In the winter of December, when DRDO showcases to the world a new range of 'indigenously' developed ballistic missile defence (BMD) systems and announces plans for an ICBM interceptor to be developed in 5-7 years, it could certainly sent shivers to people like Henry Obering, chief of the U.S. Missile Defence Agency. For, Obering's team have been struggling in the past two decades to achieve mid-course interception outside Earth's atmosphere to destroy prospective ICBMs fired by Russia or long-rangers from North Korea and Iran.

After the termination of Reagan's Star Wars, the national missile defence project was revived by President Clinton to develop a multi-tier architecture to intercept missiles at boost, mid-course and terminal stages of flight. Various systems were planned for the three tiers which included the Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC-3) for terminal phase, Theatre High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) and Arrow II for upper endo-atmosphere; the Ground-Based Mid-Course Defence (GBMDS); and the Aegis and Airborne Laser (ABL) for boost phase. Other than the PAC-3, Aegis and Arrow, most other systems are yet to be deployed after development troubles led to Congressional insinuations and budgetary cuts. The GBMDS, which is to be deployed in East Europe, was nearly aborted after 4-5 test failures. After a redesign, the system achieved around 6 successful intercepts in 11 tests, that too in 'controlled' conditions. After years of strenuous testing and integration, most of these systems are struggling to achieve technological maturity.

In this context, the successes claimed by the DRDO for its BMD programmes certainly evoke interest. When even offensive missiles like Prithvi and Agni underwent many test failures before being deployed, two successful interceptions by DRDO's BMD - the Prithvi Air Defence (PAD) and Advanced Air Defence (AAD) - certainly bring surprise. Like its counterparts in U.S., these tests were made under controlled conditions, which do not resemble actual battlefield environment including use of counter-measures. Above all, precision interception has been a major stumble for India's air/theatre defence projects like Akash and Trishul, which are under development nearly two decades after initial design.

Though the PAD system, with its exo-atmospheric capability, could be vital for India's BMD planning, the role of AAD needs further scrutiny. What the AAD intends to achieve was something designated to be achieved by the Akash. DRDO officials had claimed that the AAD had intercepted a missile at 15 km endo-atmospheric (within Earth's atmosphere) range, which was also the intended range for the Akash. The Cabinet Committee on Security had recently cleared a joint-venture with Israel for a Medium-Range Surface-to-Air Missile (MR-SAM) with a 70-km range in order to match the PAC-3. A leading defence magazine had reported that the MR-SAM might replace the Akash as the armed forces had asked for a revised range of 50km+, which the DRDO was unable to meet. So then, is the Akash system dead or is it being masqueraded as the AAD?
Hundreds of crores have been spent on the Akash and Trishul, the two air defence projects of the Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme (IGMDP) launched in 1980s. While the status of Akash is still ambiguous, the Trishul was aborted due to consecutive test failures and then revived after a political decision in 2006. In the absence of the Trishul, the Navy was forced to buy the Israeli Barak, while the Army plans to acquire the Quick Reaction Surface-to-Air Missiles (QRSAM) to chip in for the Trishul. Similarly, the Air Force is seeking the Israeli Spyder to replace the Pechora system, which was actually intended to be supplanted by Akash. When the armed forces are forced to opt for off-the-shelf purchases as 'indigenous' systems fail to meet timelines, can the country then trust DRDO's current optimism on BMD projects?

Our BMD experimentations were warranted by the missile nexus between China and Pakistan in the 1990s. India had then approached Washington for the Arrow, but was in turn offered the PAC-3, while Russia was ready to share the S-300. Though India could have benefited from these systems to close the gap created by Akash, there was a need for upper-tier systems to tackle medium-range missiles from China, which the PADE could meet if successfully developed. For, a comprehensive missile defence shield should always strive to destroy the incoming threat as farther out in order to pre-empt an attack and ensure minimal collateral damage to the protected area, especially if the projectile is nuclear-armed. When DRDO prepares the PAD to meet this threat, it should note the Chinese capabilities in MIRV and decoys, and also appreciate the fact that a 48-km interception would be insufficient for world-class exo-atmospheric interceptor.

While declaring its aspiration to develop BMD systems to intercept ICBMs, the DRDO should also spare a thought for the years put in by U.S. and Russian scientists to develop mid-course systems. DRDO should also realise that India currently does not face an ICBM threat. Rather, the threat from the neighbourhood is from medium- range missiles, which the PADE should be capable to intercept. If not, then there are better choices for our armed forces.

The writer is with IDSA, Delhi. Views expressed here are personal.