and the suicide bombings that have erupted across major cities over the past few years. But the courts have only insisted on the rule of law. Musharraf's failure to effectively counter the militancy springs from more other causes. The most important problem has been the military regime itself and its policies towards the Islamic political parties and militants. In need of some kind of political cover after seizing power in 1999, Musharraf and his generals cobbled together an alliance of opportunistic politicians, defectors from other parties and the Islamist political parties. This military-mullah alliance in Pakistan stretches back over 30 years, and was central in the US-backed jihad against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan of the 1980s and the Kashmir insurgency of the 1990s.

Militant groups are grudgingly banned in public and privately allowed to operate. Whether is in the tribal areas of Waziristan or the militant takeover of Lal Masjid in the heart of Islamabad, Musharraf and his generals preferred to ignore it, and then make concessions to the militants in the vain hope that the problem would go away. The government has responded to the militancy only when domestic and international demands do something became overwhelming. But instead of a legal, politically measured, and thought-out response that is part of a long-term policy to counter the militancy, Musharraf and his generals have responded time and again with a spasm. They unleash a dramatic show of force including artillery, helicopter gun ships and air strikes, which inevitably result in large numbers of civilian deaths and injuries, inflame public opinion, and stoke the militancy.

At the heart of Musharraf's second coup is not an activist court, illegal detentions or the militancy but rather its willingness to hear a legal challenge to Musharraf's role as both chief of army staff and president of the republic. Pakistan's Constitution explicitly forbids holding both positions. A showdown was imminent. It has been claimed that a Supreme Court judge told the government or was overheard that the court was set to rule against Musharraf. Musharraf ended this threat by removing the chief justice and most of the rest of the Supreme Court.

The target of the coup is also obvious from the list of those who have been the first to be detained in the police raids: leaders of the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, prominent lawyers, and pro-democracy activists. The goal is clearly to prevent a movement for democracy and rule of law that could confront General Musharraf and the larger structure of army rule in Pakistan.

Protests have started across the country, led by lawyers and civil society groups. They have been met with teargas and brute force. Thousands are reported to have been arrested. It is likely to be a determined campaign, building on the experience of the mobilization earlier this year. But Pakistan's civil society, while heroic, is fragile. It is poorly equipped for a long and difficult struggle against a military regime. Central to any prospect of success will be the PPP and the PML-N.

With the government is at odds with the people, the police being tasked to crush pro-democracy activists, and chaos in the streets, the Islamic militants may try and take advantage of the unrest. They have already spread their influence far beyond the tribal and border areas and now control three major towns in the Swat valley, a few hours drive from Islamabad. Government forces simply surrendered and handed over their weapons. Pakistani flags have been replaced by jihadi banners on public buildings. Across the country, there have been attacks on soldiers and police. Washington was alerted to the coup in advance. Admiral William Fallon, the head of US forces in the Middle East met General Musharraf in Islamabad the day before the coup and is reported to have warned Musharraf about declaring an emergency. According to The New York Times, administration officials said "General Musharraf had been offering private assurances that any emergency declaration would be short-lived".

The Bush administration's response has been predictable thus far. In the crucial first few days after the coup there had been no phone calls from President George W. Bush or other leading US officials demanding an immediate end to the martial law. Islamabad expected, rightly it turns out, that Washington would wring its hands, offer platitudes about restoring democracy, perhaps a token slap on the wrist, and keep on supporting General Musharraf. When President Bush did call, he told General Musharraf that "you ought to have elections soon".

Washington has invested heavily in General Musharraf and will not want to write this off. Since September 11, 2001, the US has given enormous political and diplomatic support and over $10 billion to Pakistan to buy General Musharraf's support for its "war on terror". It is a doomed policy. The US has supported all of Pakistan's military dictators, politically and with guns and money, starting as long ago as 1958. In the 50 years since then, it has failed to learn that supporting Pakistan's generals and the army they command does little for Pakistan's people. Under American tutelage, the army has grown in size and developed a fierce appetite for high-tech expensive weapons, which now include nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, and a habit of seizing power while people continue to struggle with grinding poverty and failing institutions.

No wonder that the US is deeply unpopular in Pakistan. A 2007 poll found that only 15 per cent of Pakistanis had a favourable attitude towards America. This hostility will only worsen as Pakistanis see it set aside democracy and the rule of law in favour of a general and his army. To get out of this crisis, the international community must demand that General Musharraf immediately end his emergency, restore the Constitution and Supreme Court, and fulfil his commitment to step down as chief of army staff. Having lost what little trust was vested in him by the country, Musharraf should also stand down as president as well. An interim administration could hold elections and let Pakistanis choose lawful leaders.

No one expects elections and a shift to civilian rule to be a panacea. And though Pakistanis have had bitter experiences with democracy, they still prefer it to the army. Elections can mark the start of the long and difficult task of building democratic institutions and creating a system of accountability and trust between government and people, state and society.

Zia Mian directs the Project on Peace and Security in South Asia at Princeton University's Programme on Science and Global Security. A H Nayyar is the Executive Director of Developments in Literacy, a non-profit group supporting education for the poor in Pakistan. This article has been adapted from a longer version that originally appeared in Foreign Policy in Focus.