The events in Pakistan seem to be acquiring a dynamics of their own. Much depends on the nature of the security operation in the Lal Masjid, and the casualties. The storming of the mosque by troops is a defining moment.

The Pakistani security establishment is taking on erstwhile allies and the army is being called upon to shoot at civilians. As former foreign secretary Tanvir Ahmed Khan put it, the mosque's leaders have a 'history of links to the intelligence establishment, and have often been used to destabilise liberal and secular governments in the past'.

There are several fault lines in the emergent politico-security situation. First and foremost, the government has a lot to explain. Observers suggest that the government connived with the militants in the Lal Masjid over the past six months, and orchestrated this crisis with a view to disorienting the opposition and occupying high ground in the political contests looming ahead.

Tensions in the Lal Masjid have been "waxing and waning", says Khan, with the lawyers' movement. The crisis has thrown Pakistani Opposition into disarray. Benazir Bhutto and Maulana Fazlur Rahman didn't attend the all-party meet in London last Sunday, convened at the initiative of Nawaz Sharif. The Bhutto-Sharif rift is coming back.

The United States, China and Britain have expressed strong support for Musharraf, which strengthen his political standing. The Chinese foreign ministry spokesman in Beijing emphasised that, "As a friendly neighbour of Pakistan, China backs Pakistan's measures to safeguard social stability and economic development."

But what matters at the end of the day will be the extent of backlash, if any, by the 'jihadi' elements within Pakistan. So far it has been limited; it's too early to be sure.

Pakistan has about 7,000 madrassas with approximately 1.8 million students. They have been watching these events. Religious parties have also kept a distance. But even if there is no backlash, the perception will grow that Musharraf is acting to please Washington. That will make the task of security operations even more difficult in the tribal areas.

The developments have already generated turmoil in the North-West Frontier Province and other tribal bastions. A rally was held in the northwest region of Bajaur protesting against Musharraf and US policies. There are reports that the government is preparing for large-scale military operations in the North Waziristan tribal area, and that an army division has been dispatched to Swat valley.

Significantly, US Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte openly assured Islamabad that Washington was willing to support it "in any way we can". The question is, with Pakistani security forces so occupied, whether North Atlantic Treaty

Organisation (NATO) forces in Afghanistan would extend operations inside Pakistan as well - something Washington has demanded. NATO involvement in the Pak-Afghan border region can be projected as a coordinated move. But given the robust 'anti-Americanism' within Pakistan, there is bound to be sensitivity.

Against the backdrop of the acute security situation, especially if there is large-scale bloodshed in the Lal Masjid crisis, the probability cannot be ruled out that Musharraf may resort to emergency rule which entails postponement of elections. Indeed, a flashpoint is coming - soon Musharraf will have to decide whether to continue or quit as army chief.

Musharraf can count on Washington's support as restoration of democracy is not a priority for the US right now. Any readiness on Musharraf's part to crack down on the Taliban and Al-Qaeda will be a matter of satisfaction for Washington, which realises that even if Pakistan is under a democratically elected government, the army has to deliver on the 'war on terror'.

And Musharraf appears to command army support. In the Lal Masjid operations, despite taking serious casualties, the troops acquitted themselves as a disciplined force under a chain of command.

The US administration's dependence on Pakistan is only increasing. It will be a horrible legacy for the present US administration if it loses two wars in a row. The paradox is the certainty that the US forces will remain in Afghanistan for several years is to be juxtaposed with the ground reality that the US is not winning the war.

The writer is a retired Indian diplomat formerly posted in Islamabad