A significant political development recently occurred in Kabul under the radar of almost every international news outlet. March 12 marked the public birth of a political group so powerful its very essence dampens the future outlook of Afghanistan’s national security. It is called Jabhe-ye-Motahed-e-Milli, or the United National Front (UNF), and comprises a potpourri of former Mujahideen leaders, Warlords and ex-Communist strongmen.

Some of the power brokers that made up the government or who fought against it during the destructive years of 1992-95, which resulted in 25,000 Kabulis dying in the ensuing rocket onslaught, make up this group.

The initial March 12 press conference detailing the formation of the group includes the following members: former Commerce Minister Sayed Mustafa Kazimi, former president Burhanuddin Rabbani, speaker of the lower house Younus Qanuni, Minister for Energy and Water Ismail Khan, communist-era Minister (Sayed) Mohammad Gulabzoy, and military aide to President Hamid Karzai Rashid Dostum. Former communist party leader turned MP Noor-ul-Haq Ulumi was added to the list in a separate recent announcement. [Since this article was published, First Vice President Zia Mas’ud, former Afghan Defense Minister Marshal Mohammad Qasim Fahim and Mustafa Zahir, the grandson of Afghanistan’s former king, have also announced their participation in the UNF's ranks.]

A number of of these individuals formerly served together in the disastrous government of the early 1990’s, committed grave war atrocities against civilians and have all fought each other at least once. When this reporter recently asked regional expert Syed Saleem Shahzad whether this unsavory rogue’s gallery poses a security threat to the current administration he answered, “Of course it is. There are old traditions in Afghan society to switch sides and sometimes the alliances are very odd. One should recall that Jamiat-e-Islami Afghanistan (Rabbani) and Massoud were once ally of the Taliban against Hekmetyar when the Taliban movement emerged.” Most of the core members had numerous chances to redeem themselves, reform and fulfill promises and failed each time; giving observers and analysts no choice but to doubt the sincerity of this new alliance.

Reasons for worry

The UNF has established a list of public goals it wishes to accomplish: continuing to work on bringing ‘true democracy’ to Afghanistan, representing Afghans across ethnic and regional boundaries, changing the working procedure of Parliament and the method of appointing Governors and attorneys. Member Sayed Gulabzoy recently said in an interview with IWPR, “We want to change the constitution, change the form of government from presidential to parliamentary, and have direct elections for mayors and governors.” Obviously such a change allowing direct elections for local governors will only serve to reinstall these Warlords over their respective regions. Whatever the UNF’s public disclosures may be, they should certainly be taken at face value. A closer look at the formation of this group and what lurks under the surface is surely warranted. Although no single point can be identified as the sole catalyst for such a political mutation, a combination of three highly likely reasons comes to bear.

One such rationalization is the high resentment factor held by these politicians after systematically being marginalized by the current administration. Despite the hard work of nearly five years, the Karzai administration’s efforts to effectively ostracize and thwart warlordism essentially ended overnight with the creation of this group. Although Karzai struggled to reel in these powerful political relics by giving them staff positions in Kabul, each still holds a degree of sway over their former fiefdoms. For example, Ismail Khan still runs Herat TV and the largest daily newspaper in the western provinces called Ittifaq-e Islam. Dostum literally owns and runs a TV channel out of one of his residences in Mazar-i-Sharif called Aina (Mirror) Television. It is broadcast in several provinces throughout the north where he still enjoys a great following.

A second characteristic brining these men together is their adamant support of a law that disallows the state to independently prosecute people for war crimes committed during the last three decades. Rabbani’s Jamiat and many of its sub-commanders, Dostum, and Ismail Khan have all been cited by the US Human Rights Watch Group as serious offenders. Rabbani and his Jamiat faction led the notorious ‘Afshar Operation’ against ethnic Hazara forces occupying the Ahshar Mountain in February of 1993. Battlefield results include attacks on the civilian population and civilian objects, killings, torture and other inhumane treatment, rape, abductions and forced disappearances, forced labor, and pillage and looting, all of which is documented. This led to the eventual explosion of violence in eastern Kabul the following year in which tens of thousands of civilians died. Dostum’s list of abuses is also illustrious with well documented cases of killing, looting and torturing. During the Najibullah regime he led the Jowzjani militia, an Uzbek Communist unit that nearly destroyed the Kandahar hospital and looted everything in sight. Such behavior eventually garnered Dostum and his men the name Gilam-Jam, which loosely means 'carpet snatchers.’ They earned this moniker by habitually looting everything they could, even the carpet off the floor.

Finally, with last year’s startling resurgence of Taliban military activity severely disrupting stability and reconstruction throughout the south and east, the formation of a group like the UNF gives the remaining anti-Taliban commanders some legitimacy, if not leverage, to deal with the eventuality of advancing Taliban forces. This is one point most concerning to observers and analysts. These political leaders of various factions are concocting a Plan B, a political fire escape from the impending power collapse in Kabul. Knowing full well that the Taliban in the near future may have to be bargained with, as they did in their rise to power in the mid 1990’s, the former warlords have preemptively created a negotiating committee.

Such a committee would be necessary then, near or after the disintegration of the current administration, to dole out a power sharing agreement between the Taliban and non-Taliban entities. An even higher likelihood is that a pre-negotiation ceasefire with the Taliban could take place before the collapse and essentially concede the southern provinces to the Taliban. In such a deal, analysts predict the UNF would likely carve out their respected fiefdoms; reinstalling the former warlords as governors and possibly leave a Panjshiri government apparatus led by Qanuni and Rabbani in Kabul. Although such a scenario seems far fetched with the current deployment of international troops under NATO’s command, consider last week’s audacious attack on a district headquarters in Wardak, suicide bombings in Laghman and the recent bombings in Kabul. Such incidents effectively generate anxiety as the Taliban’s tentacles creep ever close, constricting Kabul’s security situation like an anaconda. The last ominous sign may be the recent rumors indicating members of Rabbani’s entourage set up talks with the Taliban movement, about what however, can only be speculated.

Jamiat core

The true heart beat of the UNF seems to be its Jamiat base with Rabbani and Qanuni reunited under one umbrella. Rabbani, surely the most disgruntled, has suffered politically since 2002 by the hand of Karzai. Carrying such a burden since his failed presidency in the 1990’s, Rabbani surely remains power hungry and ambitious. He likely sees the Taliban’s strength in the south and east as an opportunity for him to once again serve as the vanguard of the north; protecting northern Tajiks from marauding Taliban forces (the northeastern region where Rabbani support runs deep is the only area never to be occupied by Taliban forces). His reluctance to step down from his faltering presidency in the 1990’s speaks loudly of the man and is the butt of many political jokes inside of Afghanistan. Syed Haider Akbar mentions a tale about a local Afghan poet in his book Come Back to Afghanistan, who once wrote a verse regarding Rabbani’s reluctance and centers on the piece of furniture he sat on each day of his term. My beloved chair. I’ve worked so hard for you. I’ve fought jihad for you. My beloved chair, I’ll take you to the mountains of Badakshan. I’ll take you everywhere.

By biding his time and forming such a powerful allegiance, he and Qanuni have a chance to finally lead the government they always wanted. It is appropriate to note that Qanuni was the only serious contender against Karzai in the 2004 election as he garnered second place with over 1.3 million votes and enjoys a strong following.

Conclusion

Such illogical alliances and side-switching behavior is very typical amongst Afghan politicians and embodies the modern Afghan political assembly altogether. This time however, may indeed shift the balance of democracy helmed by Karzai into a repeat of early 1990’s bloodletting. Reeling from decades of war and destruction comparable to an atomic blast, Afghan society is now faced with a combined political party that meshes most of those responsible for such misery under one umbrella. It took nearly five years for the Karzai administration to slowly marginalize, although still incorporate, most these political figures into the current administration. The abhorrent and self-serving, behavior of nearly every key member of the United National Front cannot be dismissed or overlooked. Without facing punishment for past abuses, such men and political groups will only be emboldened to continue such objectionable acts; leaving the public’s desire for government legitimacy, accountability and quest for justice unfulfilled.